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Abstract
Improving road safety and traffic efficiency has been a long-term endeavor for the gov-
ernment, automobile industry and academia. Recently, the U.S. Federal Communication
Commission (FCC) has allocated a 75 MHz spectrum at 5.9 GHz for vehicular communi-
cations, opening a new door to combat the road fatalities by letting vehicles communicate
to each other on the roads. Those communicating vehicles form a huge Ad Hoc Network,
namely Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET). In VANETs, a variety of applications ranging
from the safety related (e.g. emergence report, collision warning) to the non-safety related
(e.g., delay tolerant network, infortainment sharing) are enabled by vehicle-to-vehicle (V-2-
V) and vehicle-to-roadside (V-2-I) communications. However, the flourish of VANETs still
hinges on fully understanding and managing the challenging issues over which the public
show concern, particularly, security and privacy preservation issues. If the traffic related
messages are not authenticated and integrity-protected in VANETs, a single bogus and/or
malicious message can potentially incur a terrible traffic accident. In addition, considering
VANET is usually implemented in civilian scenarios where locations of vehicles are closely
related to drivers, VANET cannot be widely accepted by the public if VANET discloses
the privacy information of the drivers, i.e., identity privacy and location privacy. There-
fore, security and privacy preservation must be well addressed prior to its wide acceptance.
Over the past years, much research has been done on considering VANET’s unique char-
acteristics and addressed some security and privacy issues in VANETs; however, little of
it has taken the social characteristics of VANET into consideration. In VANETs, vehicles
are usually driven in a city environment, and thus we can envision that the mobility of
vehicles directly reflects drivers’ social preferences and daily tasks, for example, the places
where they usually go for shopping or work. Due to these human factors in VANETs, not
only the safety related applications but also the non-safety related applications will have
some social characteristics.
In this thesis, we emphasize VANET’s social characteristics and introduce the concept
of vehicular social network (VSN), where both the safety and non-safety related appli-
cations in VANETs are influenced by human factors including human mobility, human
self-interest status, and human preferences. In particular, we carry on research on vehicu-
lar delay tolerant networks and infortainment sharing — two important non-safety related
applications of VSN, and address the challenging security and privacy issues related to
them. The main contributions are, i) taking the human mobility into consideration, we
first propose a novel social based privacy-preserving packet forwarding protocol, called
SPRING, for vehicular delay tolerant network, which is characterized by deploying road-
side units (RSUs) at high social intersections to assist in packet forwarding. With the help
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of high-social RSUs, the probability of packet drop is dramatically reduced and as a result
high reliability of packet forwarding in vehicular delay tolerant network can be achieved.
In addition, the SPRING protocol also achieves conditional privacy preservation and resist
most attacks facing vehicular delay tolerant network, such as packet analysis attack, packet
tracing attack, and black (grey) hole attacks. Furthermore, based on the “Sacrificing the
Plum Tree for the Peach Tree” — one of the Thirty-Six Strategies of Ancient China, we
also propose a socialspot-based packet forwarding (SPF) protocol for protecting receiver-
location privacy, and present an effective pseudonyms changing at social spots strategy,
called PCS, to facilitate vehicles to achieve high-level location privacy in vehicular social
network; ii) to protect the human factor — interest preference privacy in vehicular social
networks, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving protocol, called FLIP, for vehicles to
find like-mined ones on the road, which allows two vehicles sharing the common interest
to identify each other and establish a shared session key, and at the same time, protects
their interest privacy (IP) from other vehicles who do not share the same interest on the
road. To generalize the FLIP protocol, we also propose a lightweight privacy-preserving
scalar product computation (PPSPC) protocol, which, compared with the previously re-
ported PPSPC protocols, is more efficient in terms of computation and communication
overheads; and iii) to deal with the human factor – self-interest issue in vehicular delay
tolerant network, we propose a practical incentive protocol, called Pi, to stimulate self-
interest vehicles to cooperate in forwarding bundle packets. Through the adoption of the
proper incentive policies, the proposed Pi protocol can not only improve the whole vehicle
delay tolerant network’s performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low average delay,
but also achieve the fairness among vehicles.
The research results of the thesis should be useful to the implementation of secure and
privacy-preserving vehicular social networks.
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With the advancement and pervasiveness of wireless communication technologies, it is
envisioned that vehicles can communicate with each other as well as with the roadside in-
frastructure located at some critical sections of the road. With the wireless communication
devices equipped in vehicles (also known as On-Board Units (OBUs)) and the Roadside
Units (RSUs), a self-organized network can be formed, which is called a Vehicular Ad
Hoc Network (VANET). Due to various envisioned vehicle safety application scenarios and
emerging service demands, VANETs have attracted extensive attentions from all aspects
of governments, car manufacture industry, and research community [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Exten-
sive lists of potential applications are compiled and assessed by the various projects and
consortia. Typically, applications are categorized as safety related and non-safety related
[6]. Examples for each category are: 1) Cooperative forward collision warning, namely, to
avoid rear-end collisions; traffic light optimal speed advisory, namely, to assist the driver to
arrive during a green phase; 2) Mobile peer-to-peer network, namely, to share interesting
multimedia files; or other value-added services.
However, before the VANET applications can be put into commercial product lines
and start to serve our lives, security and privacy preservation issues must be well tackled
[7, 8, 9]. This is not only because vehicles/drivers may not be willing to expose their
identities and their corresponding location information to the public, but also because that
any misbehavior of a vehicle in a VANET, such as launching a single bogus and malicious
traffic related message, could potentially lead to a serious traffic accident. In order to
protect the integrity and authenticity of the message, message authentication code (MAC)
and digital signature technologies, such as RAISE [10], have provided efficient methods,
which prevent an adversary from tampering messages in the middle. On the other hand,
in order to provide conditional privacy preservation, some promising techniques, such as
1
GSIS, ECPP and others [11, 12, 13, 14], are suggested. Although these previously reported
schemes have utilized some unique characteristics of VANETs, another special feature of
VANETs — social characteristic, has not been well exploited, which may make previously
reported schemes unsuitable for some practical VANET applications. In this thesis, we
propose the concept of vehicular social network (VSN) in which the social characteristics
of VANETs are considered, and develop a suite of security and privacy-preserving solutions
to adapt to this promising network’s needs.













Figure 1.1: Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET)
The advancement and wide deployment of wireless communication technologies have
revolutionized our lifestyles by providing the best ever convenience and flexibility in access-
ing Internet services and various types of personal communication applications. Recently,
car manufactories and telecommunication industries have geared up to equip every car
with the technology that allows drivers and passengers from different cars to communicate
with each other in order to improve the driving experience. By using those communica-
tion devices equipped in vehicles, also known as onboard units (OBUs), the vehicles can
communicate with each other, as well as with roadside units (RSUs) located at the critical
points on the road, such as a traffic light at a road intersection. With the OBUs and the
RSUs, a self-organized network can be formed, which is called a vehicular ad hoc network
(VANET), as shown in Fig. 1.1. Due to low cost and easy deployment of wireless technol-
ogy in the near future, the roadside will be expected to be densely covered with a variety
of RSUs, like traffic lights, traffic signs, and wireless routers, which will provide wireless
access to vehicles on the road. In addition, the RSUs could be connected to the Inter-
net backbone to support diversified services, such as transmission control protocols and
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real-time multimedia streaming applications [15]. Thus, an increasing interest has been
enhanced by both industry and academia in the applications of roadside-to-vehicle com-
munication and intervehicle communication (IVC), aiming to improve the driving safety
and traffic management and also provide drivers and passengers with Internet access.
1.1.1 Characteristics of VANETs
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) is a special case of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
[16, 17], where the mobile nodes are instantiated with vehicles equipped with OBU commu-
nication devices, as shown in Fig. 1.2. Therefore, VANETs have some unique characteristics




Figure 1.2: The relation between VANET and MANET
1. Rapid change in topology: Since vehicles are moving at high speeds, the topology
of VANETs is prone to frequent and rapid changes, and usually follows the freeway,
Manhattan, streets in real world.
2. No power constraint: Since the batteris of the vehicles are self-charging, vehicles in
VANET do not have the conventional power constraints of the hand-held devices in
MANETs.
3. Large scale: VANETs constitute the largest instance of MANETs that the world
have ever seen, where the order of the number of vehicles is around 107 in reality.
4. Variable network density: The number of vehicles in one area of the road is temporally
changing during the day, e.g., roads in the rush hours are busier than other times of
the day.
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5. High predictable mobility: The velocity of vehicles in cities ranges from 0 to 60 km/h,
and the average velocity can reach up to 100 km/h on a highway. Therefore, the road
geometric topology regulates the mobility of vehicles.
In summary, we use Table 1.1 to give a brief comparison between VANET and MANET
in terms of topology, architecture, connectivity, resource, scalability and application.
Table 1.1: Comparisons between VANET and MANET
VANET MANET
Topology Freeway, Manhattan, Streets in real world Random waypoint
Architecture Vehicle-to-vehicle, Vehicle-to-RSU Node-to-node
Connectivity Random and Intermittent Random
Resource Almost unlimited Limited hardware, Power limited by bat-
tery
Scalability Huge 50-100 nodes
Application Safety, traffic, payment, electronic toll col-
lection (daily life)
Military, disaster (specific)
1.1.2 Applications of VANETs
VANET applications can be divided into two major categories. Applications that increase
vehicle safety on the roads are called safety related applications. Applications that pro-
vide value-added services, for example, entertainment, vehicular delay tolerant networks
(DTNs), are called non-safety related applications [19, 3, 15].
Safety related applications
Safety related applications can decrease the number of road accidents significantly . Ac-
cording to some studies [20], 60 percent of accidents could be avoided if a driver were
provided with a warning half a second before the moment of collision. There are three
major scenarios in which safety applications could be very useful [3].
1. Accidents: When vehicles travel at a high speed on major roads,drivers have very
little time to react when a vehicle in front of them make an unexpected move. If
an accident occurs, the approaching vehicles often crash before they can a stop.
Safety related applications of VANET could be used to warn cars of an accident
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that occurred further along the road, thus preventing a pile-up from occurring. In
addition, a safety related application could also be used to provide drivers with early
warnings and prevent an accident from happening in the first place.
2. Intersections: In reality, driving near and through intersections is one of the most
complex challenges that drivers face because when two or more traffic flows intersect,
and the possibility of collisions is high. In 2003, according to the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DoT), intersection crashes accounted for more than 45 percent
of all reported crashes and 21 percent of fatalities, that is, 9213 fatalities occurred
at intersections in the United States [21]. The number of accidents would be re-
duced if a safety related application of VANET warned the driver of an impending
collision. The driver then could take action to avoid it (see the European project
PReVENT/Intersafe [22] for more details).
3. Road Congestion: Safety related applications also could be used to provide drivers
with the best routes to their destinations [23]. This would decrease congestion on
the road and maintain a smooth flow of traffic, thus increasing the capacity of the
roads and preventing traffic jams. It also could have the indirect effect of reducing
traffic accidents because drivers would feel less frustrated and more inclined to follow
traffic regulations.
Non-safety related applications
Non-safety related applications can provide road users with information, advertisements,
and entertainment during their journey. Three basic non-safety related applications are
described as follows [3].
1. Internet Connectivity: Constant Internet access has become a daily requirement for
many of us, and since many user applications also require Internet connectivity, pro-
viding this facility to vehicle occupants and other VANET applications are important.
Moreover, this means that the usual business framework will be presented seamlessly
in vehicles, without a requirement for specific redevelopment.
2. Peer-to-Peer Applications: To alleviate boredom, peer-to-peer applications are also
interesting ideas for VANETs. Passengers in the vehicles could share music, movies,
and so on, and chat with each other and play games. They could also stream music
or movies from special servers during long journeys.
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3. Vehicular DTNs: In vehicular DTNs, each DTN node is instantiated by vehicle
driven by people running in a city environment to cooperatively relay messages in an
opportunistic fashion [24].
1.1.3 Security Threats
The adoption of a variant of the widely deployed IEEE 802.11 protocol by the vehicle
manufacturers makes the attacker’s task easier in VANETs, and the VANET could be a
double-edged sword if the security concern is not well addressed. In general, the security
threats in VANETs can be classified into the following categories [19, 7, 15, 1, 25, 2, 26].
1. Jamming: An attacker deliberately generates a huge of bogus messages to jam the
communication channel so that preventing other vehicles form normal communica-
tions.
2. Forgery: For malevolent goals, an attacker can launch forgery attack, which could
potentially cause the accidents. Therefore, the freshness and correctness of the trans-
mitted messages in V-2-V communication are very important to ensure that the
received messages are not forged.
3. In-transit traffic tampering: In this attack, an attacker deliberately delays, drops,
corrupts, or modifies messages to damage the normal V-2-V communications.
4. Impersonation: In this attack, an attacker aims to let others convince he/she is a
legitimate vehicle for his/her own benefits. For example, an attacker can claim that
he/she is an emergence vehicle to make other vehicles yield the road in front of
him/her.
5. Privacy violation: In VANETs, the collection of vehicle-specific information from
overheard vehicular communications will become particularly easy. Then, if an at-
tacker can collect enough messages from vehicles, the inferences on the drivers per-
sonal data could be made, and thus violate drivers’ privacy.
6. On-board tampering: Beyond abuse of the communication protocols, an attacker
may select to tinker with data (e.g., velocity, location, status of vehicle parts) at
their source, tampering with the on-board sensing and other hardware. For example,
an attacker can by-pass a sensor or put some ice around the sensor that senses
temperature to make the vehicle to send bogus warning of icy road.
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1.1.4 Security Requirements
In order to protect VANETs against the threats mentioned above, the security mechanisms
employed in VANETs should satisfy the following security requirements [19, 27, 6, 28, 2,
29, 30, 31]:
1. Authentication: Authentication is the ability to ascertain that a thing is indeed the
one that it claims to be. Message authentication is of vital importance in VANETs
because it ensures that a received message is indeed sent from a legitimate and
authorized vehicle in the networks.
2. Integrity: Integrity is the ability to assure that messages exchanged between vehicles
have not been subject to modifications, additions, or deletions. Integrity ensures that
all messages sent by vehicles should be delivered unaltered.
3. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is the ability to prevent an authorized vehicle
from denying the existence or contents of the message sent by itself. Non repudiation
is a critical property for VANETs because it can prevent an attacker from denying
the attacks that he/she have launched.
4. Access control: Access control is necessary to ensure reliable and secure operations of
a system. In VANETs, any misbehaving entity should be revoked from the network to
protect the safety of other legitimate entities in the network. Moreover, any actions
taken by that misbehaving entity should be canceled.
5. Privacy: Privacy is the ability to protect private information from an unauthorized
party. In VANETs, the real identity of any individual vehicle is only blind to other
vehicles and road side units, but should be transparent to a trusted authority (TA).
This security requirement is also called “conditional privacy preservation”. Cur-
rently, IEEE 802.11p [32] and IEEE 1609.x are called wireless access in vehicular
environments (WAVE) standards [33, 34] since their goal, as a whole, is to facilitate
the provision of wireless access in vehicular environments.
As shown in Table 1.2, WAVE [33, 34] develops a family of standards for vehicular
communications, including resource manager, service services, networking services, multi-
channel operation, architecture, communication manager, and facilities, where the IEEE
1609.2 standard mainly addresses the security issues in message processing in VANET.
However, as we know, the current version of IEEE 1609.2 standard has not provided
any mechanism to achieve privacy preservation in VANETs. Therefore, anonymous and
authenticated communication is still a challenging issue in VANETs.
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Table 1.2: Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE)
Standard document Protocols
IEEE 802.11p WAVE PHY and MAC Underdevelopment [32]
IEEE 1609.1 Resource Manager Trial-use standard Approved 15/09/06
IEEE 1609.2 Security Services Trial-use standard Approved 8/06/06
IEEE 1609.3 Network Services Trial-use standard Approved 23/03/07
IEEE 1609.4 Multi-Channel Operation Trial-use standard Approved 30/10/06
IEEE 1609.0 Architecture Underdevelopment
IEEE 1609.5 Communication Manager Underdevelopment
IEEE 1609.6 Facilities Underdevelopment
1.1.5 Related Work on Securing VANETs
In the following, we review some previously reported works concerning the security and
privacy preservation issues in VANETs [35, 36, 1, 37, 7, 38, 12, 39, 40, 14]. Security and
privacy issues on VANETs have attracted extensive attentions from both academia and
industry since 2004. J. Hubaux et al. [36, 1] first identify security and privacy issues of
VANETs by claiming that an appropriate public key infrastructure must be well devised
to protect the transmitted information and to do mutual authentication among network
entities. To address the privacy issue, they suggested to rely on temporary pseudonyms to
achieve anonymity.
The IEEE 1609.2 standard [35] is an IEEE trial-use standard for wireless access in ve-
hicular environments particularly for security services. It can be used to protect messages
from attacks such as spoofing, eavesdropping and alteration. Also, with this standard,
vehicles can send encrypted messages to each other or to roadside infrastructures. Never-
theless, as presented in the last section, the communication overhead caused by the security
mechanism is large. Although this standard mentions the necessity to respect the drivers’
privacy, such as not leaking personal, identifying, or linkable information to unauthorized
parties, it does not provide detailed approaches to achieve this privacy requirement.
To achieve both message authentication and anonymity, Raya et al. [37, 7] propose that
each vehicle should be pre-loaded with a large number of anonymous public and private key
pairs together with the corresponding public key certificates. All traffic related messages
are signed with a public key based scheme. To achieve privacy, each public and private
key pair is used in a short life time and a pseudo ID is used in each public key certificate.
Moreover, the authors computed a safe time interval, in which each vehicle should change
its pseudo ID at least once so that two consecutive pseudo IDs of the vehicle cannot be
linked by an adversary. Clearly, this scheme to protect privacy is straightforward and
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efficient. However, it requires a large storage capacity to store these security information
in each vehicle. Further more, on the side of the trust authority (TA), it should keep
the record of all pseudo IDs and their corresponding key pairs of all vehicles. This is not
only inconvenient for the TA to find the real identity of an abusing vehicle, but is also
inconvenient to manage these pseudo identities.
In order to overcome the weakness of the above issues, Lin et al. [12] developed a group
signature based scheme. With this scheme, vehicles do not require any identities at all.
All vehicles within the same group share the same public key, while their private keys are
different. When a vehicle receives a signed message, the vehicle verifies it with the group
public key. The verifier only knows whether the signer is a legitimate group member or not,
but the verifier does not know who the signer exactly is. In this way, the identity privacy
is well protected. In case that a dispute happens, TA working as the group manager is
capable to trace the real identity of the sender by using TA’s secret key. For example, a
group member (as an attacker) broadcasts a malicious bogus message with his/her group
private key. Notice that the signature of the message is valid, but the content is fake.
Suppose a neighbor of the attacker finds out that the message is bogus. The neighbor
reports the message along with the corresponding message signature to TA. The TA using
its private key can compute the private key of the attacker from the signed signature.
Then, by looking up the table in which a private key maps to a real world identity of
a user, eventually TA can trace the real identity of the attacker. The disadvantage of
the group signature based scheme lies on its inefficiency of revocation. If TA revokes a
private key of a vehicle, TA has to update the entire security keys of the whole group. The
key materials of all group members have to be renewed. In addition, although the group
signature based scheme achieves the conditional privacy preservation, the computational
cost of verifying a group signature is high, as compared with the traditional PKI based
signature scheme. Therefore, the group signature based scheme could result in a high
message loss ratio under a high traffic density scenario.
To alleviate the high computational overhead of the group signature based security
scheme, Calandriello et al. [39] introduce a hybrid scheme that integrates the traditional
PKI based scheme and the group signature based scheme. Similar to the above group
signature based scheme, each vehicle is assigned a private key and a group public key.
The group public is the same for all group members, and each member holds a distinct
private key. Unlike the above scheme of Lin et al. [12], the private key is not used for
signing messages. Instead, a signer uses the private key to generate temporary public key
certificates. In particular, vehicles generate multiple private and public key pairs. Each pair
has a public key certificate, which mainly contains a pseudo identity and a lifetime, as well
as a signature. The signature in the certificate is signed using its group private key by each
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vehicle itself instead of the trust authority. Here, the lifetime in the certificate indicates
how long the certificate is valid. The lifetime should be short such that an adversary
cannot link two distinct pseudo identities. The temporary public and private key pairs
work the same as in [7]. They are used to sign traffic related messages. The revocation
process is similar to the group signature scheme in [12]. In case that a dispute happens,
TA can trace the real identity of the attacker through the public key certificate because the
certificate is signed by vehicles using their group private key. The hybrid scheme makes a
tradeoff between the traditional PKI based scheme and the group signature based scheme.
Although the hybrid scheme has less computational overhead than the group signature
based scheme, it still has higher computation overhead than the traditional PKI based
scheme. Therefore, this hybrid scheme cannot address the scalability issues.
The presence of roadside infrastructure units (RSUs) is one of the unique character-
istics of VANETs. Some related works take advantage of this feature to achieve privacy
requirements. 1) J. Freudiger et al. [40] introduce a mix-zone scheme to protect the lo-
cation privacy for vehicles. An RSU manages a mix-zone, in which vehicles change their
pseudo IDs and corresponding public keys. An adversary cannot link two pseudo IDs from
the same vehicle when the vehicle passes through a mix-zone. In the mix-zone scheme,
RSUs are located at intersections. Vehicles that go through an intersection process mutual
authentication with the RSU, and then obtain a secret key from the RSU. All legitimate
vehicles share the same secret key. When vehicles within an intersection send safety mes-
sages, vehicles first sign them with their temporary public keys and then encrypt the whole
message with the secret keys. An adversary without the secret key cannot see the content
of the message including the used public certificates, and thus the adversary cannot link
two pseudo IDs used before and after a vehicle going through a mix-zone. However, the se-
cret key cannot stop a legitimate vehicle from linking such two IDs because any legitimate
vehicle has the same secret key. Therefore, the mix-zone scheme cannot thwart an internal
attack. 2) Lu et al. [14] develope a conditional privacy preservation scheme, called ECPP,
which divides privacy requirements into three levels. The first level is anticipated by TA.
TA is capable to trace the real identity of vehicles from a signed safety message. From the
users’ perspective, no privacy is defined in the first level. In the second level, each safety
message is anonymously authenticated, but an adversary can trace a vehicle by collecting
messages. The third level is the strongest privacy level. An individual cannot be traced
by collecting messages of the vehicles. In ECPP, RSUs play an important role to achieve
the three privacy levels. RSUs are responsible to issue a temporary public key certificate,
which vehicles use to sign safety messages. The temporary certificate does not reveal the
real identity of a vehicle. Vehicles determine the lifetime of a certificate. When vehicle re-
quests a certificate from an RSU, the vehicle indicates the lifetime of the certificate. Then
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the RSU issues the requested certificate. Before an issued certificate is expired, a vehicle
should request a new certificate from a nearby RSU. The unfixed lifetime is to prevent
an adversary from linking multiply certificates of an individual vehicle. RSUs sign each
temporary certificate using a group signature scheme, which prevents an adversary from
having any knowledge of location information during the use of a certificate. However, TA
has the highest authority, which is not only able to recover the real identity of a vehicle
from its message signature, but also is able to reveal the real identity of an issuer (RSU)
from a temporary public key certificate. The abilities of TA are used in case of a dispute.
Although all the above previously reported works considered VANET’s unique charac-
teristics and addressed some security and privacy issues in VANETs, as we know, few of
them takes the social characteristics of VANET into consideration. Therefore, in this the-
sis, we will emphasize VANET’s social characteristics and present the concept of vehicular
social network (VSN). In specific, we will address the following issues: what is the social
characteristic of VANET? what benefits can it bring in VANETs? and what are the more
challenging security and privacy issues lying in it?
1.2 Vehicular Social Networks: Research Motivations
and Objectives
1.2.1 Motivations
Today, everyone on the Internet knows the buzzword social networking. Sites such as
Facebook, LinkedIn, as well as content-sharing sites that also offer social networking func-
tionality such as YouTube, have captured the attention of millions of users and made
millions of dollars from venture capitalists [41, 42]. Social networking over Internet offers
us many interesting functionalities including network of friends lists, person surfing, pri-
vate messaging, discussion forums or communities, and media uploading. In a word, social
networking can help us work together over common activities or interests. Although social
networking is a buzzword popular in Internet, social networks exist everywhere around us
— at workplace as well as within families and social groups, e.g., pocket switched network
[43], where users exchange data related games, rumors, and interesting information using
their mobile devices with short range wireless interfaces.
In VANETs, vehicles are usually driven by citizens in a city environment, and thus
we can envision that the mobility of vehicles directly reflects people’s intentions. Then,
since people’s intentions (human factors) are involved in VANETs, not only the safety
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related applications but also the non-safety related applications will show some social
characteristics. As a result, we are motivated to study the social characteristics and their
impacts on VANETs.
What Is the Matter of Vehicular Social Network?
Vehicular Social Network (VSN) is a VANET, which includes the traditional V-2-V com-
munications as well as V-2-I communications. Most importantly, it takes the “human
factors” into consideration, as shown in Fig. 1.3. To illustrate the concept of VSN clearly,



















Figure 1.3: Vehicular social network (VSN)
• Human Mobility Model: In VSNs, vehicles are driven by people. Then, the mobility
model is no longer a random waypoint. Instead, some realistic human mobility models
in a city environment may be adopted. In the following, we list some of them [44].
1. Shortest Path Map Based Movement: A vehicle chooses its destination by ran-
domly selecting a map point on the map. Then, it calculates the shortest path
to the destination using the Dijkstra’s algorithm.
2. Community Based Mobility Model: In the community based mobility model,
it is assumed that there exist several spots having high social attractivity in a
map, where the social attractivity is calculated from the number of vehicles that
are currently stopping in the spot. Then, a vehicle prefers to choose a spot with
higher social attractivity as its destination.
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3. Time-variant Mobility Model: The time-variant mobility model is somewhat
similar to the community based model. However, a vehicle prefers to different
spots at different times of a day, thereby moving between them in a periodic
manner. For example, people goes to the office to work in the morning, to a
restaurant to eat at noon and home after working in the evening.
Based on these realistic models, we can develop more efficient non-safety related
applications in VSNs.
• Human Selfish Status: In VSNs, vehicles are driven and controlled by rational entities
— human beings. Since not all people in reality is nonselfish, some vehicles will
behave selfishly and may not be willing to participate in some non-safety related
applications. For example, in order to conserve buffer and computing resources, a
selfish vehicle may be reluctant in the cooperation that is not directly beneficial to
it, which could make a well designed routing protocol in VANET useless. Therefore,
the selfishness is a very challenging issue for non-safety related applications in VSNs.
• Human Preferences: In VSNs, a great number of vehicles driven by people move
between home and office for one or more hours each day. Since these commutes
typically take people over highways and other frequented corridors, they are highly
predicable and regular. Day after day, the same people travel along the same road-
ways at the same time. Then, based on their preferences, they could form some
virtual communities to discuss some interesting topics.
1.2.2 Objectives
Since the social characteristics (human mobility, selfish status, and preferences) are con-
sidered in VSNs, the study of VSNs become more promising and richer than that in the
pure VANET. For example, many social based VANET routing protocols and non-safety
related applications can be developed in VSNs. Nevertheless, like in traditional online
social networks, more challenging security and privacy issues are also reared up in VSNs,
especially for the privacy.
In VSNs, the human mobility model can be used for designing efficient routing protocols.
However, if poorly treated, the mobility model could disclose people’s location privacy. On
the other hand, when the privacy technique, even the conditional privacy preservation tech-
nique, is employed in the VSN, the identification of a self-interest oriented vehicle becomes
challenging, for a vehicle’s behaviors may be unlinkable. In addition, the favorite of people
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is obviously a privacy issue, it is unrealistic for a person to disclose his/her favorites to
everyone else on road. Therefore, security requirements including authentication, integrity,
non-repudiation, access control and privacy should be paid more attention in VSNs.
In this thesis, we will study safety and non-safety related applications based on human
factors (mobility model, self-interest status and preferences) in VSNs, and devote ourselves
to resolving the challenging security and privacy issues amongst of them.
1.3 Research Contributions
The research in this thesis focuses on developing a suite of protocols to deal with the
challenging security and privacy-preserving issues in vehicular social networks. Specifically,
the main contributions lie in the following aspects:
• First, by taking the human factor — human mobility into consideration, we propose
a novel social based privacy-preserving packet forwarding protocol, called SPRING
[24], for vehicular delay tolerant networks, which is characterized by deploying RSUs
at high social intersections to assist in packet forwarding between vehicles by tem-
porarily storing packets through V-2-I communications. With the assistances of
high-social RSUs, the probability of packet drop is reduced and as a result high re-
liability of packet forwarding in vehicular DTNs can be achieved. In addition, the
SPRING protocol also achieves conditional privacy preservation and resist most at-
tacks facing vehicular DTNs, such as packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack,
and black (grey) hole attacks. Further, based on the “Sacrificing the Plum Tree
for the Peach Tree” — one of the Thirty-Six Strategies of Ancient China, we also
propose a socialspot-based packet forwarding (SPF) protocol for protecting receiver-
location privacy in VANETs [45]. In addition, an effective pseudonyms changing at
social spots strategy, called PCS [46], is proposed, which facilitates vehicles to achieve
high-level location privacy in VANET.
• Second, to protect the human factor — interest preference privacy in vehicular social
networks, an efficient privacy-preserving protocol for finding like-minded vehicles on
the road, called FLIP [47], which allows two vehicles with the common interest to
identify each other and establish a shared session key, and at the same time, protects
their Interest-Privacy (IP) from other vehicles who do not have the same interest on
the road. To generalize the FLIP protocol, a lightweight privacy-preserving scalar
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product computation (PPSPC) protocol is also proposed, which, compared with pre-
vious PPSPC protocols, is much efficient in terms of computation and communication
overheads.
• Third, to deal with the human factor – self-interest issue in vehicular delay tolerant
networks, a practical incentive protocol, called Pi [48], is proposed to stimulate selfish
nodes to cooperate in forwarding bundle packets. Through adoption of the proper
incentive policies, the proposed Pi protocol can not only improve the whole vehicle
DTN network’s performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low average delay
but also achieve the fairness among nodes.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 recalls some related
work, including basic concepts in social theory, bilinear groups and conditional privacy-
preserving authentication for VANET. Chapter 3 presents a novel social based privacy-
preserving packet forwarding (SPRING) protocol for vehicular delay tolerant networks.
Chapter 4 presents a socialspot-based packet forwarding (SPF) protocol for protecting
receiver-location privacy in VANETs. Chapter 5 presents an effective pseudonyms chang-
ing at social spots (PCS) strategy for facilitating vehicles to achieve high-level location
privacy in VANET. Chapter 6 presents an efficient privacy-preserving protocol (FLIP) for
finding like-minded vehicle on the road and its generalization — a lightweight privacy-
preserving scalar product computation (PPSPC) protocol. Chapter 7 presents a practical
incentive (Pi) protocol to stimulate selfish nodes to cooperate in forwarding bundle pack-




Related Work: Social Theory and
Cryptography
In this chapter, we discuss some related work, including basic concepts in social theory, bi-
linear groups, and conditional privacy-preserving authentication (CPPA) technique, which
serve as the basis of the schemes/protocols presented in the remaining of this thesis.
2.1 Basic Concepts in Social Theory
Since our research — vehicular social network (VSN) uses some social properties to study
the vehicular communications, we first review some basic concepts in social theory [49, 50].
• Propinquity : In social theory, propinquity is defined that, under equal conditions, if
two nodes are geographically near to each other, they are more likely to be connected.
• Homophyly : Homophyly is defined as having one or more common social attributes,
like the same organization, favorites. The greater the homophyly, the more likely
two nodes will be connected. At the individual level, persons are more likely to have
a connection, friendship or association, if they have common attributes.
• Degree Centrality: In social networks, a central node is one that relates to a large
quantity of other nodes in the network. Therefore, the centrality of a node can be
measured as the number of out-links connecting a node to its neighbors or as the
number of in-links that a certain node is receiving from adjacent nodes. We can
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measure a node’s centrality by counting the number of links (in-links or out-links)
that the node possesses. By definition, the degree of a node ni is the number of
links incident to it and is represented as d(ni). When there is no distinction between
in-degree and out-degree, the centrality of a node ni can be denoted by




where CD(ni) is the degree centrality of node i; d(ni) is the degree of node i; xij is 1
if node i is indicent to node j; and 0 otherwise. Clearly, this magnitude depends on
the size of the network and it becomes complex to use once it is compared with other
networks. Therefore, a way to standardize degree centrality is to divide Eq. (2.1) by
the maximum number of nodes that a node can be connected to. Since the number







• Closeness Centrality : Degree centrality just shows how many nodes are directly
joined to a central node, nevertheless it does not consider indirect ties by which a
node can reach others using paths available in the network. A node that is central-
close can reach other nodes through short distance paths. Therefore, the notion
of closeness-centrality is related to the inverse of distance between nodes (e.g., the
higher the distance, the less the central-close). In social networks, a shortest path
between two nodes is defined as a geodesic. As a result, a closeness index has to
account for the geodesics that a given node has to all other nodes in the network.
Assuming the network is fully connected, the central-closeness of a node ni can be
measured by i) adding up all individual geodesics related to ni; and ii) calculating the
inverse of this value. Specifically, the standardized formula of a node ni’s closeness
centrality can be defined
C ′C(ni) =
n− 1(∑
j=1,i 6=j d(ni, nj)
) (2.3)
where C ′c(ni) is the standardized closeness centrality of node ni; and d(ni, nj) is the
Geodesic between node ni and node nj [49].
• Betweenness Centrality : Betweenness, which is focusing on nodes that lie in the path
between other nodes, is another one to measure the centrality. To calculate an index
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that measures betweenness centrality, several considerations should be taken into
account [49]. First, it is assumed that a node which wants to reach another node uses
preferably shortest paths available between them; second, if two or more geodesics
are available, then the node can choose between them with equal probability; third,
if A communicates with B, then B must communicate with A; finally, adding up
the proportion that a node is between others gives the standardized betweenness









where C ′B(ni) is the standardized betweenness centrality of node i; gjk(ni) is the
number of geodesics linking j and k that contains i in between; and gjk is the total





Figure 2.1: The degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities in social networks
Fig. 2.1 shows the differences among the degree, closeness, and betweenness central-





has the highest degree centrality, i.e., it has the most direct connections, serving as “Cen-





, nodes B, C have the highest closeness centrality, i.e., they have the short-








node D has the highest betweenness centrality, i.e., it plays a “broker” role in the network,
having great influence over what flows in the network. In this thesis, we would utilize





Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . .} be the set of positive integers. If x is a string, then |x| denotes its
length, while if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. If k ∈ N then 1k denotes the string with
k ones. If S is a set then s← S denotes the operation of picking a random element s of S
uniformly.
2.2.2 Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive and has been widely adopted in
many positive applications in cryptography [51, 52]. Let G be a cyclic additive group
and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same prime order q. We assume that the
discrete logarithm problems in both G and GT are hard. A bilinear pairing is a mapping
e : G×G→ GT which satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: For any P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)
ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G and Q ∈ G such that e(P,Q) 6= 1GT .
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈
G.
From Reference [51], we note that such a bilinear pairing may be realized using the
modified Weil pairing associated with supersingular elliptic curve.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Generator) A bilinear parameter generator Gen is a probability
algorithm that takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs a 5-tuple (q, P,G,GT , e),
where q is a κ-bit prime number, (G,+) and (GT ,×) are two groups with the same order
q, P ∈ G is a generator, and e : G×G→ GT is an admissible bilinear map.
In the following, we define the quantitative notion of the complexity assumptions, in-
cluding Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem, Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
Problem, Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem, Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Prob-
lem, Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Problem, and Strong Diffie-Hellman-2 (SDH2) Problem.
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Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem) The Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem in G is defined as follows: Given P , aP , bP ∈ G for unknown
a, b ∈ Z∗q, compute abP ∈ G.
Definition 3 (CDH Assumption) Let A be an adversary that takes an input of (P , aP ,





←− Zq, α← A (P, aP, bP )
if α = abP , then β ← 1, else β ← 0
return β





Let τ ∈ N and ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the CDH is (τ, ǫ)-secure if no polynomial algorithm
A running in time τ has success SuccCDHA ≥ ǫ.
Definition 4 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem) For a, b, c ∈ Z∗q, given P , aP ,
bP , cP ∈ G, decide whether c = ab ∈ Zq. The DDH problem is easy in G, since we can
compute e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab and decide whether e(P, P )ab=e(P, P )c [51].
Definition 5 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem) The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(BDH) problem in G is as follows: Given P , aP , bP, cP ∈ G for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q,
compute e(P, P )abc ∈ GT .
Definition 6 (BDH Assumption) Let A be an adversary that takes an input of (P , aP ,
bP, cP ) ∈ G for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q, and returns e(P, P )





←− Zq, α← A (P, aP, bP, cP )
if α = e(P, P )abc then β ← 1 else β ← 0
return β
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Let τ ∈ N and ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the BDH is (τ, ǫ)-secure if no polynomial algorithm
A running in time τ has success SuccBDHA ≥ ǫ.
Definition 7 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem) The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) problem in G is as follows: Given an element P of G, a tuple (aP, bP, cP, T )
for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and T ∈ GT , decide whether T = e(P, P )
abc or a random element
R drawn from GT .
Definition 8 (DBDH Assumption) Let A be an adversary that takes an input of (aP , bP ,
cP , T ) for unknown a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and T ∈ GT , and returns a bit β
′ ∈ {0, 1}. We consider







β̃ ← {0, 1}
if β̃ = 0, then T = e(P, P )abc; else if β̃ = 1 then T = R
β̃ ′ ← A(aP, bP, cP, T )
return 1 if β̃ ′ = β̃, 0 otherwise








ExpDBDHA = 1|β̃ = 1
]∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
Let τ ∈ N and ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the DBDH is (τ, ǫ)-secure if no adversary A running
in time τ has an advantage AdvDBDHA ≥ ǫ.
Definition 9 (Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Problem) The Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH)
problem in G is defined as follows: Given an element P of G, and an l-tuple (xP, x2P, · · · , xlP )
for some unknown x ∈ Zq, compute a new tuple (c,
1
x+c
P ), where c ∈ Zq.
Definition 10 (Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) Assumption) Let A be an adversary that
takes an input of (P, xP , x2P , · · · , xlP ) for some unknown x ∈ Zq, and returns a new
tuple (c, 1
x+c





←− Zq, (c, α)← A
(
P, xP, x2P, · · · , xlP
)
if α = 1
x+c
P then b← 1 else b← 0
return b





Let τ ∈ N and ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the SDH is (τ, ǫ)-secure if no polynomial algorithm
A running in time τ has success SuccSDHA ≥ ǫ.
Definition 11 (Strong Diffie-Hellman-2 (SDH2) Problem) The strong Diffie-Hellman-2
(SDH2) problem in G is defined as follows: Let P be an element of G. Given (xP, yP, 1
x+y
P )
for unknown x, y ∈ Zq, l1 distinct tuples (ci,
1
x+ci
P ), where ci ∈ Zq, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l1}, and
another tuple (y2P, · · · , yl2P ), compute a new tuple (m, 1
y+m
P ), where m ∈ Zq.









P , · · · , cl1,
1
x+cl1
P for some unknown x, y, c1, · · · , cl1 ∈ Zq, and an-
other tuple (y2P, · · · , yl2P ), returns a new tuple (c, α). We consider the following random
experiment.
Experiment ExpSDH2A



















y2P, · · · , yl2P


if α = 1
y+m
P then b← 1 else b← 0
return b





Let τ ∈ N and ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the SDH2 is (τ, ǫ)-secure if no polynomial algorithm
A running in time τ has success SuccSDH2A ≥ ǫ.
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2.2.3 Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
Let p, q be two distinct large primes, and n = pq. Groups (G,GT ) of composite order n
are called bilinear map groups of composite order if there is a mapping e : G × G → GT
with the following properties [53, 54]:
1. Bilinearity: e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any (g, h) ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zn;
2. Non-degeneracy: there exists g ∈ G such that e(g, g) has order n in GT . In other
words, e(g, g) is a generator of GT , whereas g generates G.
3. Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h) ∈ GT for all
(g, h) ∈ G.
Note that 1) we use the multiplicative group to represent the group G, which, however,
can be instantiated by the elliptic curve addition group, i.e., the modified Weil pairing
or Tate pairing [53]; 2) the vast majority of cryptosystems based on pairings assume for
simplicity that bilinear groups have prime order q. In composite order case, it is important
that the pairing is defined over a group G containing |G| = n elements, where n = pq
has a (ostensibly hidden) factorization in two large primes, p 6= q; 3) those complexity
assumptions above in bilinear group of prime order also hold in bilinear group of composite
order.
Definition 13 (Composite Bilinear Generator) A composite bilinear parameter generator
CGen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input, and outputs a
5-tuple (n, g,G,GT , e), where n = pq and p, q are two k-bit prime numbers, G,GT are two
groups with order n, g ∈ G is a generator, and e : G×G→ GT is a non-degenerated and
efficiently computable bilinear map.
Let g be a generator of G, then g = gq ∈ G can generate the subgroup Gp =
{g0, g1, · · · , gp−1} of order p, and g′ = gp ∈ G can generate the subgroup Gq = {g′0, g′1, · · · ,
g′q−1} of order q in G. In the following, we define the quantitative notion of the complexity
of the SubGroup Decision (SGD) Problem [53].
Definition 14 (SubGroup Decision (SGD) Problem) The SubGroup Decision (SGD) prob-
lem in G is as follows: Given a tuple (e,G,GT , n, h), where the element h is randomly
drawn from either G or subgroup Gq, decide whether or not h ∈ Gq.
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Definition 15 (SGD Assumption) Let A be an adversary that takes an input of h drawn
from either G or subgroup Gq, and returns a bit b




if b̃ = 0, then h
R
←− Gq; else if b̃ = 1 then h
R
←− G
b̃′ ← A(e,G,GT , n, h)
return 1 if b̃′ = b̃, 0 otherwise








ExpSGDA = 1|̃b = 1
]∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
Let τ ∈ N and ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. We say that the SGD is (τ, ǫ)-secure if no adversary A running
in time τ has an advantage AdvSGDA ≥ ǫ.
2.2.4 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Let G, G′, and GT be three cyclic multiplicative groups of the same prime order q, i.e.,
|G| = |G′| = |GT | = q. Let g be a generator of G, g′ be a generator of G′, and ψ
be an isomorphism from G′ to G, with ψ(g′) = g. An efficient admissible bilinear map
e : G×G′ → GT with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for all g1 ∈ G, g2 ∈ G′ and a, b ∈ Z∗q , e(g
a
1 , g2
b) = e(g1, g2)
ab;
2. Non-degeneracy: there exist g1 ∈ G and g2 ∈ G′ such that e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT ;
3. Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g1, g2) ∈ GT for any
g1 ∈ G, g2 ∈ G′.
Such an admissible asymmetric bilinear map e can be constructed by the modified Weil
or Tate pairings on the elliptic curves. As mentioned in [55, 56], the Tate pairing on MNT
curves gives the efficient implementation, where G 6= G′, the one-way isomorphism ψ can
be implemented by the trace map, and the representations of G can be expressed in 171
bits when the order q is a 170-bit prime. By this construction, the discrete logarithm
problem in G can reach as hard as the discrete logarithm in Z∗p where p is 1020 bits.
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Definition 16 (Asymmetric Bilinear Generator) An asymmetric bilinear parameter
generator AGen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input and
outputs a 7-tuple (q,G,G′,GT , e, g, g
′) as the bilinear parameters, including a prime number
q with |q| = k, three cyclic groups G, G′, GT of the same order q, an admissible bilinear
map e : G×G′ → GT and generators g, g′ of G, G′, respectively.
Note that those complexity assumptions in symmetric bilinear groups above also hold
in asymmetric bilinear groups.
2.3 Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication
The Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication (CPPA) technique is one kind of group
signature [12], which is dedicated for vehicular communications to achieve conditional
privacy-preserving authentication. Here, we first formalize the CPPA technique and its
security notions, then present a provable secure CPPA scheme [57], followed by the formal
security proofs with provable security technique.
2.3.1 Definition of CPPA
Definition 17 (CPPA) A Conditional Privacy-preserving Authentication CPPA scheme
is defined by the following algorithms: system setup, key generation, anonymous authen-
tication, and conditional tracking.
• a system setup algorithm Setup: it is a probabilistic algorithm run by a trusted
authority (TA), which takes a security parameter k as input and outputs the system
public parameters params and master key.
• a key generation algorithm KGen: it is an algorithm run by TA, which takes the
public parameters params, master key and an identifier of a vehicle vi ∈ V as input,
and outputs a corresponding private key ski. This algorithm can be either probabilistic
or deterministic.
• an anonymous authentication algorithm AnonyAuth: a vehicle vi takes as input a
fresh nonce mi, the private key ski, and the public parameters params, and outputs
an anonymous signature σ of mi. Then, any verifier takes as input the purported
signature σ, the fresh nonce mi, and the public parameters params and tests whether
σ is valid. If it is valid, the anonymous authentication is passed; otherwise rejected.
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• a conditional tracking algorithm CTrack: Once a sensitive operation is disputed, the
TA can provide (σ, Ti) to the TA. Then, the TA can track the real identity of the
vehicle with (σ, Ti).
Correctness: A conditional privacy-preserving authentication CPPA scheme should
satisfy the following properties: a registered vehicle must be anonymously authenticated by
the AnonyAuth algorithm with σ; once a vehicle executes a disputed operation, the real
identity of the vehicle must be tracked by the CTrack algorithm.
2.3.2 Security Notions
Full Anonymity on Signature σ
A typical approach to define full anonymity σ is the following experiment in the spirit of
cpa-indistinguishability [53, 54]. In the CPPA setting, an adversary A is given the public
parameters, as well as an access to the key generation oracle OK on some registered vehicles
in V = {v1, v2, · · · }, to the anonymous signature oracle OS on some valid signatures. Then,
A outputs (v0, v1, m). After an anonymous signature σ
b corresponding to (vb, m) is signed,
where b ∈ {0, 1}, A must decide which vehicle in (v0, v1) signed the signature σb.
Definition 18 (Full Anonymity) Let V = {v1, v2, · · · } be a group of registered vehicles, k
and t be integers and ǫ be a real in [0, 1], let CPPA be a conditional privacy-preserving
authentication scheme with security parameter k. Let A be an adversary against the












←− {0, 1}, σb ←− (vb,M)
b′ ←− AOK ,OS(params, σb)
if b = b′ is valid then return b∗ ← 1 else b∗ ← 0
return b∗
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− 1 = 2Pr [b = b′]− 1
CPPA is said to be (k, t, ǫ)-anony secure, if no adversary A running in time t has a success
SuccanonyCPPA,A(k) ≥ ǫ.
Full Traceability on Signature σ
Full traceability on signature σ can be described in the following game [53, 54]. In the
CPPA setting, an adversary A is given the public parameters and tracking information
(trackinfo), as well as an access to the key generation oracle OK on some registered users in
V = {v1, v2, · · · }, to the anonymous signature oracle OS on some valid signatures, where
the validity of signature and identity tracing can be checked by A. At some point, A
outputs a forged anonymous signature σ⋆ with its tracking identity v⋆ ∈ V and a message
m⋆. There is the natural restriction that in the returned signature σ⋆, the identity v⋆ has
not been queried on OK and (v⋆, m⋆) has not been obtained from OS.
Definition 19 (Full Traceability) Let V = {v1, v2, · · · } be a group of registered vehicles,
k and t be integers and ǫ be a real in [0, 1]; let CPPA be a conditional privacy-preserving
authentication scheme with security parameter k. Let A be an adversary against the trace-









σ⋆ ←− AOK ,OS(params, v⋆)
if σ⋆ is valid then b∗ ← 1 else b∗ ← 0
return b∗





CPPA is said to be (k, t, ǫ)-trace secure, if no adversary A running in time t has a success
SucctraceCPPA,A(k) ≥ ǫ.
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2.3.3 A Provably Secure CPPA Scheme
In the following, we introduce a provably secure CPPA scheme [57], which includes the
following four parts: system setup Setup, key generation KGen, anonymous authentication
AnonyAuth, and conditional tracking CTrack.
Setup: Given the security parameter k, the bilinear map groups (G,GT , e) of composite
order n = pq are generated by running CGen(k), where e : G × G → GT and p, q are two
large primes with |p| = |q| = k. Let Gp, Gq denote G’s two subgroups of orders p and
q, respectively. Then, a trusted authority (TA) chooses two elements (g, u) of G, one
generator h of Gq, two random exponents α, a ∈ Z∗n, and a collision-resistant hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗n. After these, the TA sets the master key (g
α, a, q) and the system public
parameters params = (G,GT , e, n, g, u, e(g, g)
α, A = ga, h,H).
KGen: When a vehicle vi ∈ V registers to the system, the TA first chooses a random
number si ∈ Z∗n, and computes the private key ski = (si, g
1
a+si ) for vi. In addition, TA also
stores (vi, g
siq) in the tracking list used for CTrack.
AnonyAuth: Assume that the vehicle vi wants to anonymously authenticate itself at
time Ti, it uses the secret key ski = (si, g
1
a+si ) to execute the following steps:
• Use the anonymous authentication key si to compute ρ, where









• Choose three random numbers z1, z2, z3 ∈ Z∗n, and compute (σ1, σ2, σ3) and the proof
(π1, π2)
σ1 = ρ1 · h
z1; σ2 = ρ2 · h












• Set CPPA(Ti) = σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, π1, π2) as the authentication information.
After receiving CPPA(Ti) at time T
′
i , any verifier checks whether or not T
′
i − Ti ≤ ∆T ,
where ∆T is the expected legal time interval for transmission delay. If it does not hold,
the authentication fails. Otherwise, the verifier executes the following steps:
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= e(π2, h); (2.9)
If the above two equations hold, the vehicle vi is anonymously authenticated, i.e., vi is
a valid registered user in the system, but the real identity is not disclosed; Otherwise,
the authentication fails.
CTrack: Once the dispute occurs, the TA can fast track the real identity of vehicle
with CPPA(Ti) = σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, π1, π2) as follows:





= gsiq (∵ h is a generator of Gq) (2.10)
• Trace the real identity vi by looking up the entry (vi, gsiq) in the tracking list. As a
result, the CPPA technique achieves conditional privacy-preserving authentication.
Note that during the conditional tracking, no pairing computation is needed, the
tracking is faster than other previously reported ones [12].
2.3.4 Security Proofs
In this section, under the complex assumptions in Section 2.2, we analyze the security of
the proposed CPPA scheme in the standard model.
Theorem 1 (Anonymity of σ) Let A be an adversary against the proposed CPPA scheme
in the standard model. Assume that A has the success probability SuccanonyCPPA,A ≥ ǫ to break





; τ ′ ≤ τ +Θ(.) (2.11)
such that the SGD problem can be solved with probability ǫ′ within time τ ′.
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Proof. We define a sequence of games Game0, Game1, · · · of modified attacks starting
from the actual adversary A [58]. All the games operate on the same underlying probability
space: the system parameters and master key, the coin tosses of A. Let (e,G,GT , n, h̃) be a
random instance of SGD, we will use these incremental games to reduce the SGD instance
to the adversary A against the full anonymity of σ in the proposed CPPA scheme.
Game0: This is the real attack game. In the game, the TA chooses the master key
(gα, a, q) and the system public parameters params = (G,GT , e, n, g, u, e(g, g)
α, A =
ga, h,H), and feeds the adversary A with these system public parameters. First, the
adversary A exactly makes qK queries to OK on group members’ private keys, qS queries
to OS on anonymous signatures, and at some point, A chooses a message M and two
vehicles (v0, v1) for challenge. Note that the adversary A can know the private keys of
(v0, v1) in the game. Then, we flip a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and produce vb’s anonymous signature
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, π1, π2) as the challenge to the adversary A. The anonymous signature
comes from ski and three random numbers z1, z2, z3 ∈ Z∗n, and σ1 = ρ1 · h
z1 , σ2 = ρ2 · hz2 ,
σ3 = ρ3 · hz3, π1 = ρ
z1
2 (Aρ1)











. Finally, the adversary A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}. In any Gamej ,
we denote by Guessj the event b = b
′. Then, by definition, we have
ǫ ≤ SuccanonySP,A = 2Pr[b = b









Game1: In this game, we modify the simulation by replacing the master key and system
parameters with the SGD challenge (e,G,GT , n, h̃). In specific, we choose α, a ∈ Z∗n,
compute the master key (gα, a,⊔), and publish the systems parameters as params =
(G,GT , e, n, g, u, e(g, g)
α, A = ga, h̃, H). Since the distribution of (e(g, g)α, A = ga, h̃) is
unchanged in the eye of the adversary, we thus have
Pr[Guess1] = Pr[Guess0] (2.13)
Game2: In this game, we will simulate the key generation oracle OK on qK group
members’ anonymous authentication keys queries and qS anonymous signature oracle OS
queries. Because we have the master key (gα, a,⊔), it is not difficult for us to simulate OK
and OS. Thus, this game is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one, and we have
Pr[Guess2] = Pr[Guess1]. (2.14)
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Game3: In this game, we consider, if h̃ in the SGD challenge (e,G,GT , n, h̃) actually
belongs to the subgroup Gq, i.e., b̃ = 0 in experiment Exp
SGD
A , we know this game is
indistinguishable from the previous one, we have




ExpSGDA = 1|̃b = 0
]
= Pr[Guess3 |̃b = 0]. (2.16)
When h̃ does not belong to Gq, i.e., h̃ ∈ G and b̃ = 1 in experiment Exp
SGD









is masked by random numbers z1, z2, z3 in Z
∗
n, i.e., σ1 = ρ1 · h̃
z1,
σ2 = ρ2 ·h̃z2 , σ3 = ρ3 ·h̃z3 , (σ1, σ2, σ3) reveals nothing about the challenge b. In the following,
we show that (π1, π2) also does not reveal the challenge b.
For a specific (σ1, σ2, σ3), we know there exist random numbers z1(b), z2(b), z3(b), z1(1−b),































For example, suppose h̃ = gη = uξ, ε = a+sb
a+s1−b
, ζ = sb+H(M)
s1−b+H(M)




z1(1−b) = z1(b) +
sb − s1−b
η
















































































































































































+ (sb +H(M))z3(b) + ηz1(b)z3(b)
= logg π2(b)
⇒π2(b) = π2(1− b)
(2.22)
Since π1(b) = π1(1− b) and π2(b) = π2(1− b) are independent of b, we have
Pr
[
ExpSGDA = 1|̃b = 1
]





























In addition, we can obtain the claimed bound for τ ′ ≤ τ +Θ(.), where Θ(.) is the time
cost used for queries on OK and OS in the simulation. Thus, the proof is completed. 
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Theorem 2 (Traceability of σ) Let V = {v1, v2, · · · } be a group of registered vehicles.
Let A be an ef-cma adversary against the proposed CPPA scheme in the standard model.
Assume that A has the success probability SucctraceCPPA,A ≥ ǫ to existentially forge the anony-
mous signature σ (in a weak chosen message attack), within the running time τ , after
making qK , qS queries to the key generation oracle OK and the signature oracle OS, respec-
tively. Then, there exist ǫ′ ∈ [0, 1] and τ ′ ∈ N as follows
ǫ′ ≥ ǫ; τ ′ ≤ τ +Θ(∗) (2.25)
such that the SDH2 problem can be solved with probability ǫ′ within time τ ′, where Θ(∗) is
the time cost in the simulation.
Proof. We define a sequence of games Game0, Game1, · · · of modified attacks starting
from the actual adversary A [58]. All the games operate on the same underlying probability
space: the system parameters and master key, the coin tosses of A. Let







x+c1 , c2, g
1








be a random instance of SDH2, where g is an element of the subgroup Gp of G, we will
use these incremental games to reduce the SDH2 instance to the adversary A against the
existential forgery under a weak chosen message attack in the proposed CPPA scheme.
Game0: This is the real attack game. In the game, the TA chooses the master key
(gα, a, q) and the system public parameters params = (G,GT , e, n, g, u, e(g, g)
α, A =
ga, h,H), and feeds the adversary A with these system public parameters and the mas-
ter key q for tracking. First, the adversary A outputs a list of qS distinct messages
m1, m2, · · · , mqS ∈ Z
∗
n, where mi = H(Mi) for i = 1, 2, · · · , qS, and exactly makes qK
queries to OK on group members’ anonymous authentication keys, qS queries to OS on
a specific vehicle v⋆’s signatures, where v⋆ has not been queried on OK . Note that the
signatures queried from OS can be traced by A with q and tracking list. In the end, the
adversary A outputs a valid signature (σ⋆, m⋆) of v⋆, where m⋆ is not queried to OS before.
In any Gamej, we denote by Pr[Forgej] the forgery success probability of A in Gamej . Then,
by definition, we have
Pr[Forge0] = Succ
trace
CPPA,A ≥ ǫ (2.26)
Game1: In this game, we confine the elements (g, u) in the subgroup Gp, i.e., g
p = 1,
up = 1. Since g, u ∈ Gp still belong to G in accordance with the scheme design, the
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adversary A cannot detect this trick. Therefore, we have
Pr[Forge1] = Pr[Forge0] (2.27)
Game2: In this game, we modify the simulation by replacing the system parameter
(A = ga, u) with (gx, u′), where u′ is generated by adopting the same simulating ap-
proach in [59], i.e., given (gy, g(y
2), · · · , g(y
qS ) and m1, m2, · · · , mqS ∈ Z
∗
n, we can generate
(u′, (u′)y, (u′)
1
y+m1 , · · · , (u′)
1
y+mqS ). Since the distribution of (A = ga, u) is unchanged, we
thus have
Pr[Forge2] = Pr[Forge1] (2.28)
Game3: In this game, we will simulate the key generation oracle OK on qK group
members’ anonymous authentication keys queries. Concretely, when a fresh query on
vehicle vi ∈ V is queried, we randomly chooses an un-queried ci, records (vi, ci, gciq), and
return (ci, g
1
x+ci ) as the answer to the oracle query. Since (ci, g
1
x+ci ) is uniformly distributed,
this game is therefore perfectly indistinguishable from the previous one. Hence,
Pr[Forge3] = Pr[Forge2]. (2.29)
Game4: In this game, we simulate a total of qs times signing oracle OS. Note that, since
the adversary A has already gotten other group members’ private keys, A only queries the
signing oracle OS on the challenged v∗. For any fresh query on mi, we first pick the
corresponding (u′)
1





y+mi ). Then, we choose three
random numbers z1, z2, z3 ∈ Z∗n, and compute σ1 = ρ1 · h








z3hz1z3 . In the end, we return σ =(σ1, σ2, σ3, π1, π2)
as the answer to the oracle query. In this game, OS perfectly simulates the anonymous
signature, and we will have
Pr[Forge4] = Pr[Forge3]. (2.30)









on (m⋆, v⋆) at some point. Then, the forgery should satisfy the verification equations
e(σ⋆1A, σ
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We generate a random number λ such that λ ≡ 1 mod p and λ ≡ 0 mod q. Then, we





























λ) = e(g, u)
(2.33)
and can get σ⋆1
λ = gy, σ⋆2
λ = g
1





y+m⋆ . Then, using the same
approach in [59], we convert (u′)
1
y+m⋆ back to g
1
y+m⋆ and output (m⋆, g
1
y+m⋆ ) as the challenge
of SDH2 problem. In the end, from Eqs. (2.26)-(2.33), we have
ǫ′ = SuccSDH2A = Succ
trace
SP,A ≥ ǫ (2.34)
In addition, we can obtain the claimed bound for τ ′ ≤ τ+Θ(∗), where Θ(∗) is the time cost
used for generating (u′, (u′)y, (u′)
1
y+m1 , · · · , (u′)
1
y+mqS ) and g
1
y+m⋆ . Thus, this completes the
proof. 
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed some related works, including basic concepts in social
theory, bilinear groups, and conditional privacy-preserving authentication (CPPA) tech-
nique. In the following chapters, we will present several schemes/protocols one by one to




Forwarding Protocol for Vehicular
DTNs
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, delay tolerant networks (DTNs), such as space communication and net-
working in sparsely populated areas [60], and vehicular ad hoc networks [61], have been
subject to extensive research efforts. Unlike traditional tethered networks like the Inter-
net, a DTN is a sparse mobile network where the connection between nodes in the network
changes over time, and as a result the communication constantly suffers from higher de-
lays and disconnections. Since a contemporaneous end-to-end path may never exist in
DTNs, effective communication in DTNs requires cooperation of all the nodes for routing
and forwarding, where, the intermediate nodes on a communication path are expected
to store, carry and forward the packets in an opportunistic way, which is also named
as opportunistic data forwarding. However, in most cases, DTNs could consist of many
resource-constrained nodes, i.e., limited storage. If carried for a certain of time without an
available downstream node, the packets have to be dropped by the carrying node, which
thus incurs very unreliable forwarding in DTNs. Therefore, efficient packet forwarding in
DTNs becomes an especially challenging issue, and a number of DTN packet forwarding
schemes recently have been proposed to improve the reliability [62].
Over the past few years, vehicular ad hoc network, as a special case of DTNs and also
known as vehicular DTN, has become increasingly attractive to the public due to its promis-
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ing ability of improving road safety and traffic efficiency. In vehicular networks, a variety
of applications can be enabled by vehicle-to-vehicle (V-2-V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V-2-I) communications to improve transportation systems. Unlike other forms of DTNs,
there exists a fixed infrastructure in VANETs, i.e., Roadside Units (RSUs) deployed along
the roadside. Recent efforts to improve the reliability of DTNs show that the introduced
infrastructure in DTNs could dramatically enhance wireless networks in terms of packet
delivery ratio [63]. Obviously, it is viable to adopt an RSU-aided packet forwarding mecha-
nism in VANETs, where RSUs are used to assist in forwarding packets. However, deploying
infrastructure is very costly, preventing from making RSUs widely available, for example,
in rural areas or in the early stage deployment phase of VANET. Thus, effectively deploy-
ing RSUs is crucial to improving packet forwarding efficiency in VANETs. Since people
are involved in Vehicular DTNs, human factors, in particular human mobility, will affect
the network characteristics. Therefore, Vehicular DTN can be regarded as one kind of
vehicular social networks.
Heavy traffic is a common occurrence in some areas on the roads, for example, at
intersections, Taxi loading/unloading areas. Despite dynamics of traffic flow, traffic pattern
is relatively static in an area. For example, during morning rush hours, overwhelming traffic
can be observed inside a certain area, such as, in the downtown area because of its core
focus on business. In other words, the area becomes a popular social place for vehicles
to connect to each other. Obviously, if a roadside infrastructure is deployed in these high
traffic areas and then used to assist in forwarding data packets in vehicular (social) DTNs,
reliability in vehicular communications can be dramatically improved with incurred costs
under control. Furthermore, security and privacy issue is crucial to the full adoption of
any networks, but security and privacy issues in vehicular DTNs have been subject to little
attention.
Based on the above observations, in this chapter, we propose a novel Social-based
PRivacy-preserving packet forwardING (SPRING) protocol for vehicular DTNs [24]. The
proposed SPRING protocol is characterized by deploying RSUs at high social intersections
to assist in packet forwarding between vehicles by temporarily storing packets through
V-2-I communication during the period when the proper next-hop vehicles of these packets
are not available. With such kind of RSU assistance, the probability of packet drop is
reduced and as a result a high reliability of packet forwarding in vehicular DTNs can be
achieved. Specifically, the contributions of this chapter are threefold.
First, we heuristically define the social degree of intersections in vehicular DTNs. Based
on the social information, we place RSUs at these high social intersections. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to investigate social-based RSU deployment in
vehicular DTNs.
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Second, we propose the SPRING protocol, a social-based privacy-preserving packet
forwarding protocol for vehicular DTNs. In SPRING, because the stationary RSUs are
deployed at high social intersections, a large number of vehicles will pass by these RSUs.
Then, RSUs can provide tremendous assistance in temporarily storing some packets and
helping packet forwarding to achieve a high transmission reliability. In addition, SPRING
can also achieve conditional privacy preservation and resist most attacks existing in vehic-
ular DTNs, such as packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack, and black (grey) hole
attacks [64], that are crucial to success of such networks.
Third, we develop a simulator to show the substantial improvement of the SPRING
protocol in terms of high reliability, resistance to packet tracing attack, and black (grey)
hole attacks. The simulation results demonstrate its effectiveness and security.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we formalize
the network, node and threat models and identify our design goal. Then, we present
the SPRING protocol in Section 3.3, followed by the security analysis and performance
evaluation in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, respectively. We also review related works in
Section 3.6. Finally, we draw our summary in Section 3.7.
3.2 Models and Design Goal
In this section, we formalize the network model, node model and threat model, and identify
our design goal.
3.2.1 Random Graph-Based Network Model
Consider a large number of vehicles V = {v1, v2, · · · } moving around in a city by following
map-based shortest path routing algorithm. Then, a vehicular DTN can be represented as
a directed random graph G = (V∗, E), as shown in Fig. 3.1(a), where V∗ is a union between
the set of vehicle nodes V and a set of intersection nodes C = {c1, c2, · · · }, i.e., V∗ = V ∪C,
and E is the set of directed random edges between any intersections ci, cj ∈ C, where i 6= j.
For any edge eij ∈ E from ci to cj, we denote the flow of eij as F (eij) = σij · λij , where
σij = 1 if ci, cj are connected by a direct road (i.e., no intermediate intersection between
ci and cj), and 0 otherwise; λij is the Poisson arrival rate of the road (ci → cj) if σij = 1
and assuming the arrival follows the Poisson distribution, which can realistically capture
the average number of vehicles passing from ci to cj during a unit of time. If F (eij) = 0,








Figure 3.1: Vehicular DTN model with social-based RSU deployment
In-Degree of interaction vertex ci ∈ C is the number of roads with ci as their terminal
vertex, and is denoted as KIi =
∑
j∈C σji. Out-Degree of interaction vertex ci ∈ C is the
number of roads with vertex ci as their initial vertex, and is denoted as KOi =
∑
j∈C σij .
Because σji = σij , we have KIi = KOi. Generally, in a directed graph, both in-degree
and out-degree of a vertex can capture its impact in the whole graph. However, in the
defined random directed graph, the impact of an interaction vertex ci is contingent upon
the number of contacts between ci and other vehicle nodes in V. Therefore, the Social
Degree of interaction vertex is introduced.








where δj is the number of shortest paths that a vehicle node vj ∈ V drives during a unit of
time, and δj(ci) is the number of shortest paths that passes through the intersection vertex
ci.





λij , although λji 6= λij for some cj. With this observation, the







Because all vehicles V = {v1, v2, · · · } follow the map-based shortest path routing, the social













Deployment of RSUs. Let ST denote the social threshold of a given random directed
graph G = (V∗, E). We choose a set of high social intersection vertexes as follows
HS = {ci ∈ C|SDi ≥ ST} (3.3)
Note that, by adjusting the social threshold ST , we can determine the cardinality of HS.
After the set HS is determined, we place an RSU Ri at each intersection ci ∈ HS, as
shown in Fig. 3.1(b). Then, each RSU has high social capability and can effectively assist
vehicles to store-forward packets in vehicular DTNs.
3.2.2 Node Model
Vehicular DTNs, as distinct from general DTNs, are characterized by two kinds of DTN
nodes, i.e., vehicles and RSUs, each kind of which has unique characteristics.
• Vehicles: Apart from the mobility, each vehicle node driven by people is also resource-
constrained, i.e., buffer constraints. In general, a vehicle node will help forwarding
the packets when it has available storage. However, once the storage is insufficient,
the vehicle node no longer serves the relay node to help forwarding.
• Roadside Units (RSUs): Different from the vehicle node, each RSU node is stationary
but has huge storage capacity. Once it is deployed at some intersection, each RSU
node can temporarily help store some bundle packets till passing-by vehicle nodes
carry them close to their destinations. However, since each RSU is costly, it is
impractical to erect RSU nodes at all intersections, especially at the early deployment
of VANETs. Therefore, as discussed in the network model, only a small number of
RSU nodes will place at some high social intersections.
Let TR and TV , where TR > TV , be the transmission ranges of RSU and vehicle nodes,
respectively. Then, the wireless interfaces between vehicle nodes are bidirectional, i.e., if vi
hears the transmission of vj, then vj is also able to hear vi. However, the wireless interfaces
between vehicle node and RSU node are usually unidirectional unless they are very close
to each other, as shown in Fig. 3.2. Therefore, packets in vehicular DTNs will be i) either
stored-carried by the vehicle nodes or stored in RSU nodes if no other node is encountered;









Figure 3.2: Store-Carry-Forward in Vehicle DTNs
3.2.3 Threat Model
In our threat model, RSU nodes are trustable, and non-compromisable. However, a small
fraction of vehicle nodes may be compromised. We consider a global external adversary A
with limited control capability, where
• Global shows the adversary A has full traffic information of the whole vehicular DTN;
• External denotes the adversary A generally can only capture the communications
between DTN nodes, but has no idea about the internal information stored in these
nodes.
• Limited control means the adversary A can control a very small fraction, (i.e., less
than 0.1), of vehicle nodes to launch some kinds of active attacks. (Note that, limited
controlling a small fraction of vehicles nodes does not help the adversary A to gain
other vehicles’ key materials.)
In specific, we consider the adversary A can launch the following attacks to either subvert
privacy or degrade the performance of the whole vehicle DTN.
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• Packet analysis attack: After eavesdropping a packet, the adversary A tries to iden-
tify the source identity by analyzing the packet, i.e., recover the packet content and
infer the source.
• Packet tracing attack: The adversary A eavesdrops the transmission of a single packet
as it traverses around the vehicular DTN. In such a way, the source and destination
locations of the packet can be traced. Note that the adversary A does not need to
recover the packet content to infer the source and destination locations of the flow.
• Black hole attack: In vehicular DTN, the adversary A first lures packets by claiming
that it can help forward them close to their destinations. However, all packets are
actually dropped by the adversary A. Clearly, the black hole attack is one kind of
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which can largely degrade the performance of the
whole vehicular DTN, especially when the adversary A controls some compromised
vehicle DTN nodes to launch the attack.
• Grey hole attack: Grey hole attack is a variant of black hole attack in vehicular DTN,
where the adversary A selectively forwards some packets but not all packets. This
kind of attack is hardly to detect because it is indistinguishable from the normal
packet dropping event when the vehicular DTN is poor-connected.
3.2.4 Design Goal
Based on the above models, our design goal in this work is to develop a social-based privacy-
preserving packet forwarding protocol for vehicular DTNs. Specifically, the following three
desirable objectives will be achieved.
• Optimizing vehicular DTN with RSU assistance. In a large vehicular DTN, when the
vehicle density is sparse, the contacting opportunity of vehicle DTN nodes is low,
which will incur the low delivery ratio in vehicular DTN, especially when the single-
copy technique is adopted. In order to prevent the overall performance degradation,
we introduce high social RSU deployment into vehicular DTNs. Because RSUs have
huge storage capabilities, they can temporarily store packets when the next-hop
vehicle node is not available. In addition, the high social capacities of these RSUs
can ensure they can contact many more vehicles in a very short time. As a result,
the delay due to RSU temporary storing can be confined, and the performance of the
vehicular DTN is optimized.
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• Resisting privacy-related attacks on vehicle DTN nodes. Because vehicular DTN is
usually implemented in civilian scenarios, where the locations of vehicle nodes are
tightly related to the citizens who are driving them. If the vehicular DTN discloses
the privacy information of the citizens, i.e., identity and location privacy, vehicular
DTN cannot be widely accepted by the public. Therefore, the citizens’ privacy must
be protected in order for wide acceptance to the public.
• Achieving conditional privacy preservation: Following the threat model discussed
earlier, if the adversary A launches the black/grey hole attacks by controlling a small
fraction of compromised vehicle nodes, these attacks are hard to resist, because these
compromised nodes have their valid key materials. Therefore, the absolute privacy
preservation is insufficient, and the conditional privacy preservation is expected. In
specific, once a compromised vehicle node launches the attack, a trust authority
(TA) should have ability to identity the compromised node and punish it under the
applicable law.
3.3 Proposed SPRING Protocol
In this section, we present our social-based privacy-preserving packet forwarding (SPRING)
protocol for vehicular DTNs, which mainly consists of the following two phases: system
initialization phase and opportunistic RSU-aided packet forwarding phase.
System Initialization Phase
Based on the system requirements, the following steps are performed to bootstrap the
whole system:
• Assume that there exists a TA in the system, which initializes the whole system.
Given the security parameter k, the composite bilinear parameters (n, g,G,GT , e)
are first generated by running CGen(k). Then, the TA chooses two elements (g, u)
of G, one generator h of Gq, two random exponents α, a ∈ Z∗n, a collision-resistant
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗n, and a secure symmetric encryption algorithm Enc().
After these, the TA sets the master key (gα, a, q) and the system public parameters
params = (G,GT , e, n, g, u, e(g, g)
α, A = ga, h,H,Enc()).
• For each vehicle vi ∈ V = {v1, v2, · · · }, the TA chooses a random number xi ∈ Z∗n
such that a + xi 6= 0 as a secret key, and computes Ai = g
1
a+xi ∈ G, Bi = gxi ∈ GT ,
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where g = e(g, g). Then, TA sets (xi, Ai) as vi’s anonymous credential and stores
duplet (vi, g
xiq) in the tracing list. In addition, TA authorizes Bi ∈ GT as the public
key of vi.
• For a specific area, the TA first investigates a set of intersection nodes C = {c1, c2, · · · }
and computes the social degree SDj of each intersection cj. Then, by setting a social
threshold ST , the TA derives a set of high social intersection nodes HS = {cj ∈
C|SDj ≥ ST}. At each high social intersection, TA places an RSU, authorizes a
secret key xj ∈ Z
∗
n and the corresponding public key Cj = g
xj ∈ GT for the RSU.
Note that the public key Cj here is associated with the intersection ci attested with
a certificate issued by the TA.
Opportunistic RSU-aided packet forwarding phase
Suppose that a source node v1 wants to send a sensitive message m ∈ GT to the destination
node v2, where the location L2 of v2 is assumed stationary and known by v1. To fulfill such
sensitive packet forwarding in vehicular DTN, the following steps will be executed.
Step 1. The source node v1 first uses the destination node v2’s public key B2 = g
x2 and
two random numbers k0, k1 ∈ Z
∗
n to encrypt the message m as
M = (α0, β0, α1, β1) = (m · B
k0
2 , g
k0, Bk12 , g
k1) (3.4)
the latter part of ciphertext (α1, β1) will be used for any future possible re-encryption on
M by RSUs in order to build up a mix network [65].
Step 2. When a passing-by vehicle node vi is willing to help forwarding the message
M , the source node v1 and node vi execute the following interactive operations.
• The passing-by vehicle vi first gets the current timestamp Ti and computes gx, where
x is randomly chosen from Z∗n. Then, vi uses the CPPA technique in Chapter 2.3.3
to construct CPPA(Ti||gx) and sends it to the source node v1.
• After checking the validity of CPPA(Ti||gx), v1 chooses another random number y ∈
Z∗q , encrypts the destination location L2 as D = (α2, β2) = (L2 · g
xy, gy), and sends
M ||D back to the passing-by vehicle vi.







the passing-by vehicle vi tries its best to help carrying the message M closer to the
destination.
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Step 3. After the vehicle vi carries the message M for a period of time, the destination
L2 is no longer on the vehicle vi’s way. Then, vi invokes the Algorithm 1 to forward the
message M to a proper next-hop node. Because RSU’s transmission range TR is larger
than vehicle’s transmission range TV , if there exists an RSU at some nearby intersection
ci on its way, the vehicle vi can first detect it. Then, vi will drive close to the RSU and
forward the message M with V-2-I communication as follows.
Algorithm 1 Packet forwarding in vehicular DTN
1: procedure Packet forwarding
2: when the vehicle node vi thinks it cannot help carrying message packet M any more, it
will first set a holding time to wait next-hope node (Th) and try to forward M to the next-hop
DTN node within Th
3: if vi detects an RSU located in a nearby intersection then
4: vi will drive close and forward the message M to the RSU
5: else if vi detects an available vehicle node vj nearby then
6: vi will forward the message M to vj
7: else if no next-hop node is available then
8: the message M has to be discarded
9: end if
10: end procedure
Vehicle-to-RSU (V-2-I) communication: Considering an average vehicle velocity of V =
60 km/h (≈ 16.6 m/s) and a transmission range TV = 300 m, the communication interval
(CI) for the vehicle vi and a stationary RSU located at intersection ci, as shown in Fig. 3.3,




= 36.1 s. Note that, if there are traffic
lights at the intersection, the CI can be longer than 36.1 s. Then, within the CI, the V-2-I
communication is executed by the follow steps:
• The RSU periodically broadcasts the beacon message within its coverage. Concretely,
the RSU first chooses a random number a ∈ Z∗n, signs the current timestamp Tj as
(α3, β3), where
α3 = g
a, β3 = a+ xj ·H(α3, Tj) mod n (3.5)
and broadcasts the beacon information (Tj , α3, β3).
• After receiving the beacon message (Tj, α3, β3) at time T ′j , the vehicle vi checks
whether T ′j − Tj ≤ ∆T . If it does not hold, vi believes it is a replay attack and
neglect it. Otherwise, vi checks g
β3 ?= α3 · C
H(α3,Tj)









Figure 3.3: Vehicle-to-RSU (V-2-I) communication
Cj = g
xj . If it holds, the beacon message is accepted. The correctness and security
can be referred to [66].
• The vehicle vi chooses a random number b ∈ Z∗n to encrypt the destination location
L2 as D = (α2, β2) = (L2 · gab, gb) and sends M together with D to the RSU.
• Upon receiving M ||D, the RSU first recovers L2 from
α2
β2





re-encrypt the message M = (α0, β0, α1, β1) as
M = (α0 · α1
















Then, the RSU stores L2||M and waits for the proper next-hop vehicle to carry it.
• Because the RSU is deployed at a high social intersection, the RSU may have already
stored many messages. Therefore, if the vehicle vi is willing to carry some of them to
their destinations or other high social RSUs closer to their destinations, it will use the
CPPA technique CPPA(Ti||gx) to again anonymously authenticate itself, where Ti is
a new timestamp here. Then, after checking the validity of CPPA(Ti||gx), the RSU,
like the source node v1, will forward some messages to vi. We assume each message
packet is 2 M and the packet transmission bitrate is 5 Mbps. (Note that, the 802.11p
physical layer offers different bitrates, ranging from 3 to 27 Mbps, from which we
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can choose [67].) By deducing the cost around 2 seconds used for authentication
between vehicle and RSU, we have (CI − 2) · 5 Mbps/2 M = (36.1 − 2) · 5/2 ≈ 85.
This result shows that almost 85 message packets can be forwarded between V-2-I
communications.
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V-2-V) communication: If no nearby RSU is found but an available
vehicle vj is passing by, then vi will forward the message M to vj with the V-2-V com-
munications. The concrete interactive operations are the same as those between v1 and
vi above. Consider both vi and vj having the same velocity V = 60 km/h (≈ 16.6 m/s)
and transmission range TV = 300 m, the communication interval (CI) between them on a




= 18.0 s. This calculation indicates that
forwarding between vehicle and vehicle should be fulfilled within 18.0 s. Because vehicle
has no huge storage and is also not as social as RSU in our network model, then the
18-second CI can fit for fewer packet forwarding between V-2-V communications.
Packet dropping case: As show in Algorithm 1, if none of RSU or vehicle is found as
an available next-hop node in vehicular DTN, the message M has to be dropped.
Step 4. If the message M = (α0, β0, α1, β1) is not dropped, it will eventually be relayed
to the destination node v2 at location L2. Then, the destination node v2 can use its secret









If m0 6= 1 and m1 = 1, the destination node accepts m0 as the valid plaintext m; otherwise,
the message M = (α0, β0, α1, β1) is invalid and will be rejected.
Correctness. SupposeM = (α0, β0, α1, β1) is temporarily stored at RSU only once, then


































x2 = 1 (3.8)
If M = (α0, β0, α1, β1) was stored in RSUs more than once, with simple deduction, the
correctness on recovering the plaintext m can also be checked. The details on this universal
re-encryption technique can be referred to [65].
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed SPRING protocol. In
specific, following the threat model discussed earlier, our analysis will focus on how the
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proposed SPRING protocol can resist to the packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack,
and the black (grey) hole attack, respectively.
3.4.1 Resilience to Packet Analysis Attack
In the proposed SPRING protocol, the source node v1 has encrypted the sensitive message
m into M = (α0, β0, α1, β1). Without knowing the destination node v2’s secret key x2,
the adversary cannot recover m from packet analysis. In addition, because the CPPA
anonymous authentication is adopted, no identity information will be disclosed. Therefore,
the proposed SPRING protocol can resist the packet analysis attack.
3.4.2 Resilience to Packet Tracing Attack
First, we consider no vehicle nodes controlled by the adversary A participate in the packet
forwarding. Then, the capability of the adversary is limited to eavesdrop the interactions
among V-2-V communications and V-2-I communications. Because the destination is en-
crypted in each interaction, the adversary cannot know the destination information. In
addition, in the proposed SPRING protocol, when an RSU receives M = (α0, β0, α1, β1)
from a vehicle, it will use the universal re-encrypt technique to convert M into another
form M = (α0 · α1k
′
0, β0 · β1
k′0 , α1
k′1, β1
k′1). Since k′0 and k
′
1 are randomly chosen from Z
∗
q ,
(α0, β0, α1, β1) and (α0 · α1k
′
0, β0 · β1
k′0, α1
k′1 , β1
k′1) are unlinkable. More importantly, since
the RSU is located at a high social intersection, a large number of vehicles pass by and
many packets will be temporally stored at the RSU, the RSU can naturally serve as a
mix server, as shown in Fig. 3.4. Then, for a specific message packet, only if it had been
temporally stored in a high social RSU at least once, the adversary cannot trace it only
by eavesdropping.
Second, we consider some vehicles controlled by the adversary A participate in the
packet forwarding. Clearly, in this case, the destination information is disclosed to the
adversary. However, in the proposed SPRING protocol, 1) the source node v1 is indistin-
guishable from other intermediate nodes during the V-2-V and V-2-I communications; 2)
the real identity will not be disclosed in the CPPA anonymous authentication, the adver-
sary still cannot determine who is the indeed source node. By summarizing the above, the
proposed SPRING protocol can resist the packet tracing attack.
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Mix Server
Figure 3.4: High social RSU serves as a mix server in vehicular DTNs
3.4.3 Resilience to Black (Grey) Hole Attack
Because of the CPPA anonymous authentication, the black (grey) attacks launched by the
external adversary can be efficiently resisted in the proposed SPRING protocol. However,
once the vehicle nodes controlled by the adversary A launch the black (grey) attacks,
because they know the valid key materials, and at the same time, the CPPA anonymous
authentication also makes them unlinkable, the black (grey) attacks in this case are serious
and hard to resist. Fortunately, the privacy preservation provided by the CPPA technique
is conditional, which provides the second line of defense. Once the witness CPPA(Ti||g
x) is
submitted to the TA, the TA can reveal the real identity by using the conditional tracking
algorithm in Chapter 2.3.3. Thus, if a message packet does not reach the destination L2,
then with the chain tracking policy shown in Fig. 3.5, each next-hop node participating in
such packet’s forwarding can be identified by the TA with the witness CPPA(Ti||gx)||L2
provided by the current node, where the destination L2 is used to assist the current node
to identify the involved next-hop node among many next-hop nodes. If the current node
cannot provide any witness, it becomes suspicious.
As shown in Algorithm 1, if no next-hop node is available, the message packet can also
be dropped. However, this packet dropping event is less than the event caused by the
packet dropping due to black (grey) hole attacks. Therefore, with the detection process in
Algorithm 2, the vehicle nodes who launched the black (grey) hole attacks can be identified.



























Figure 3.5: Detect the suspicious vehicle nodes with chain tracking
false positive and false negative could be high.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we study the average-case performance of the proposed SPRING protocol,
using a custom simulator built in Java. The performance metrics used in the evaluation
are average delivery ratio (DR) and packet average delay (AD), where the DR is defined
as the average ratio of the packets successfully delivered to the destinations with respect
to those generated by the sources within a given time period, and the AD is defined as the
average time between when a packet is generated at some source and when it is successfully
delivered to the destination. In addition, following the earlier design goal, we also evaluate
the resistance to packet tracing attack and detection of black (grey) hole attacks in the
simulations.
3.5.1 Simulation Setup
To simulate a sparse vehicular DTN, 50 vehicle nodes with transmission radius of 300
meters are first deployed to cover an interest Kitchener-Waterloo (K-W) region of 6, 000 m
× 15, 000 m, as shown in Fig. 3.6. In addition, 12 intersections are chosen as the candidates
for RSU deployment in the region.
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Algorithm 2 Detection of black (grey) hole attacks
1: procedure BlackGreyHoleAttackDection
2: With the chain tracking in Fig. 3.5, the TA can obtain each vehicle node vi’s packet
dropping number, denoted as Xi.




i=1 Xi, where V
is the cardinality of V.
4: Compute the distance of each Xi to the mean X as d(Xi) = |Xi −X |.
5: Define the thresholds TB, TG for black hole attack and grey hole attack, respectively.
6: for each vehicle node vi ∈ V = {v1, v2, · · · } do
7: if d(Xi) > TB then
8: vi is considered as a black hole attacker.
9: else if d(Xi) > TG then
10: vi is considered as a grey hole attacker.
11: else





















Figure 3.6: Kitchener-Waterloo (K-W) region considered for simulation
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Mobility model. In vehicular DTN, the performance of packet forwarding is highly
contingent upon the mobility of the vehicle nodes. Because the vehicle nodes are mostly
driven by the citizens, modeling the mobility patterns of citizens in a specific area (i.e.,
K-W region) can achieve a relatively accurate performance evaluation. Let s0 denote the
state that a person is located at any spot in the K-W region, and state s1, where s1 ⊂ s0,
denote the person is stationary at some spot in the downtown. A person stays at each
state si, i ∈ {0, 1}, for 120 ± 60 seconds, and then chooses the next state. If the current
state is s0, s/he will choose s1 as the next state with the probability ρ = 0.5 and s0 with
the probability 1− ρ. If the current state is s1, s/he will choose s0 with the probability 1.
Once the next state is determined, the person will drive the vehicle to the destination by
following the map-based shortest path routing with the velocity 60 km/h.
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                RSU set
Figure 3.7: Selection of high social intersections
High-social intersection selection & RSU deployment. Because each vehicle node follows
the map-based shortest path routing, we can use the simulations to statistically test the
social degree of each intersection in Fig. 3.6. Based on the definition of social degree in
Eq. (3.2), the duration for each simulation is set as one hour — a unit of time, and the
results, as shown in Fig. 3.7, are averaged over 1, 000 runs. After setting a proper social
threshold (ST), we can select high-social intersections HS = {c5, c6, c7, c9}, and place an
RSU at each intersection ci ∈ HS. To examine the outstanding performance of social-
based RSU deployment in the proposed SPRING protocol, we compare it with random
RSU deployment, complete RSU deployment and non RSU deployment in vehicular DTN.
The detailed parameter settings are summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Simulation Settings in SPRING
Parameter Setting
Simulation
duration time; area 10 hours; 6, 000 m × 15, 000 m
Vehicle node
number; storage; velocity 50; 20 MB; 60 km/h
transmission radius; mobility model 300 m; map-based shortest path
holding time to wait next-hop node Th = [10; 20; 40; 80] seconds
RSU
number; storage; transmission radius 50; 10000 MB; 1000 m
group 1 (no deployment) —
group 2 (random deployment) {c2, c4, c8, c11}
group 3 (social-based deployment) HS = {c5, c6, c7, c9}
group 4 (complete deployment) {c1, c2, · · · , c11, c12}
Message size; generation interval 2± 0.5 MB, 120± 20 seconds
In the following, we conduct the simulations with different parameter Th and different
RSU deployments. For each case, we run the simulation for 10 hours, and the average
performance results over 20 runs are reported.
3.5.2 Simulation Results
Delivery Ratio & Average Delay
Fig. 3.8 shows the delivery ratio varies with the specified period from 1 hour to 10 hours.
From the figure, we can see the delivery ratio in group 1 is lower than that in groups 2, 3 and
4. This observation validates that the V-2-V plus V-2-I based packet forwarding is more
reliable than the pure V-2-V based forwarding in vehicular DTN. Comparing the delivery
ratio in groups 2, 3 and 4, we can also observe that the more the RSUs are deployed,
the higher the deliver ratio is; when the number of deployed RSUs are constrained, the
social-based RSU deployment can achieve better deliver ratio than that with the random
RSU deployment. In addition, Fig. 3.8 also shows that, when the parameter Th increases,
a vehicle node has more chances to contact next-hop DTN nodes (vehicle and RSU), and
the delivery ratio will visibly increase.
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(d) Th = 80 seconds
Figure 3.8: Delivery ratio versus specified time period
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Fig. 3.9 depicts the average delay within 10 hours in different RSU deployments. From
the figure, we can see the average delay in groups 2, 3, and 4 is larger than that in group
1. As discussed above, the delivery ratio in pure V-2-V based forwarding is very low, and
many packets will be dropped, while the delivery ratio in V-2-V plus V-2-I based forwarding
is high, i.e., a larger number of successfully delivered packets can be temporarily stored in
the RSUs for achieving high delivery ratio. Therefore, for some delay tolerant applications,
high delivery ratio gained from some tolerant delay is an acceptable option. Because the
RSUs deployed at high social intersections can contact more vehicle nodes, the packets
stored in RSUs can be quickly forwarded. Thus, the average delay in social-based RSU
deployment is slightly lower than that in random RSU deployment. Another interesting
observation shown in Fig. 3.9 is that the average delay in social-based RSU deployment is
also lower than that in complete RSU deployment. The reason is that when the RSUs are
deployed at all intersections, many packets could be temporarily stored in some low-social
RSUs. Then, although the delivery ratio is improved, it possibly takes a slightly long time
to forward these packets to the next-hop vehicle nodes.




























Th=10 seconds Th=20 seconds Th=40 seconds Th=80 seconds
Figure 3.9: Average delay within 10 hours in different RSU deployments
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Free Packets from Tracing Attack
As we mentioned earlier in Section 3.4, the RSUs naturally serve as Mix servers in the
proposed SPRING protocol. Once a packet was temporarily stored at least in one RSU, it
can resist the packet tracing attack launched by the external adversary. Fig. 3.10 shows the
average number of successfully delivered packets in different RSU deployments. From the
figure, we can observe, the more the RSUs are deployed, the more the successfully delivered
packets are and the more the packets are temporarily stored at least in one RSU, as a
consequence, the more packets can get rid of the packet tracing attack. Further observing
the results in groups 2 and 3, we can conclude that the social-based RSU deployment can
achieve better effects than the random RSU deployment in the proposed SPRING protocol.
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Figure 3.10: Average number of successfully delivered packets
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Figure 3.11: Black (grey) hole attack detection
Detection of Black (Grey) Hole Attacks
The proposed SPRING protocol provides the second line of defense to detect black (grey)
hole attacks in privacy-preserving forwarding in vehicular DTNs. To evaluate the detection
effect, we consider 5 black hole attackers and 5 grey hole attackers (with packet dropping
probability (PDP)= 50%) among the total 50 vehicle nodes in the simulations. Then,
Fig. 3.11 depicts the detection effects in different groups. From the figure, we can see, i)
when more RSUs are deployed, the average dropped events will decrease; ii) the social-
based RSU deployment has low average dropped events than that in the random RSU
deployment. Therefore, when we choose proper thresholds TB and TG in Algorithm 2, these
black (grey) hole attackers can be detected. Note that, because the grey hold attackers
selectively drop the packets, the threshold TG should be more carefully chosen than TB,
especially when the PDP is low in grey hold attacks.
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3.6 Related Work
Recently, two research works on packet forwarding in DTNs are appeared, which are closely
related to the proposed SPRING protocol [63, 68]. In [63], Banerjee et al. perform an ex-
perimental and analytical study of mobile networks enhanced with relays, meshes, and
wired base stations. In specific, they first deploy a large-scale vehicular network and use
wired base stations, meshes and relay nodes as the stationary nodes deployed in an inter-
esting area to temporarily store packets for delivery to other mobile nodes, propagating
information towards the final destination. This work has the same idea on “stationary
node’s assistance” as the proposed SPRING protocol. However, the security and privacy
preservation issues are not addressed in the work. In [68], Hui et al. show that it is pos-
sible to detect characteristic properties of social grouping in a decentralized fashion from
a diverse set of real world traces, and demonstrate that such characteristics can be effec-
tively applied in packet forwarding decisions in DTN. Concretely, based on the observations
that human interaction is heterogeneous both in terms of popular individuals and groups or
communities, Hui et al. propose a social based forwarding algorithm (BUBBLE) for pocket
switched networks (PSNs). The experimental results show that the BUBBLE algorithm
can significantly improve the forwarding efficiency. Nevertheless, the security and privacy
preservation issues are still not discussed in BUBBLE. Distinct from the above works, the
proposed SPRING protocol not only heuristically studies the social-based RSU deploy-
ment for enhancing the delivery ratio in vehicular DTNs, but also discusses the privacy
preservation issues as well as black hole and grey hole attacks in vehicular DTNs.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a social-based privacy-preserving packet forwarding
(SPRING) protocol for vehicular DTNs. Based on social-based RSU deployment, the
proposed SPRING protocol has been identified to be not only capable of significantly im-
proving the reliability with V-2-V and V-2-I communications, but also able to achieve the
privacy preservation and resist the black (grey) hole attacks in packet forwarding. Through
extensive performance evaluation, we have demonstrated that the proposed SPRING pro-
tocol can achieve much better efficiency in terms of delivery ratio in vehicular DTNs.
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Chapter 4
Socialspot Strategy for Protecting
Receiver Location Privacy
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we introduced SPRING, a social-based privacy-preserving packet
forwarding protocol for vehicular DTNs, which can not only improve the reliability with
V-2-V and V-2-I communications, but also achieve the conditional vehicle identity privacy
preservation and resist the black (grey) hole attacks in packet forwarding. However, the
location of the destination is assumed stationary and known to the source in SPRING, and
as a result, the receiver’s location privacy is not protected. Since the flourish of VANET
still hinges upon fully understanding and managing the security and privacy challenges
including the location privacy that the public concerns [12, 69], in this chapter, we will
focus on how to protect receiver-location privacy in packet forwarding application [24] in
VANET.
Location privacy is one of important privacy requirements in VANET, since the loca-
tions of vehicles are tightly related to the drivers. Therefore, if VANET does not protect
vehicle’s location privacy, it cannot be accepted by the public. As for the packet forward-
ing application in VANET [24], to protect the receiver-location privacy, i.e., the receiver’s
location is unknown, a possible solution is adopting the flooding technique. However, as
we know, the flooding technique will result in a large number of duplicate packets in the
network. Though the flooding technique can protect the receiver-location privacy, it is
very inefficient, especially when the storage at each vehicle is constrained. Therefore, how
to simultaneously protect the receiver-location privacy and improve the performance of
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packet delivery in VANET has become a new challenging issue. Unfortunately, to the best
of our knowledge, this challenging issue has not be explored.
“Sacrificing the Plum Tree for the Peach Tree” is one of the Thirty-Six Strategies
of Ancient China, which means sacrificing something non-critical to ensure the overall
interests. In this chapter, we will use this tactic to propose an efficient socialspot-based
packet forwarding (SPF) protocol to address the above challenging issue [45], where the
socialspots are referred to as the locations in a city environment that many vehicles often
visit such as a shopping mall, a restaurant, or a cinema. Since socialspots are usually
low sensitive to the vehicles, we can utilize the socialspot as the relay node for packet
forwarding. In such a way, the performance of packet delivery can be significantly improved.
Meanwhile, since many vehicles visit the same socialspot, the socialspot cannot be used
to trace a specific vehicle’s other sensitive locations. Therefore, the socialspot tactic can
protect the receiver-location privacy in VANETs. The main contributions of this chapter
are two-fold.
• Firstly, based on the socialspot tactic, we propose an efficient SFP protocol aiming
at packet forwarding application in VANETs, and also conduct the comprehensive
security analysis to validate its security to protect the receiver-location privacy in
VANETs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to utilize the socialspot
tactic to resolve the above challenging issue.
• Secondly, we develop a custom simulator built in Java to examine the performance
of the proposed SPF protocol. Extensive simulation results show that, the socialspot
tactic can achieve good performance of packet forwarding in terms of packet delivery
ratio and average delay in VANETs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the
system model, privacy model and design goal. Our proposed SPF protocol is presented
in Section 4.3, followed by its security analysis and performance evaluation in Section 4.4
and Section 4.5, respectively. We also discuss the related work in Section 4.6. Finally, we
draw our summary in Section 4.7.
4.2 Models and Design Goal
In this section, we formalize the system model, privacy model, and identify our design goal.
61
4.2.1 System Model
We consider a typical VANET which consists of a trusted authority (TA), a large number




Figure 4.1: System model under consideration for SPF
• Trusted Authority (TA): TA is a trustable and powerful entity, whose duties include
initializing the system, deploying RSUs at some socialspots, and registering vehicles
by granting a family of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding key materials.
• Socialspots S = {ss1ss2, · · · }: Socialspots are referred to as the locations where many
vehicles will visit, for example, a shopping mall, a restaurant, or a cinema. At each
socialspot ssi ∈ S, TA will deploy a trusted and identified storage-huge RSU, so that
it can temporarily store some packets in packet forwarding application.
• Vehicles V = {V1, V2, · · · }: Each vehicle Vi ∈ V is equipped with the OBU device,
which allows them to communicate with each other as well as those RSUs at so-
cialspots for cooperative packet delivery in VANET. In general, the OBU device in
VANET has no power-limited issue, however the storage is assumed constrained.
4.2.2 Privacy Model
In our privacy model, we consider how to protect a vehicle receiver’s location privacy
against an external, global, and passive adversary A, where the adversary A does not com-
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promise any RSUs or vehicles, but has a complete view to eavesdrop all packets forwarding
in VANET. Note that, the adversary A could launch some active attacks such as black
hole attack, grey hole attack to degrade the performance in cooperative packet delivery
application [24]. However, since the focus of our work is on protecting receiver-location
privacy, these active attacks are beyond the scope of this chapter.
4.2.3 Design Goal
By utilizing the socialspot strategy, our design goal is to develop an efficient socialspot-
based packet forwarding (SPF) protocol to protect receiver-location privacy in VANETs.
Specifically, since not all locations in a vehicle Vi’s trajectory Tri = {tr1, tr2, · · · } are
sensitive to it, it is possible to reveal a non-sensitive socialspot that Vi often visits as a
stationary relay node so that the packet delivery performance can be improved. At the
same time, since many vehicles often visit the same socialspot, the RSU at the socialspot
can serve as a mix server [24], then the adversary A cannot link a specific packet to its
receiver. In addition, since each vehicle Vi periodically changes his pseudo-IDs on the road,
the receiver’s sensitive locations are unlinkable and privacy-preserving.
4.3 Proposed SPF Protocol
In this section, we will present our Socialspot-based Packet Forwarding (SPF) protocol for
protecting receiver-location privacy in VANET. Before proceeding the SPF protocol, the
rationale of socialspot strategy is first introduced.
4.3.1 Rationale of Socialspot Strategy
In reality, the locations in a driver’s trajectory is almost fixed. For example, a driver
may often drive to his home, school, and shopping mall. As for a driver, his home and
school could be privacy locations, which are sensitive to him; while the shopping mall is a
socialspot, which is usually not cared about. Therefore, it is possible to apply “Sacrificing
the Plum Tree for the Peach Tree” strategy to reveal a receiver’s socialspot as a stationary
relay node to improve the performance of packet forwarding in VANET while protecting





Figure 4.2: Socialspot strategy to improve the performance of packet forwarding
4.3.2 Description of SPF Protocol
The SPF protocol consists of four phases: system initialization phase, packet generation
phase, packet forwarding phase, and packet receiving phase.
System Initialization Phase
In the system initialization phase, the TA first configures the system parameter, chooses
social spots in a city environment, and registers vehicles in the system. Specifically, the
TA runs the following steps.
Step 1. Given the security parameter κ, the bilinear map groups (G,GT , e, P, q) are
generated by running Gen(κ), where e : G×G→ GT , P is a generator of G and q is a large
prime with |q| = κ. Then, TA chooses an random element Q ∈ G, and a random number
s ∈ Z∗q as the master key, and computes the corresponding system public key Ppub = sP . In
addition, TA chooses two secure cryptographic hash functionsH0,H1, whereHi : {0, 1}∗ →
Z∗q , for i = 0, 1, and a secure symmetric encryption algorithm Enc(). In the end, TA sets
the system public parameters params as (G,GT , e, P, q, Q, Ppub,H0,H1,Enc()).
Step 2. TA chooses a set of socialspots S = {ss1, ss2, · · · } in a city environment.
Then, at each socialspot ssi ∈ S, a storage-huge RSU is placed, which can be identified
and trusted by passing-by vehicles.
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Step 3. Assume the trajectory of a vehicle Vi ∈ V is Tri = {tr1, tr2, · · · } such that
Tri ∩ S 6= φ, i.e., at least there exists one location tra = ssb, with tra ∈ Tri and ssb ∈ S.
Then, when Vi registers himself, he submits his identity and the socialspot ssb to TA. TA
then grants a family of pseudo-IDs PID = {pid0, pid1, · · · } and the corresponding pseudo-
ID-based key materials for Vi by invoking Algorithm 3. In such a way, Vi can use pid0 at
socialspot ssb and constantly change its pseudo-IDs pidj ∈ PID, j ≥ 1, at other places to
achieve identity privacy [70] and location privacy in a city environment.
Algorithm 3 Vehicle Registration Algorithm
1: procedure VehicleRegistration
Input: a vehicle Vi ∈ V and a socialspot ssb ∈ S
Output: a family of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding pseudo-ID based key materials
2: choose a family of unlinkable pseudo-IDs PID = {pid0, pid1, · · · }
3: compute the private key S0 =
1
s+H0(pid0||ssb)
Q with respect to the pseudo-ID pid0 ∈ PID and the
socialspot ssb
4: for other pseudo-ID pidj ∈ PID, j ≥ 1 do





7: return all tuples (pidj , Sj) to Vi
8: end procedure
Packet Generation Phase
Assume that a stationary source wants to send a message M to a vehicle Vi ∈ V in the city
environment. However, the source does not know the exact location of Vi, what he knows
is only Vi’s pseudo-ID pid0 and the socialspot ssb. Then, the source executes the following
steps to generate a packet on M .
Step 1. The source first chooses a random number x ∈ Z∗q , and computes k = e(P,Q)
x,
and C1, C2, C3, where {
C1 = x(Ppub +H0(pid0||ssb)P )
C2 = H1(k||0), C3 = Enc(k,M)
Note that, (C1, C3) is a ciphertext of the anonymous identity-based encryption [71], which
thus can achieve the receiver-identity anonymous.
Step 2. The source then packs the packet P with the format shown in Fig. 4.3, where
Head := C1, Auth := C2, Encrypted-Payload := C3, and Socialspot := ssb, and waits for
some vehicles to help with forwarding the packet P to ssb.
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Head Auth Encrypted-Payload Socialspot
Figure 4.3: The format of packet in the SPF protocol
Packet Forwarding Phase
Generally, the law of proximity shows that if a packet is located close to the socialspot ssb,
it is more likely that it can be carried to ssb by some vehicles as soon as possible. Therefore,
in this phase, the source will ask a passing-by vehicle to help with carrying the packet P
to the socialspot ssb or other socialspots close to ssb. Specifically, the source invokes the
Algorithm 4 to forward the packet P.
Algorithm 4 Packet Forwarding Algorithm
1: procedure PacketForwarding
2: When a vehicle is passing-by the source, the source asks for the help. If vehicle can forward P to
ssb or other socialspots close to ssb, the source forwards P to the vehicle.
3: end procedure
If the packet P is successfully forwarded to the socialspot ssb, this phase is ended.
Otherwise, when the packet is forwarded to other socialspots close to ssb, then the RSU at
the socialspot will temporally store the packet P, and also invoke the Algorithm 4 to help
with forwarding P to ssb. The above RSU forwarding is iterative, and the packet P can
be forwarded to ssb eventually.
Packet Receiving Phase
Once the packet P reaches the socialspot ssb and is stored at the RSU, the vehicle Vi can
pick up the packet P by the following steps, when it comes across the socialspot ssb.
Step 1. The vehicle Vi first establishes a secure channel with the RSU by the following
interactions, as shown in Fig. 4.4.
• Vi sends his pseudo-ID pid0 to the RSU;
• RSU chooses a random number r ∈ Z∗q , computes the session key sk = e(P,Q)
r, and
sends the challenge Cha = r(Ppub +H0(pid0||ssb)P ) back to Vi;
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Vehicle Vi (pid0) RSU at socialspot (ssb)
pid0−−−−−−−−−→
r ∈ Z∗q , sk = e(P,Q)
r
Cha
←−−−−−−−−− Cha = r(Ppub +H0(pid0||ssb)P )
sk′ = e(Cha, S0)
Res = Enc(sk′, T )
Rep
−−−−−−−−−→ recover T from Res with sk
[T ]l
?
= 0l (a string of l zeros): if true, accept Vi
Secure channel is established with the session key sk = e(P,Q)r
Figure 4.4: Secure channel establishment between Vi and a trusted RSU
• After receiving the challenge Cha, Vi first computes sk
′ = e(S0,Cha), and the response
Res = Enc(sk′, T ), where T is a random number with the least significant l bits
[T ]l = 0
l, and then sends Rep back to RSU.
• Upon receiving the response Res, RSU recovers T from Res, and checks whether the
least significant l bits [T ]l
?
= 0l. If it is true, Vi is authenticated; and the secure
channel with the session key sk = e(P,Q)r is established. The correctness is as
follows





= e(P,Q)r = sk
Note that, because the RSU is trusted and can be identified by the vehicle, the unilateral
authentication on vehicle here is suitable for the application scenarios.
Step 2. Once the secure channel is established, the vehicle Vi picks up each packet’s




′||0), where k′ = e(Head, S0)
If the relation holds, Vi requests the packet’s Encrypted-Payload from RSU and recovers the
message M with k′ from the encrypted-payload C3 = Enc(k,M). The correctness is also
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as follows





= e(P,Q)x = k
In such a way, the message M is successfully received by the receiver Vi, and the SPF
protocol ends. Note that, because the receiver Vi is mobile, when Vi happens to move to
the location of the stationary source, Vi can also establish a secure channel with the source
and directly get the message M .
Computational costs. The computational costs of the SPF protocol is dominant
by the process that the vehicle Vi checks all packets stored in RSU. Let Tpair denote the
time to perform one pairing operation. Since the pairing operation dominates the speed of
each check, we only consider Tpair and neglect the hash operation in measure of the process.
Then, we can see the whole process requires n ·Tpair to complete checking all packets, where
n is the number of packets in the RSU. When we implement the SPF protocol by using
the bilinear maps in [14], we know that Tpair ≈ 4.5 ms, and then the costs are n · 4.5 ms.
If each packet is labeled with a timestamp, then the vehicle Vi only needs to check the
packets with the specific timestamp, and the computational costs can be reduced.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we will discuss the security issues of the proposed SPF protocol, i.e., the
receiver-location privacy-preservation against an external, global and passive adversary A
in VANETs.
• The packet P in the proposed SPF protocol can protect the receiver’s identity privacy.
Since Head and Encrypted-Payload in the packet P is (C1, C3), where
{
C1 = x(Ppub +H0(pid0||ssb)P )
C3 = Enc(k,M))
is a valid ciphertext of the anonymous identity-based encryption [71], (C1, C3) is provably
secure and will not disclose the receiver’s identity. At the same time, the Auth is C2 =
H1(k||0), where k = e(P,Q)x is also irrelative to the receiver identity pid0. Due to these
two reasons, the packet P can protect the receiver’s identity privacy, which is a prerequisite
for protecting receiver-location privacy.
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• The session key sk = e(P,Q)r between the vehicle and RSU is semantic secure and
can protect the receiver’s session privacy. Because the RSU is deployed at the socialspot,
it thus will store many different vehicles’ packets. If the session key is secure, it is hard
for an adversary to link a packet to a receiver. In the following, based on the DBDH
assumption, we first prove that the session key sk = e(P,Q)r is semantic secure, which
serves as the necessary condition for receiver’s session privacy. Assume that there is an
adversary A′ which runs in a polynomial time and has a non-negligible advantage ǫ′ to
break the semantic security of the session key sk in the proposed SPF protocol, then we
can use the capability of A′ to construct another adversary A to break the DBDH problem,
i.e., given (xP̃ , yP̃ , zP̃ , V ), decide whether or not V = e(P̃ , P̃ )xyz for unknown x, y, z ∈ Z∗q .
First, A sets the system parameters P = xP̃ and Q = zP̃ , which implicitly shows that
Q = zP̃ = z
x
P . Then, A chooses a random number t ∈ Z∗q , and implicitly define the master
key s = t
x
− H0(pid0||ssb) mod q. Note that, due to unknown x, the implicitly defined s
is also unknown to A, but it does not affect the interactions between A and A′. Next, A
also implicitly defines a random number r = y
t
mod q used in the challenge Cha. Then, the
challenge Cha is























In addition, A computes V
1
t ∈ GT and uses it to encrypt a random number T with [T ]l = 0l
as the response Res = Enc(V
1
t , T ). In the end, A sends (P,Q,Cha,Res) to A′ for creating
the attack environment of A′.
Upon receiving (P,Q,Cha,Res), A′ sends a request of guess on the session key. Then,
A flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and sends V
1
t to A′. When A′ receives the V
1
t ∈ GT , he returns a
bit b′ as the guess of b.
Let E be the event that (P,Q,Cha,Res) are all valid. When the event E occurs, A′ can
launch his attacking capability, and we define AdvskA′ = 2Pr[b
′ = b|E] − 1 ≥ ǫ′ to be the
advantage probability of A′, i.e.,













If the DBDH challenge (xP̃ , yP̃ , zP̃ , V ) is actually a bilinear pairing tuple (xP̃ , yP̃ , zP̃ , V =
e(P̃ , P̃ )xyz), i.e., b̃ = 0 in ExpDBDHA , then
V
1
t = e(P̃ , P̃ )
xyz
t = e(xP̃ , zP̃ )
y
t = e(P,Q)r
and Res = Enc(V
1
t , T ) is also valid. Therefore,
Pr
[
ExpDBDHA = 1|̃b = 0
]






However, if the DBDH challenge (xP̃ , yP̃ , zP̃ , V ) is a random tuple (xP̃ , yP̃ , zP̃ , V = R),
i.e., b̃ = 1 in ExpDBDHA , we know V
1
t 6= e(P,Q)r, the response Res is not valid, and the
event E does not occur. Then, the guess of A is independent of b. Therefore,
Pr
[
ExpDBDHA = 1|̃b = 1
]
= Pr[b′ = b|¬E] =
1
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This result indicates that the session key sk = e(P,Q)r is semantic secure in the proposed
SPF protocol, as required. Furthermore, because the session key sk = e(P,Q)r is semantic
secure, when it is used to encrypt the communications between the vehicle and the RSU,
the vehicle’s session privacy is protected, i.e., an adversary A cannot know which packet
the vehicle has picked up from the RSU.
• The receiver’s sensitive locations are unlinkable in the proposed SPF protocol. As
we know, each vehicle Vi holds a family of unlinkable pseudo-IDs and the corresponding
key materials, and only pseudo-ID pid0’s key is related to the socialspot ssb, other keys are
independent of the locations. Therefore, when Vi periodically changes its pseudo-IDs on
the road, other sensitive locations of Vi are unlinkable.
In summary, we can clearly see that the proposed SPF protocol can protect the receiver-
location privacy in VANETs.
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the average-case performance of the proposed SPF protocol,
using a custom simulator built in Java. The performance metrics gauged in the evaluation
are average packet delivery ratio (DR) and average packet delay (AD), where the DR is
defined as the average ratio of the packets successfully reach their destinations with respect
to those generated by the sources within a given time period, and the AD is defined as the
average between when a packet is generated at source and when it is successfully delivered
to its destination.
4.5.1 Simulation Settings
In the simulation, N = {40, 80} vehicles with transmission radius of 300 meters and veloc-
ity varying from 40 km/h to 60 km/h are moving in an interest area of 10, 000×10, 000 m2,
as shown in Fig. 4.5. In addition, 6 socialspots are randomly chosen in the region, each
socialspot is deployed with a storage-huge RSU to help with temporarily storing the pack-
ets.
10,000 m x10,000 m
Figure 4.5: Interest area considered for simulation in SPF
Mobility model. In VANET, the performance of packet forwarding is highly contingent
upon the mobility of the vehicles. Meanwhile, since the rationale of socialspot tactic is
based on the assumption that each vehicle often visits at least one socialspot, we consider a
special but more realistic mobility model in the simulation. Set each vehicle Vi’s trajectory
Tri = {tr1, tr2, · · · } contains the same number of locations, i.e., |Tri| = S = {3, 5}. In
the trajectory Tri, at least one location belongs to the socialspots, and the rest locations
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are randomly distributed in the area. In the simulation, each vehicle moves around his
individual trajectory. Specifically, each vehicle Vi first equally chooses one location in his
trajectory Tri = {tr1, tr2, · · · }, and gets there using the map-based shortest path routing.
After reaching the destination, with 2-minute pause time, the vehicle again equally chooses
a new destination in Tri and repeats the above.
The detailed parameter settings in the simulations are summarized in Table 4.1. We
perform the experiments with different N = {40, 80} and different S = {3, 5}. For each
case, we run the simulation 10 hours, and the average delivery ratio and average packet
delay over 50 runs are reported.
Table 4.1: Simulation Settings in SPF
Parameter Setting
Simulation area 10, 000× 10, 000 m2
Simulation duration 10 hours
Number of socialspots, RSU storage 6, 10000 M
Number of vehicles N = {40, 80}
Number of locations in vehicle’s trajectory S = {3, 5}
Vehicle velocity and transmission 40 ∼ 60 km/h, 300 m
Vehicle storage and waittime 20 M, 2 minutes
Package size, generation interval 1 M, 5 minutes
4.5.2 Simulation Results
Fig. 4.6(a) shows the average DR varies with the time period from 1 hour to 10 hours. From
the figure, we can observe that, with the increase of time, the DR will increase accordingly.
When the number of socialspots S is fixed, the DR in N = 80 case is higher than that in
N = 40 case. The reason is that, when more vehicles move around the area, more packets
can be carried to the socialspots, then the receivers can get their packets when they visit
the socialspots. Furthermore, when the number of vehicles N is fixed, the DR in S = 5
case is lower than that in S = 3 case at the initial stage and will be higher in the late
stage. The reason for the phenomena is that at the initial stage, the number of generated
packets is small, fewer packets should be carried to the socialspots. When S = 5, receivers
have lower frequency to visit the socialspots to pick up their packets. Therefore, the DR is
lower than that in S = 3 case. However, in the late stage, the number of generated packets
is larger. When S = 5, vehicles can carry more packets to the socialspots. Accordingly,
when the receivers visit the socialspots, they can receive more packets. Therefore, the DR
is larger than that in S = 3 case.
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Figure 4.6: The average packet delivery ratio and average delay
Fig. 4.6(b) shows the AD varies with the time period from 1 hour to 10 hours corre-
sponding to the DR in Fig. 4.6(b). From the figure, we can see, with the increase of time,
the AD will also increase, but the increased delay can improve the DR. When the number
of socialspots S is fixed, 80 vehicles can carry packets more quickly to the socialspots than
40 vehicles. As a result, the AD in N = 80 case is lower than that in N = 40 case. Mean-
while, when the number of vehicles N is fixed, vehicles will visit more locations in S = 5
than that in S = 3 case. Therefore, the AD in S = 3 is lower than that in S = 5 case, but
the corresponding DR is also lower.
4.6 Related Work
Recently, several research works have been reported [72, 73, 24], which are closely related
to the proposed SPF protocol. Jian et al. [72] study the packet-tracing attack and pro-
pose a location privacy routing (LPR) protocol in combination with fake packet injection
technique to protect receiver-location privacy in wireless sensor networks. In [73], Cheng
et al. propose an efficient packet cloaking routing mechanism to protect the privacy of a
receiver. The main idea in packet cloaking is to transmit multiple copies of a sent packet
to a selected group of k receivers, so that an adversary may only identify the true receiver
with a probability of 1/k. Although both LPR protocol and packet cloaking mechanism
can protect the receiver-location privacy, they cannot be applied to VANET, since the re-
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ceivers in VANETs are vehicles, which move around in the city environment. Our previous
work SPRING [24] studies how to utilize the vehicle mobility model, i.e., map-based short-
est routing, to improve the performance of packet forwarding in vehicular DTN. However,
SPRING only addresses the stationary receiver, and does not consider the receiver-location
privacy. Different from SPRING, the proposed SPF protocol considers the more realistic
mobility model, which not only protects the receiver-location privacy, but also improves
the performance of packet delivery.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, based on the “Sacrificing the Plum Tree for the Peach Tree” — one of
the Thirty-Six Strategies of Ancient China, we have proposed a socialspot-based packet
forwarding (SPF) protocol for protecting receiver-location privacy in VANETs. Detailed
security analysis has shown that, only when a receiver sacrifices one socialspot that he often
visits, all his other sensitive locations can be protected against an external, global, passive
adversary. In addition, through extensive performance evaluation, we have demonstrated
that the temporarily storing packets at socialspots can achieve much better efficiency in




Strategy for Location Privacy
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we presented SPF protocol, where we introduced “sacrificing the
plum tree for the peach tree” strategy in VANETs to achieve receiver location privacy in
packet forwarding application. Specifically, in SPF protocol, each vehicle holds a family of
pseudo-IDs, one is public and used at social spot to efficiently receive packets, and others
are constantly changed by the vehicle to achieve identity privacy and location privacy.
Now, the question is how, when and where the vehicle changes these pseudo-IDs? And is
the pseudonyms changing effective? To answer this question, in this chapter, we proposed
an effective pseudonyms changing at social spots strategy to facilitate a vehicle to achieve
high-level location privacy.
It is well known that, to achieve location privacy, a popular approach recommended
in VANETs is that vehicles periodically change their pseudonyms when they are broad-
casting safety messages (where each safety message is a 4-tuple including Time, Location,
Velocity, Content, and is authenticated with a Signature with respect to a Pseudonym)
[7, 2, 28]. Because a vehicle uses different pseudonyms on the road, the unlinkability
of pseudonyms can guarantee a vehicle’s location privacy. However, if a vehicle changes
its pseudonyms in an improper occasion, changing pseudonyms has no use to protect lo-
cation privacy, since an adversary could still link a new pseudonym with the old one
[74]. As an example shown in Fig. 5.1, when three vehicles are running on the road, if
only one vehicle changes its pseudonyms during ∆t, an adversary can still monitor the
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pseudonyms’ link. Even though all three vehicles change their pseudonyms simultane-
ously, the Location and Velocity information embedded in safety messages could still
provide a clue to the adversary to link the pseudonyms, making the privacy protection
fail. Therefore, it is imperative for us to exploit the accuracy of location privacy achieved
by frequent changing pseudonyms in VANETs [75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80]. Formally, we let
−→
F = {F1, F2, F3, · · · } be multi-dimensional character factors associated with a pseudonym
changing process. For example, the vector
−→
F = {F1, F2, F3, · · · } can represent factors
{Time, Location, Velocity, · · · }. In some specific scenarios, an adversary has the abil-
ity to monitor a subset
−→
F n = {F1, F2, · · · , Fn} ⊂
−→
F and use it for identifying a vehicle
pseudonym changing process. Suppose
−→
b 0 = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) and
−→
b 1 = (y1, y2, · · · , yn) be
the characteristic vectors of two vehicles’ pseudonym changing processes observed by an





































b 1) = 1. Due to the monitoring in-




b 1)| ≤ ǫ, for some small confusion value ǫ > 0, two pseudonyms
changing processes can be regarded as indistinguishable in the eye of the adversary. There-
fore, in order to protect location privacy with high quality, a vehicle should choose a proper
scenario where as many as possible indistinguishable pseudonyms changing processes are
taken place simultaneously.
Pseudonyms z1 and z2 are still linkable
t t+ ∆t
x1 y1 x1 y1
z2z1
Figure 5.1: Pseudonyms link due to changing pseudonyms at an improper occasion
In this chapter, to facilitate vehicles to achieve high-level location privacy in VANETs,
we propose an effective pseudonyms changing at social spots strategy, called PCS [46]. In
the PCS strategy, the social spots are the places where many vehicles temporarily gather,
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e.g., the road intersection when the traffic light turns red, or a free parking lot near a
shopping mall. If all vehicles change their pseudonyms before leaving the spot, the first
broadcasted safety message includes indistinguishable information Location= social spot,
Velocity=0, and unlinkable Pseudonym. Then, the social spot naturally becomes a mix
zone, and the location privacy can be achieved. Specifically, in this work, our contributions
are threefold.
First, we utilize the unique feature of social spots, i.e., many vehicles temporarily stop
at the social spot, to propose the PCS strategy. In addition, as an important technical
preliminary of PCS strategy, we present a practical key-insulated pseudonym self-delegation
(KPSD) model, which securely generates many on-demand short-life keys and can mitigate
the hazards due to vehicle theft.
Second, we take the anonymity set size (ASS) as the privacy metric (the larger the
anonymity set size, the higher the anonymity achieved [81, 74]) to measure the Quality of
Privacy (QoP) achieved in PCS strategy. To the best of our knowledge best knowledge,
most previously reported schemes [74, 80] use the simulations to gauge the achieved location
privacy in VANETs, and thus our anonymity set analytic models will shed light on this
research line.
Third, to guarantee the PCS strategy can be effectively adopted in practice, we use
the simplified game theoretic techniques to formally prove the feasibility of the PCS strat-
egy. As a result, the PCS strategy can really guide vehicles to intelligently change their
pseudonyms for better location privacy at the right moment and place.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we formalize the
problem by describing the network model, threat model, and identifying the requirements of
location privacy in VANETs. Then, we present the PCS strategy in Section 5.3, followed by
the performance evaluations in Section 5.4. We also review some related work in Section 5.5.
Finally, we draw our summary in Section 5.6.
5.2 Problem Definition
In this section, we define the problem by formalizing the network model, threat model,
and identifying the requirements of location privacy in VANETs.
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5.2.1 Network Model
We consider a VANET in the urban area, which consists of a large number of vehicles and
a collection of social spots1 as
• Vehicles: in the urban area, a large number of vehicles are running on the road ev-
eryday. Each vehicle is equipped with an OnBoard Unit (OBU) device, which allows
the vehicle to communicate with other vehicles for sharing local traffic information
to improve the whole safety driving conditions.
• Social Spots: the social spots in the urban area refer to the places where many
vehicles gather, for example, a road intersection when the traffic light is red or a free
parking lot near the shopping mall, as shown in Fig. 5.2. Since the session of red
traffic light is typically short, (i.e., 30 or 60 seconds), the road intersection is called
a small social spot. As a shopping mall usually operates for a whole day, indicating
that a number of customers’ vehicles will stop at the parking lot for a long period,
the free parking lot near the mall is hence called a large social spot. Notice that as
social spots usually hold many vehicles, if all vehicles indistinguishably change their
pseudonyms in the spots, the social spots naturally become mix zones.
5.2.2 Threat Model
Unlike other wireless communication devices, the OBU devices equipped on the vehicles
cannot be switched off once vehicles are running on the road [82]. Then, an eavesdropper,
through the safety messages broadcasted by the OBU, can monitor the location information
of a specific vehicle all the time. Concretely, in our threat model, we consider a global
external adversary A equipped with radio devices to trace the vehicles’ locations, where
• Global means the adversary A has the ability to monitor and collect all safety
messages in the network with radio devices plus some special eavesdropping in-
frastructure mentioned in [15], where each safety message includes Time, Location,
Velocity, Content as well as Pseudonym. Since Pseudonym is unlinkable and Content
could be set as irrelevant, the adversary A primarily tracks a vehicle in terms of Time,
Location, Velocity, i.e., in a spatial-temporal way in our model.
1We confine our problem to pseudonym changing in the V-2-V communication mode, and do not include
Roadside Units (RSUs) in the current network model, although RSUs are still deployed to support V-2-R




Figure 5.2: Social spots including the road intersection and free parking lots
• External denotes the adversary A can only passively eavesdrop the communications,
but does not actively attempt to compromise the running vehicles.
Notice that an adversary A of course can track vehicles by using cameras in the urban
area. However, the cost of global eavesdropping with cameras is much higher than that
of radio based eavesdropping [80]. Therefore, the camera based global eavesdropping is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
5.2.3 Location Privacy Requirements
To resist the global external adversary’s tracking and achieve the location privacy in
VANETs, the following requirements must be satisfied.
• R-1. Identity privacy is a prerequisite for the success of location privacy. Therefore,
each vehicle should use pseudonym in place of real identity to broadcast messages.
Then, by concealing the real identity, the identity privacy can be achieved.
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• R-2. Each vehicle should also periodically change its pseudonyms to cut down
the relation between the former location and the latter location. In addition, the
pseudonyms changing should be performed at the appropriate time and location to
ensure that the location privacy is achieved.
• R-3. Location privacy should be conditional in VANETs. If a broadcasted safety
message is in dispute, the trusted authority (TA) can disclose the real identity, i.e.,
TA has the ability to determine the location where a specific vehicle broadcasted a
disputed safety message.
Recall that the social spots can serve asmix zones naturally. In what follows, we explore
this feature and propose the PCS strategy for achieving location privacy in VANETs.
5.3 Proposed PCS Strategy for Location Privacy
In this section, we present our PCS strategy for achieving location privacy in VANETs.
Specifically, we develop two anonymity set analytic models to investigate the location
privacy level achieved in the PCS strategy, and use simplified game theoretical techniques to
discuss its feasibility. Before delving into the details of the PCS strategy, we first present a
practical key-insulated pseudonym self-delegation (KPSD) model, which securely generates
many on-demand short-life keys and serves as the basis of the proposed PCS strategy.
5.3.1 KPSD Model for PCS Strategy
To support the PCS strategy, a vehicle must hold a certain amount of pseudonyms. In
[7], a simple and straightforward solution is proposed, where an OBU device equipped on
a vehicle possesses a large number of anonymous short-time keys authorized by a Trusted
Authority (TA). Obviously, this solution can achieve conditional location privacy when
periodically changing the pseudonyms. However, it may take a large storage space to store
these short-time keys in OBU device. GSIS [12] is a group signature based technique which
can achieve conditional location privacy without pseudonyms changing. However, the
pure group signature verification is usually time-consuming which may be not suitable for
some time-stringent VANET applications. ECPP [14] is another anonymous authentication
technique which combines group signature and ordinary signature. In ECPP, when a
legal vehicle passes by an RSU, the RSU will authorize a group signature based short-life
anonymous certificate to the vehicle. Then, the vehicle can use it to sign messages with
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ordinary signature techniques [83]. Once receiving a signed message, anyone can verify the
authenticity of message by checking both the anonymous certificate and message signature.
Note that, when the vehicle signs many messages, any verifier only needs execute one group
signature verification operation on certificate, thus it is more efficient than GSIS. Similar
to ECPP, Calandriello et al. [84], inspired by the idea of pseudonymous PKI for ubiquitous
computing [62], also combine group signature and ordinary signature techniques to achieve
anonymous authentication in VANETs. Because the short-life anonymous certificate is
generated by the vehicle itself, their scheme is very flexible. However, once a vehicle
is stolen, the vehicle thief can arbitrarily generate valid short-life anonymous certificates
before being detected. Then, the potential hazards could be large. To mitigate such









Apply PCS strategy to change short-
period keys for location privacy
Figure 5.3: Practical KPSD model for location privacy in VANETs
As shown in Fig. 5.3, in KPSD model, TA does not directly preload authorized anony-
mous key to the vehicle, instead, it provides the authorized anonymous key to the user —
the owner of the vehicle. The user usually stores the authorized anonymous key in a secure
environment, i.e., at home. When s/he is ready to go out for a travel, like feuling enough
gasoline, s/he first generates required self-delegated short-life keys, and installs them in
the OBU device. Later, when the vehicle is running in the urban area, these short-life keys
can be used to sign messages. Because vehicle theft is still a serious concern currently, e.g.,
statistics show that there have been over 170,000 vehicles stolen each year in Canada [61],
these short-life keys could be abused by the thieves, once the vehicle is stolen. However,
81
different from previous works [7, 12, 14, 84], the authorized anonymous key in KPSD model
is not stored in the vehicle. Thus, the vehicle thieves cannot generate more short-life keys.
As a result, the hazards due to vehicle theft can be mitigated in KPSD model. Note that
if the authorized anonymous key is protected by a password-based tamper-proof device,
Calandriello et al.’s scheme [84] can fall into our key insulated pseudonym self-delegation
model, but the cost will increase accordingly.
In the following, we construct an efficient KPSD scheme with asymmetric bilinear
groups [52], which serves as the basis of the PCS strategy.
Construction
Our proposed KPSD scheme is based on Boneh-Boyen short signature [59] and the con-
ditional privacy preservation authentication technology [14, 24], which mainly consists of
the following four parts: system initialization, key generation, pseudonym self-delegated
generation, and conditional tracking.
System Initialization: Similar to the notations used in [52], let k be a security parameter,
G, G′ and GT be three (multiplicative) cyclic groups of the same large prime order q
generated by AGen(k), where |q| = k. Suppose G, G′ and GT are equipped with a pairing,
i.e., a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map e : G × G′ → GT such
that e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab ∈ GT for all a, b ∈ Z
∗
q and any g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2. We denote
by ψ the isomorphism from G′ onto G, that we assume to be one-way (easy to compute,
but hard to invert). TA first chooses two random numbers u, v ∈ Z∗q as the master-key,
and computes U1 = g1
u, U2 = g2
u, and V1 = g1
v. In addition, TA also chooses a public
collision-resistant hash function: H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q. In the end, TA publishes the system
parameters params = (q,G,G′,GT , e, g1, g2, U1, U2, V1, H).
Key Generation: When a user Ui with identity IDi joins the system, TA first chooses
a random number si ∈ Z∗q such that si + u 6= 0 mod q, computes Ai = g
1
si+u
1 . Then, TA
stores (IDi, A
u
i ) in the tracking list and returns ASKi = (si, Ai = g
1
si+u
1 ) as the authorized
anonymous key to the user.
Pseudonym Self-Delegated Generation: After receiving the authorized anonymous key
ASKi, Ui places it in a secure environment (e.g., at home). When Ui starts to travel in the
city, he first runs the following steps to generate the required anonymous short-life keys
used for the travel, which is very analogous to the fueling of a vehicle before a travel.
1. Ui first chooses l random numbers x1, x2 · · · , xl ∈ Z∗n as the short-life private keys
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and computes the corresponding public keys Yj = g
xj , for j = 1, 2, · · · , l for the
travel.
2. For each short-life public key Yj, Ui computes the anonymous self-delegated certificate
Certj as follows





α, TV = Ai · V1
α, δ = α · xi mod q
δ1 = U1








• Compute c = H(U1||V1||Yj||TU ||TV ||δ1||δ2||δ3) and sα, sx, sδ ∈ Z∗q , where
{
sα = rα + c · α mod q, sx = rx + c · xi mod q
sδ = rδ + c · δ mod q
(5.2)
• Set Certj = {Yj||TU ||TV ||c||sα||sx||sδ} as the certificate.
3. After all anonymous self-delegated certificates Certj, j = 1, 2, · · · , l, are generated,
Ui installs them to the vehicle, i.e., implanting all xj ||Yj||Certj, j = 1, 2, · · · , l, into
the OBU device.
Later, when Ui is driving the vehicle in the city, he can use one short-life key xj ||Yj||Certj
to authenticate a message M by signing σ = g2
1
xj+H(M) , and broadcast
msg = (M ||σ||Yj||Certj) (5.3)
Upon receiving msg = (M ||σ||Yj||Certj), everyone can check the validity by the fol-
lowing.























If it does hold, the certificate Yj||Certj passes the verification. The corrections are as



















iii) δ′3 = e(TV , g2
sx ·U2
c)/e(V1, U2
sα ·g2sδ)e(g1, g2c) = e(TV , g2rx)/e(V1, U2
rα ·g2rδ) = δ3.
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= e(g1, g2) (5.6)





xj+H(M) ) = e(g1, g2). Note that the value of e(g1, g2) can be pre-
computed in advance.
Conditional Tracking: Once an accepted message M under the certificate
Certj = {Yj||TU ||TV ||c||sα||sx||sδ}












uvα/guvα = Aui (5.7)





Since both the short signature [59] and conditional privacy preservation authentication
[14] are secure, the security of the proposed KPSD scheme can be guaranteed, i.e., it
can effectively achieve anonymous authentication with conditional tracking to fulfill the
requirements of location privacy. In addition, the proposed KPSD scheme can also mitigate
the hazards due to vehicle theft, since the authorized anonymous key ASKi is key-insulated,
i.e., it is stored in a secure environment, then vehicle thieves can not obtain ASKi from
the stolen vehicle, and consequently can not generate new self-delegated short-life keys
arbitrarily.
Performance
In VANETs, it is a very challenging issue for a vehicle to verify too many signed messages
in a stringent time, e.g., within 300 msec. Let Tpair, Texp-1, Texp-2 be the time costs for
pairing operation, exponentiation in G and G′, respectively. Then, to check n messages
from the same source, where n ≥ 1, the verification cost of the proposed KPSD anonymous
authentication and the pure group signature-based (GSB) anonymous authentication are
(3 + n)Tpair + (4 + n)Texp-1 + 5Texp-2 and 3nTpair + 4nTexp-1 + 5nTexp-2, respectively. Since
Tpair is dominant over Texp-1 and Texp-2, we set Tpair as 4.5 ms as in [14] and make the
comparison in Fig. 5.4. Clearly, it can be seen, when n is large, the proposed anonymous
authentication is much more efficient than the pure GSB anonymous authentication.
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Figure 5.4: Time cost comparison
Algorithm 5 Pseudonym Changing at Social Spots Strategy
1: procedure PCS Strategy
2: Case 1: Small social spot
3: A vehicle Vi stops at road intersection when the traffic light turns red. When the traffic light
turns to green, Vi changes its pseudonym.
4: Case 2: Large social spot
5: A vehicle Vi stops at a free parking lot near a shopping mall. When leaving the parking lot,
Vi changes its pseudonym.
6: end procedure
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5.3.2 Anonymity Set Analysis for Achieved Location Privacy
With the above KPSD scheme, each vehicle can hold a number of pseudonyms on the
road, then it can apply the PCS strategy, as shown in Algorithm 5, to protect its location
privacy. To gauge the benefits from the PCS strategy, we next develop two anonymity set
analytic models to investigate the location privacy achieved in small social spots and large
social spots, respectively.
Anonymity set analysis at small social spots
Small social spot
Figure 5.5: Pseudonym changing at an intersection
As shown in Fig. 5.5, when the traffic light turns red, the road intersection can be
regarded as a small social spot, since a fleet of vehicles will stop at the intersection [80].
Consider all vehicles will simultaneously change their pseudonyms when the traffic light
turns to green. Then, the road intersection naturally becomes a mix zone. Let Sa be
the number of vehicles stopped at the intersection, we will have the expected anonymity
set size (ASS) = Sa. Clearly, the larger the anonymity set size ASS is, the greater the
anonymity is offered in the small social spot. We can use a trivial anonymity set analytic
model on ASS to investigate the anonymity level provided by the small social spot.
Let Ts = t, where t = 30, 60 seconds, be the fixed stop time period of a specific road
intersection. Let vehicle arrival (VA) at the road intersection be a Poisson process, and ta
be the inter-arrival time for VA, where ta has an exponential distribution with the mean
1
λ
. Let X be the random variable of vehicles arriving at the road intersection during the
period Ts. Then, based on [85, 86], the probability X = x during Ts = t can be expressed
as





and the expected number of X can be computed as
E[X|Ts = t] =
∞∑
x=1
xPr[X = x|Ts = t] = λt (5.9)
Since all vehicles leave the intersection after the traffic light turns to green2, the
anonymity set size ASS is
ASS =Sa = E[X|Ts = t] = λt (5.10)
if all vehicles follow the PCS strategy.
Anonymity set analysis at large social spots
As shown in Fig. 5.6, a large social spot could be a free parking lot near a shopping mall
[61]. Because a parking lot usually holds many vehicles, and each vehicle randomly leaves
the parking lot at the user own will, such a parking lot also naturally becomes a mix zone
if all users change their pseudonyms in the parking lot and leave the parking lot after a
random delay. Because a parking lot can obfuscate the relation between the arriving and
leaving vehicles, the location privacy of user can be achieved.
Let Sa be the number of vehicles in the parking lot when a vehicle is ready to leave.
Then, the anonymity set size denotes ASS = Sa. In the following, we propose an anonymity
analytic model on ASS to investigate the anonymity level provided by the large social spot.
For a specific vehicle V that has entered a parking lot near a shopping mall for changing
pseudonyms, we consider the time period from the mall’s opening time, e.g., 8:00 AM,
to the vehicle V’s leaving time after pseudonyms changing, TS, as shown in Fig. 5.7, is
exponentially distributed with the density function f(t), the mean 1
µ
, and the Laplace





. On the other hand, other vehicles enter/leave a parking lot at
the drivers’ own willing, for example, a driver determines when and how long he will stop
at the mall. Let vehicle arrival (VA) at the parking lot be a Poisson process, and ta be




In addition, the time period between the time when a vehicle arrives at the parking lot
2Note that when the number of waiting vehicles is larger than some threshold, only part of the waiting
vehicles can leave the intersection after the traffic light turns to green, and some vehicles have to wait for
the next green light. In this case, the number of waiting vehicles (Nv) can be regarded as the initial value





































Figure 5.7: Timing diagram (there is no vehicle stopping in the parking lot initially)
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and the time when it leaves, tu, is assumed having the density function fu(·), the mean
1
ω
and the Laplace transform f ∗u(s). Let X be the random variable of vehicles arriving at
the parking lot during the time period Ts. Then, the probability X = x during the period
Ts = t follows Pr[X = x|Ts = t] =
(λt)x
x!
e−λt, and for t ≥ 0,
Pr[X = x] =
∫ ∞
t=0




































Let χ be the time period between the time when a vehicle arrives at the parking lot
and the time when the specific vehicle V leaves the parking lot after pseudonyms changing.









During the period Ts, many vehicles may leave the parking lot before V’s leaving, i.e.,
tu < χ, while others leave after V, i.e., tu ≥ χ. Assume that Y is the number of vehicles
leaving the parking lot before V, then the probability Pr[Y = y|X = x] can be computed
as









Then, the probability Pr[tu ≥ χ] can be calculated as


















and Pr[tu < χ] can be derived from Pr[tu ≥ χ] as





After that, Eq. (5.14) can be rewritten as




































Therefore, the expected anonymity set size ASS for the specific vehicle V’s pseudonyms
changing is

























Since the exponential distribution has been widely used in modeling many realistic
scenarios [85], we assume that tu also follows the exponential distribution. Then, the
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5.3.3 Feasibility Analysis of PCS Strategy
The above anonymity set analyses are under the assumption that all vehicles change their
pseudonyms. In this subsection, we use the simplified game theoretic techniques to show
the feasibility of PCS strategy, i.e., we prove that each vehicle is really willing to change
the pseudonym at social spots for achieving its location privacy in practice.
Let the anonymity set size ASS be N = n+ 1, where n ≥ 0, at social spots, which can
be estimated by the above anonymity set analysis. Then, we investigate the scenario where
all vehicles are rational to protect their location privacy. At social spots, each vehicle Vj,
1 ≤ j ≤ N has two possible actions: change (C) the pseudonym with probability pj and
keep (K) the pseudonym with probability 1 − pj. If Vj keeps its pseudonym at the social
spot, it will still be tracked with probability 1. Then, the loss of Vj’s location privacy is
unchanged, and the payoff in this action is a normalized location privacy loss of −dj , where
dj ∈ (0, 1) is the Vj’s self-evaluation on the importance of location privacy. On the other
hand, when Vj changes its pseudonym at the social spot, if there are other vehicles taking
the same action as well, the anonymity set size will become S. After this social spot, Vj
remains being tracked only with probability 1
S
. As such, the loss of location privacy in this
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case is reduced to −dj
S
. Let cj ∈ (0, 1) be Vj ’s normalized cost of changing a pseudonym,
so the payoff in this action is −dj
S
− cj . For all vehicles except Vj , let pm be the minimum
of all probabilities {pi|1 ≤ i ≤ N, i 6= j}. Then, when Vj is ready to change its pseudonym








· pim · (1− pm)
n−i · (i+ 1)
= npm + 1





− cj , if action C is taken;
−dj , else if action K is taken.
(5.22)
Since vehicle Vj is rational and its goal is to protect its location privacy, the condition








With the adopted KPSD scheme, all vehicles generate and manage their pseudonyms
by themselves, they can generate enough pseudonyms before a travel, then the cost of
changing pseudonym can be very low. Nevertheless, when npm is 0, Eq. (5.23) does not
hold, which indicates when there is no neighboring vehicle changing its pseudonym, Vj also
does not change its pseudonym. However, when npm is large than 0, Vi is always able to
reduce the cost cj such that cj <
npmdj
npm+1
. Then, Vj can actively change the pseudonym at








Then, LPGj is an increase function in terms of pm. When pm = 1, i.e., all vehicles change







Since each vehicle is rational to maximize its location privacy gain, it would be a win-
win situation when they all change their pseudonyms. As a result, the feasibility of PCS
strategy in practice is shown.
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5.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the location privacy level achieved in the PCS strategy. In
particular, extensive simulations are conducted to demonstrate the impacts of different
parameters on the performance metrics in terms of the anonymity set size (ASS) and
location privacy gain (LPG). Our simulations are based on a discrete event simulator coded
in C++, where the simulation parameters are listed in Table 5.1 for two scenarios: the small
social spot and the large social spot. For each case, we repeat the simulation 100 times
with different random seeds and calculate the average value with 95% confidence intervals.
In addition, we compare the simulation results (denoted as Sim) with the numerical ones
(denoted as Ana) to validate the developed analytical models.
Table 5.1: Simulation Settings in PCS
Parameter Values
TS: time period at small social spot 30, 60 seconds
1/λ: at small social spot [2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12] seconds
1/µ: mean of TS at large social spot [1, 2, · · · , 10] hours
1/λ: at large social spot [2, 4, 6] minutes
1/ω: at large social spot [10, 20, · · · , 90] minutes
di: a vehicle’s self-evaluation on the impor-
tance of its location privacy
normalized
We first validate the location privacy level achieved at small social spot, i.e., a road
intersection when the traffic light turns red. Consider the stopping time period TS = 30, 60
seconds for a low traffic intersection and a high traffic intersection, respectively. Fig. 5.8
shows the ASS and LPG versus 1/λ varying from 2 seconds to 10 seconds with increase
of 2. From the figure, it can be seen that ASS and LPG decrease with the increase of
1/λ. The reason is that with a large 1/λ, less vehicles drive at the road intersection when
traffic light is red, which leads to a small number of vehicles gather at the intersection, as
a result, it causes a smaller ASS as well as a lower LPG. In addition, a large TS also has
a positive impact on ASS and LPG. Therefore, to achieve a high location privacy level,
a large intersection with high traffic is a good choice for vehicles, which tallies with our
common sense.
To evaluate the location privacy level achieved at large social spot, we consider a free
parking lot near a shopping mall. Parameterized with 1/µ = 4 hours, Fig. 5.9 shows the
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Figure 5.8: ASS and LPG versus 1/λ with different TS at small social spot















1/λ = 2 minutes (Sim)
1/λ = 2 minutes (Sim)
1/λ = 4 minutes (Sim)
1/λ = 4 minutes (Ana)
1/λ = 6 minutes (Sim)
1/λ = 6 minutes (Ana)
(a) ASS versus 1/ω
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1/λ = 4 minutes (Ana)
1/λ = 6 minutes (Sim)
1/λ = 6 minutes (Ana)
(b) LPG versus 1/ω
Figure 5.9: ASS and LPG versus 1/ω with 1/µ = 4 hours at large social spot
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impacts of 1/ω on the performance metrics in terms of ASS and LPG. From the figure,
it can be seen, as 1/ω increases, both ASS and LPG also increase. The reason is that
the larger 1/ω, the more vehicles will park at the parking lot. In addition, the smaller
1/λ also achieves a larger ASS and a higher LPG. Therefore, when a vehicle changes its
pseudonyms in a parking lot near a prosperous shopping mall (with small 1/λ and large
1/ω), the high location privacy level can be guaranteed. From the figure, it can also be
seen that the simulation and analysis results match very well, which justifies the accuracy
of the analytical model.
Fig. 5.10 shows the impact of the parameter 1/µ on ASS and LPG. We can see, except
the first two hours, with the increase of 1/µ, both ASS and LPG smoothly increase. The
results indicate that a vehicle can change its pseudonyms at most of daytime for better
location privacy at large social spot, no matter in the morning or afternoon. In the figure,
the gaps between the simulation results and the analytical results are small, which can be
further reduced if larger number of simulation runs are conducted.
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1/λ = 6 minutes (Sim)
1/λ = 6 minutes (Ana)
(b) LPG versus 1/µ
Figure 5.10: ASS and LPG versus 1/µ with 1/ω = 40 minutes at large social spot
5.5 Related Work
There have been a few prior efforts on frequently changing pseudonyms in mix zones to
achieve location privacy in VANETs. In the following, some research works closely related
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to ours are reviewed. In [87], Gerlach proposes an approach, called context mix, to protect
the location privacy of vehicles. In context mix, a vehicle permanently assesses its neigh-
borhood, and changes its pseudonyms only if the vehicle detects k vehicle with a similar
direction in a confusion radius. The context mix is an intuitive approach for achieving
location privacy in VANETs. However, how to detect k vehicles in neighborhood and how
to guarantee neighboring vehicles to react similarly should be further exploited. In [78],
Li et al. propose two user-centric location tracking mitigation schemes called Swing and
Swap, where Swing can increase location privacy by enabling the nodes to loosely syn-
chronize updates when changing their velocity, and Swap enables the vehicle to exchange
their identifiers to potentially maximize the location privacy provided by each update. In
[74], Butyan et al. define a model to study the effectiveness of changing pseudonyms to
provide location privacy in VANET. Concretely, they characterize the tracking strategy of
the adversary in the model, and introduce a metric to quantify the level of location privacy
enjoyed by the vehicles. Additionally, they also use extensive simulations to study the rela-
tionship between the strength of the adversary model and the level of the privacy achieved
by changing pseudonyms. In [80], Freudiger et al. use cryptographic techniques to create
mix zones at road intersections and combine these mix zones into vehicular mix networks,
then leverage on the mobility of the vehicles and the dynamics of road intersections to mix
vehicle identifiers. Finally, they evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed mix system by
simulations. Different from the above works, our PCS strategy suggests the vehicles to
change pseudonyms at social spots (as mix zones), to maximize the location privacy, and
theoretically analyze the achieve location privacy.
In the research line of the placement of mix zones, Freduiger et al. [88] analyze the
optimal placement of mix zones with combinational optimization techniques, and show
that the optimal mix zone placement performs comparatively well to the fully deployment
scenarios. This work is instructive, which guides the placement of mix zones in VANETs.
In our PCS strategy, due to the characteristics of social spots, and at the same time, since
the KPSD model can provide each vehicle enough secure pseudonyms for changing, social
spots are in nature of mix zones for achieving better location privacy.
The size of the anonymity set and the entropy of the anonymity set are two pop-
ular quantitative measurements of location privacy in VANETs [89]. Following Beres-
ford and Stajano’s seminal work [75], the location privacy of a vehicle corresponding to a
pseudonyms changing (PC) event is the entropy of Pi→PC, i.e., H(PC) = −
∑N
i=1 Pi→PC ·
log2(Pi→PC), where Pi→PC is the probability of the mapping of a vehicle i to PC event and
N is the total number of vehicles in the mix zone. When N increases, and Pi→PC is uni-
formly distributed, i.e., Pi→PC = 1/N , the entropy reaches the maximum H(PC) = log2N .
Therefore, when pseudonyms changing events are indistinguishable in social spots, both
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the size and the entropy of the anonymity set size can measure the achieved location pri-
vacy. In this work, our PCS strategy adopts anonymity set size as the metric, and focuses
on developing anonymity set analytical models to investigate the location privacy level.
In [90], Freudiger et al. observe that self-interested mobile nodes may not cooperate in
changing pseudonyms in mix zone and would jeopardize the achieved location privacy. To
address this issue, they use the game-theoretical techniques to analyze the non-cooperative
behavior of mobile nodes. In our PCS strategy, we also use game theory to analyze the
feasibility. Since the adopted KPSD scheme provides each vehicle with enough pseudonyms,
each vehicle is willing to change its pseudonym at social spot for achieving better location
privacy. As a result, the feasibility is easily analyzed.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an effective pseudonym changing at social spots (PCS)
strategy for location privacy in VANETs. In particular, we developed two anonymity set
analytical models in terms of ASS to formally analyze the achieved location privacy level,
and we used game theoretic techniques to prove its feasibility. In addition, we introduced a
practical KPSD model to mitigate the hazards caused by vehicle theft. To the best of our
knowledge, most previously reported works on mix-zone based pseudonyms changing only
use the simulations to evaluate the achieved location privacy. Therefore, our analytical






Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs), as a special instantiate of mobile ad hoc network,
have been subject to extensive research efforts not only from the government, but also
from the academia and automobile industry in recent years [12]. In VANETs, each vehicle
is equipped with OnBoard Unit (OBU) device, which allows them communicate with each
other, i.e., vehicle-to-vehicle (V-2-V) communication, as well as to the Roadside Units
(RSUs), i.e., vehicle-to-infrastructure (V-2-I) communication. Compared with traditional
ad hoc networks, the hybrid of V-2-V and V-2-I communications makes VANETs more
promising, and can provide a board of safety-related (e.g., emergence report, collision
warning) and non-safety-related (vehicle chatting, downloading and sharing files on the
road) applications close to our daily lives. Due to these salient applications, VANETs have
been increasingly attractive to the public.
Vehicle chatting is one of the most promising applications in VANETs, which allows
vehicles moving along the same road to chat with each other on some topics of common
interest, for the purpose of passing the time during the commute or asking for a help on
the road [91]. However, the success of vehicle chatting application in VANETs still hinges
up the fully understanding and managing the security and privacy challenges that the
public concerns, for example, the identity privacy, location privacy, and interest privacy.
Because VANETs are usually implemented in civilian scenarios, where the locations of
vehicles are tightly related to people who drive them. If the vehicle chatting application
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discloses the vehicle’s identity privacy and location privacy, it cannot be accepted by the
public. In recent years, these two kinds of privacy have been deeply discussed in VANETs
[12, 14, 24]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the interest privacy, as a special
privacy requirement in vehicle chatting application, has not been explored. Therefore,
how to identify a vehicle who is like-minded and establish a shared session key for secure
chatting, and how to prevent other vehicles who are not like-minded from knowing one
vehicle’s interest have become two newly emerging privacy challenges in vehicle chatting
application.
In this chapter, to address the above challenging privacy issues in vehicle chatting
application, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving finding like-minded vehicle protocol,
called FLIP [47], which allows two vehicles with the common interest to identify each other
and establish a shared session key, and at the same time, protects their Interest-Privacy
(IP) from other vehicles who do not have the same interest on the road. Specifically, the
contribution of this chapter are two-fold.
• Firstly, we propose an efficient IP-preserving FLIP protocol aiming at vehicle chatting
application in VANETs, and formalize its security model as well. Then, we apply
the provable security technique to validate its security within the defined model.
• Secondly, we develop a custom simulator built in Java to measure the relation be-
tween the IP-preserving level and the delay for finding the like-minded vehicle. The
extensive simulation results show that, after setting a required IP-preserving level, a
vehicle can find a like-minded vehicle within an expected time.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the
system model and design goal, as well as the security model of FLIP. Then, we present our
IP-preserving FLIP protocol in Section 6.3, followed by its security analysis and perfor-
mance evaluation in Section 6.4 and Section 6.5, respectively. We also generalize the FLIP
protocol with a lightweight Privacy-preserving Scalar Product Computation (PPSPC) in
Section 6.6 and discuss the related work in Section 6.7. Finally, we draw our conclusions
in Section 6.8.
6.2 System Model and Design Goal




We consider a VANET in a city environment, which consists of a large number of vehicles
V = {V1, V2, · · · } and a single offline trusted authority (TA), as shown in Fig. 6.1. Since we
confine our problem to the scenario where vehicles find like-minded vehicles with common
interest on the road without the assistance of RSUs, we do not include RSUs in our current
model, although they are still deployed to support V-2-I communication.
TA
Chatting on the 
topic of common 
interest
RSU
Figure 6.1: System model under consideration
• Trust Authority (TA): TA is a trustable and powerful entity. The responsibility of
TA is in charge of management of the whole network, for example, initializing the
system, registering the vehicles in the system by assigning a finite set of pseudo-IDs
and the corresponding key materials to each vehicle. Note that TA is an offline entity,
which is not directly involved in the V-2-V communications.
• Vehicles V = {V1, V2, · · · }: Each vehicle Vi ∈ V is equipped with the OBU device,
which allows them to communicate with each other for sharing some information of
common interest. Different from the mobile nodes in the general ad hoc network,
the OBU device in VANET has no power-constrained issue and at the same time, is
equipped with powerful computational and communication capabilities. According
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to [67], the medium used for communications among the neighboring vehicles is 5.9
GHz Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) identified as IEEE 802.11p,
and the transmission range of each vehicle is 300 m. When two vehicles Va, and
Vb ∈ V are within their transmission range, they can chat on the topics of common
interest on the road.
6.2.2 Design Goal
Security requirements and design goal
Security and privacy are always of vital importance to the flourish of vehicle chatting
application in VANETs. Without the guarantee of vehicle’s privacy including identity pri-
vacy, location privacy and interest privacy, vehicle chatting application cannot be widely
accepted by the public. Therefore, it is essential to protect vehicle’s privacy. Specifically,
the following security requirements should be ensured in vehicle chatting application: i)
vehicle’s real identity should be protected; ii) vehicle’s location privacy should be guaran-
teed; and iii) vehicle’s interests should be protected against others who does not have the
common interest.
In regard of the former two security requirements, each vehicle can use pseudo-ID
to conceal the real identity, and periodically change multiple pseudo-IDs to achieve the
location privacy [12, 14]. However, for the third security requirement, vehicles should use
some IP-preserving protocols to find other vehicle who has the common interest on the
road. Concretely, when a vehicle Va wants to talk with another vehicle Vb nearby, if Vb
has the common interest with Va, Va and Vb can establish a shared session key used for
secure chatting on the topics of common interest. However, if Vb does not have the common
interest with Va, neither Va nor Vb can know the counterpart’s interest.
To satisfy the above security requirements, our design goal is to develop an efficient
privacy-preserving finding like-minded vehicle protocol (FLIP) in VANET environments.
With FLIP, vehicles who have the common interest can establish a shared session key
without violating IP to others who have non-common interest. To subtly check the security
of FLIP protocol in terms of IP-preserving, we should formally define its security model
as follows.
Security model of FLIP
To model all possible leakages of IP in finding like-minded vehicle protocol on the road, we
define the security model of FLIP by borrowing some ideas from security model of authen-
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ticated key exchange (AKE) protocols [92] to describe some possible attacks. Specifically,
in the model, the vehicles do not deviate from the FLIP protocol, while an adversary A,
whose attack capabilities are modelled by a set of pre-defined oracle queries, can passively
monitor and/or actively control all the inter-vehicle communications. We assume that two
vehicles Va and Vb participate in FLIP for common interest Iα ∈ I = {I1, I2, · · · , Ik}.
Each of them has several instances called oracles involved in distinct executions of FLIP,
where the common interest Iα varies in different executions. We denote an instance s




s-th instance Va executing FLIP with Vb on the common interest I
s
α, where α ∈ N and
1 ≤ α ≤ k.
Adversarial Model: We allow the adversary A to access to all transcripts in the
FLIP. All oracles only communicate with each other via A. The adversary A can replay,
modify, delay, interleave or delete transcripts.
• Execute(ΠsVa,Vb): This query models passive attacks, where A accesses an honest
execution of FLIP between Va and Vb by eavesdropping.
• SendReq(ΠsVa , ∗): This query models A can send a transcript m to the requestor-
instance ΠsVa , and get back the answer of Π
s
Va
by following FLIP. The adversary A can
use this query to perform active attacks by modifying and inserting the transcript




initializes the protocol, and thus the adversary A receives the transcripts sent out by
Va to Vb.
• SendRes(ΠsVb , ∗): This query models A can send a transcript m to the responsor-
instance ΠsVb , and get back the answer of Π
s
Vb
by following FLIP. The adversary A
can use this query to perform active attacks by modifying and inserting the transcript
of the protocol to identify the IP of the responsor Vb.
• Reveal(ΠsVa,Vb): This query models the known session key attack. The adversary A
can get access to an old session key that has been previously established. Once
ΠsVa,Vb is valid and holds some session key, then Π
s
Va,Vb
will send the session key and
the common interest Isα to A when it receives the query.
• Corrupt(Vi): This query models exposure of the private key corresponding to pidi held
by Vi ∈ {Va, Vb} to the adversary A. In reality, the scenarios that Vi may discard
some outdated pseudo-ID and its corresponding key materials are modelled by this
query.
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• Test(ΠsVa,Vb): This query is used to define the advantage of the adversary A. When
the adversary A queries on an instance ΠsVa,Vb based on the common interest I
s
α,
where 1 ≤ α ≤ k, A is given either the actual session key or a random value drawn
from the session key space, according to a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., actual session
key is given when β = 0 and a random value is drawn when β = 1. The Test query
can be asked at most once by A.
Freshness: The freshness is a useful notion, which identifies the session keys about
which the adversary A ought not to know anything since A has not revealed any oracles
that have accepted the session key and has not corrupted Vi ∈ {Va, Vb}. An oracle ΠsVa,Vb is
said fresh if i) ΠsVa,Vb has accepted a session key and Π
s
Va,Vb
has not been asked for a Reveal
query; ii) No Corrupt query has been asked before a query of the form SendReq(ΠsVa , ∗) or
SendRes(ΠsVb , ∗).
Definition of Security: The security of FLIP is defined using the following game,
played between A and a collection of ΠsVa,Vb oracle for vehicles Va, Vb and s ∈ N, where
Va, Vb are first assigned pseudo-IDs and the corresponding key materials, respectively.
• In the game, Amay ask some queries and get back the answers from the corresponding
oracles.
• At certain point, A asks a Test query to a fresh oracle, and outputs its guess α′ for
α, where 1 ≤ α ≤ k, and β ′ for the bit β in the Test query.
The success of A in the game is quantified in terms of A’s advantage in distinguishing
whether A guesses the correct common interest Isα, and receives a real session key or not,
i.e., its ability guessing α, β. We define A’s advantages as
AdvαP(A) = k · Pr[α = α
′]− 1,AdvβP(A) = 2 · Pr[β = β
′]− 1
We say that the FLIP is secure if both AdvαP(A) and Adv
β
P(A) are negligible.
6.3 Our Proposed FLIP Protocol
In this section, we present our efficient privacy-preserving finding like-minded vehicle
protocol (FLIP), which mainly consists of two parts: system initialization and privacy-
preserving finding like-minded vehicle on the road.
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vehicle Va (pida) vehicle Vb (pidb)
choose I+ ∈ I = {I1, I2, · · · , Ik}, x ∈ Z∗q
X = xH(I+), σa = ECDSA(I||X)
I||X||σa||pida||certa−−−−−−−−−−−−→
if σa is valid
choose I− ∈ I, y ∈ Z∗q , Y = yH(I
−), Z = yX
Auth0 = H0(pida||pidb||Z)
σb = ECDSA(X ||Y ||Auth0)
X||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−





if it holds (when I+ = I− = Iα)
Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z
′)
Auth1−−−−−−−−−−−→ if Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z) holds
session key sk = H2(pida||pidb||Z
′) session key sk = H2(pida||pidb||Z)
Figure 6.2: Proposed Privacy-preserving Finding Like-minded Vehicle Protocol
6.3.1 System Initialization
In the system initialization phase, the Trusted Authority (TA) first initializes the whole
system by running the following steps. Given the security parameter l, TA generates an
elliptic curve group G = 〈P 〉, where the generator P has a large prime order q with |q| = l.
Then, TA chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q as the master key and compute the correspond-
ing system public key Ppub = sP . In addition, TA also chooses four secure hash functions
H,H0,H1, and H2, where H : {0, 1}
∗ → G and Hi : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q , for i = 0, 1, 2. In the
end, TA publishes the public system parameters params as {G, P, q, Ppub,H,H0,H1,H2}
and keeps the master key secretly.
When a vehicle Vi ∈ V itself to the system, TA first checks the vehicle Vi’s validity. If
Vi is valid, TA generates a family of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding key materials for
Vi using Algorithm 6. In such a way, Vi can constantly change its pseudo-IDs to achieve
identity privacy and location privacy on the road.
6.3.2 Privacy-preserving Finding Like-minded Vehicle
When a vehicle Va ∈ V is on the road and wants to find a like-minded vehicle Vb ∈ V on
the common interest Iα nearby, as shown in Fig. 6.2, they will run the following steps to
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Algorithm 6 Vehicle Registration Algorithm
1: procedure VehicleRegistration
Input: a verified vehicle Vi ∈ V
Output: a family of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding key materials
2: choose a family of unlinkable pseudo-IDs PID = {pid1, pid2, · · · }
3: for each pseudo-ID pidj ∈ PID do
4: randomly choose a private key xj ∈ Z
∗
q
5: compute the corresponding public key Yj = xjP
6: assert (pidj , Yj) with certificate certj signed by TA with s
7: end for
8: return all tuples (pidj , xj , Yj , certj) to Vi
9: end procedure
establish a shared session key sk regarding the common interest Iα.
Step 1. Va first sets an interest set I, which consists of k kinds of interests {I1, I2, · · · , Ik},
where Va’s actual interest I
+ is involved. Then, Va chooses a random number x ∈ Z
∗
q ,
computes X = xH(I+), and uses the ECDSA algorithm to make a signature σa =
ECDSA(I||X) on I||X with regard to the pseudo-ID pida and the certificate certa. In
the end, Va broadcasts the request I||X||σa||pida||certa to the nearby vehicles.
Step 2. Upon receiving the request I||X||σa||pida||certa, a nearby vehicle Vb first
checks the validity of σa with pida||certa. If it is invalid, Vb neglects the request. Oth-
erwise, Vb chooses his interest I
− ∈ I and a random number y ∈ Z∗q , computes Y =
yH(I−), Z = yX , and Auth0 = H0(pida||pidb||Z). In addition, Vb makes a signature
σb = ECDSA(X||Y ||Auth0) on X||Y ||Auth0 with regard to the pseudo-ID pidb and the cer-
tificate certb, and returns the response X||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb to Va. Note that, in the
protocol, Vb is only allowed to make at most one response for the same request.
Step 3. After receiving the responsor Vb’s response X||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb, the
requestor Va first checks the validity of σb with pidb||certb. If it is invalid, Va neglects the
response. Otherwise, Va computes Z




If it holds, Va computes and sends Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z
′) to Vb, and calculate the session
key sk = H2(pida||pidb||Z
′).
Step 4. When Vb receives Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z
′), he checks whether Auth1
?
=
H1(pida||pidb||Z). If it holds, Vb calculates the session key sk = H2(pida||pidb||Z). If
I+ = I− = Iα for some 1 ≤ α ≤ k, Va and Vb have the shared session key sk, i.e., the
vehicle Va successfully finds an like-minded vehicle Vb on the road.
Correctness. If the interests I+ and I− are same, i.e., I+ = I− = Iα ∈ I, then
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H(I−) = H(I+),
Z ′ = xY = xyH(I−) = xyH(Iα) = yxH(I
+) = yX = Z
and both the authenticators Auth0 = H0(pida||pidb||Z), Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z
′) and the
session key sk are valid. However, if I+ 6= I−, then H(I−) 6= H(I+) and
Z ′ = xY = xyH(I−) 6= xyH(I+) = yX = Z
which indicates that Auth0, and Auth1 are not valid, and the shared session key sk cannot
be established. Therefore, the correctness of the proposed FLIP protocol follows. Note
that, the responsor Vb can only respond once for the same request. Otherwise, by succes-
sive responses to the same request, the requestor’s IP can be guessed by non-like-minded
vehicles. In reality, the requestor Va usually can detect whether a nearby vehicle Vb has
responded more than once based on Vb’s relative location and other correlative information
on the road. Thus, the successive-response attack can be prevented.
6.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we will demonstrate the IP can be protected against non-like-minded ve-
hicles without collusion in the proposed FLIP protocol. Note that, since the ECDSA
signature is unforgeable, all transcripts in FLIP are detectable if they are altered by the
adversary. Therefore, we should only consider an adversary cannot break the proposed
FLIP protocol without altering the transcripts.
Theorem 3 Let A be an adversary against the proposed FLIP protocol in the random ora-
cle model, where the hash functions H,H0,H1, and H2 behave as random oracles. Assume
that A has the advantage AdvαP(A) = ε to guess the correct interest Iα, and the advantage
AdvβP(A) = ǫ breaks the proposed FLIP protocol without altering the transcripts, within
the running time τ , after several oracles defined in the adversarial model. Then, there exist
ǫ′ ∈ [0, 1] and τ ′ ∈ N as follows
ǫ′ = SuccCDHA ≥
ǫ
qsqH2
, τ ′ ≤ τ +Θ(.)
such that the CDH problem can be solved with probability ǫ′ and within time τ ′, where Θ(.)
is the time complexity for the simulation, qH2 is the total number of H2 oracle queries, and
qs is the total number of session instances Π
1
Va,Vb







On input of an interest Ii ∈ I = {I1, · · · , Ik}
choose a fresh random number ri
R
←− Z∗q
compute Hi = riP , set H(Ii) = Hi
add (Ii, ri, Hi) to H-list
return Hi∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-SendRes(ΠsVb , I||X ||σa||pida||certa)
if s = γ then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
choose the same interest Iα identified with s
obtain the tuple (Iα, rα, Hα) in H-list
compute Y = rαyP , set Z = ⊔
choose a fresh random number uα0
R
←− Z∗q
set Auth0 = H0(pida||pidb||Z) = uα0
add (pida||pidb||Z, uα0) to H0-list
compute σb = ECDSA(X ||Y ||Auth0)
return X ||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb
else if s 6= γ then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
choose the same interest Ii identified with s
obtain the tuple (Ii, ri, Hi) in H-list
chooses yi ∈ Z∗q , set Y = yiHi, Z = xiyiHi
choose a fresh random number ui0
R
←− Z∗q
set Auth0 = H0(pida||pidb||Z) = ui0
add (pida||pidb||Z, ui0) to H0-list
compute σb = ECDSA(X ||Y ||Auth0)
return X ||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-H0,H1,H2
On input of pida||pidb||Zi on Hj , j ∈ {0, 1, 2}
choose a fresh random number uij
R
←− Z∗q
set Hj(pida||pidb||Zi) = uij
add (pida||pidb||Zi, uij) to Hj-list
return uij∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-Corrupt(Vi) with Vi ∈ {Va, Vb}
return private key x̃i of Vi with respect to pidi∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-Reveal(ΠsVa,Vb) with s 6= γ
obtain the tuple (pida||pidb||Z, ui2) in H2-list
and the interest Ii identified with s
return sk = ui2 and Ii
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-SendReq(ΠsVa , X ||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb
||certb)
if s = γ then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
obtain the tuple(pida||pidb||Z, uα0) in H0-list
on condition that Auth0 = uα0
choose a fresh random number uα1
R
←− Z∗q
set Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z) = uα1
add (pida||pidb||Z, uα1) to H1-list
return Auth1
else if s 6= γ then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
obtain the tuple(pida||pidb||Z, ui0) in H0-list
on condition that Auth0 = ui0
choose random numbers uα1, uα2
R
←− Z∗q
set Auth1 = H1(pida||pidb||Z) = ui1
add (pida||pidb||Z, ui1) to H1-list
set session key sk = H2(pida||pidb||Z) = ui2
add (pida||pidb||Z, ui2) to H2-list
return Auth1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-SendReq(ΠsVa , init)
if s = γ then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
randomly choose an interest Iα ∈ I
obtain the tuple (Iα, rα, Hα) in H-list
compute X = rαxP , σa = ECDSA(I||X)
return I||X ||σa||pida||certa
else if s 6= γ then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
randomly choose Ii ∈ I, and xi ∈ Z∗q
obtain the tuple (Ii, ri, Hi) in H-list
compute X = xiHi, σa = ECDSA(I||X)
return I||X ||σa||pida||certa∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-Execute(ΠsVa,Vb)
successively simulate SendReq(ΠsVa , init),
SendRes(ΠsVb , I||X ||σa||pida||certa), and
SendReq(ΠsVa , X ||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
⊲ sim-Test(ΠsVa,Vb) with s = γ
randomly flip a coin β ∈ {0, 1}





Figure 6.3: Simulations of oracles in FLIP
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Proof. Since the adversary A can, with non-negligible advantage AdvβP(A), break the
proposed FLIP protocol, we can use A’s attack capabilities to construct another algorithm
B to solve the CDH problem. In specific, B is given a random instance of the CDH problem
(P, xP, yP ), where x, y ∈ Z∗q . Then, B runs A as a subroutine and simulates the attack
environment required by A.
At first, for each vehicle Vi ∈ {Va, Vb} involved in the FLIP protocol, B sets Vi’s pseudo-
ID pidi, generates valid key materials by choosing a random number x̃i ∈ Z
∗
q as the private
key, computes the corresponding public key Ỹi = x̃iP , as well as the certificate certi with
the resort of TA. Then, B interacts with A and simulates all the instances with queries of
oracles SendReq, SendRes, Execute, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test. In order to make use of A’s
attack capability, B first guesses γ such that A asks the Test query in the γ-th session.
Because there are total qs session instances, the probability for successful guessing γ is 1/qs.
Besides the above oracles, B should also simulates the random oracles H,H0,H1, and H2
by maintaining the lists H-list, H0-list, H1-list andH2-list to deal with the identical queries
as shown in Fig. 6.3.
After receiving uα2 from Test(Π
s
Va,Vb
), the adversary A guesses α′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} for
α and β ′ ∈ {0, 1} for β, and returns (α′, β ′) to B. Then, we analyze A’s successful guess
probability on α′ and β ′.
First, we consider the transcripts X = xH(Iα) and Y = yH(Iα) with unknown x, y ∈
Z∗q . Because G is a cyclic group, we can see there always exist other xi, yi ∈ Z
∗
q such that
X = xiH(Ii) and Y = yiH(Ii). Therefore, the transcripts (X, Y ) can be linked to each




AdvαP(A) = k · Pr[α = α
′]− 1 = 0, i.e., ε = 0
Second, we analyze the advantage probability AdvβP(A) on guessing the correct β,
where






Let E denote the event that pida||pidb||Z has been queried by A on H2 oracle, where
Z = rαxyP . If the event E does not occur, B has no idea on the session key sk, then we
have Pr[β ′ = β|¬E] = 1
2
, and
Pr[β = β ′] = Pr[β = β ′|E] · Pr[E] + Pr[β = β ′|¬E] · Pr[¬E]














Therefore, based on the above relations, we have
Pr[E] ≥ AdvβP(A)
Because H2-list contains qH2 entries, we can pick up the correct pida||pidb||Z, where Z =
rαxyP , with the success probability 1/qH2. Then, by computing Z/rα = xyP , where rα is
included in the entry (Iα, rα, Hα) in H-list, we can get the CDH challenge xyP . Combining
the probability 1/qs for guessing the correct γ, we have






In addition, we can obtain the claimed bound for τ ′ ≤ τ + Θ(.) in the above simulation.
In summary, the IP can be protected in FLIP. Thus, the proof is completed.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In the proposed FLIP protocol, to prevent successive-guessing attack from non-like-minded
vehicle, the responsor Vb is only allowed to respond once for the same request. Therefore,
the larger the Interest Set I = {I1, I2, · · · , Ik} that the requestor Va chooses, the harder the
actual interest Iα ∈ I can be guessed by non-like-minded vehicle, and thus the IP can be
protected. However, when the set I becomes large, multiple interests I ′ = {Iα, Iβ, Iγ, · · · }
of the like-minded vehicle Vb could belong to I. Then, it is hard for Vb to choose the correct
Iα ∈ I ′, which thus causes the long delay for finding the like-minded vehicle. Therefore, in
this section, we use a custom simulator built in Java to study how the interest set I affects
the delay for finding the like-minded vehicle on the road. In specific, the performance metric
used in the evaluation is the average delay for finding the like-minded vehicle, denoted by
FD, which is defined as the average time between when the requestor Va sends a request
and when Vb successfully finds a like-minded vehicle Vb on the road.
6.5.1 Simulation Settings
We consider a large number of vehicles V = {V1, V2, · · · } are moving on a multi-lane same-
direction road with velocity varying from 40 km/h to 80 km/h. Consider other vehicles
passing-by a vehicle Va ∈ V follows a Poisson process, and the inter-passing-by time ta
has an exponential distribution with the mean 1/λ. In the simulation, the vehicle Va will
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broadcast the request with Interest set I of different size |I| varying from 1 to 10, to find
the like-minded vehicle.
The detailed parameter settings in the simulations are summarized in Table 6.1. We
perform the simulations for the specified interest set size |I| varying from 1 to 10 with
increment of 1. For each case, we run the simulation 10,000 times, and the average FD is
reported.
Table 6.1: Simulation Settings in FLIP
Parameter Setting
Simulation area, duration a multi-lane same-direction road, 1 hour
Vehicle velocity, transmission 40 km/h - 80 km/h, 300 m
Mean passing-by rate λ [20/h, 40/h, 60/h, 80/h, 100/h, 120/h]
Interest set size |I| [1, 2, · · · , 10]































Figure 6.4: The average FD in different interest set size |I| within 1 hour
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6.5.2 Simulation Results
Fig. 6.4 shows the average FD under the different |I| and λ within 1 hour. From the figure,
we can see, the larger the |I|, the longer the average FD; but at the same time, the average
FD can be reduced with the increase of λ. Therefore, by setting a proper size of |I| on
considering of λ, a vehicle Va can find a like-minded vehicle within an expected time on
the road while keeping his IP from non-like-minded vehicles.
6.6 Generalization of FLIP
The goal of the proposed FLIP protocol is to exactly find a like-minded vehicle. However,
this kind of exact finding sometimes is not efficient, especially when the size of |I| is
large. To address this issue, we propose a lightweight Privacy-preserving Scalar Product
Computation (PPSPC) to generalize the FLIP.
Given an interest set I = {I1, I2, · · · , In}, each vehicle’s interest preferences can be
represented by a binary vector ~a = (a1, a2, · · · , an), where ai ∈ ~a indicates one interest,
i.e., ai = 1 if the vehicle has the corresponding interest, and ai = 0 otherwise. Now, assume
vehicles Va and Vb have their interest vectors ~a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) and ~b = (b1, b2, · · · , bn),
respectively. If the number of their common interests reaches a threshold τ , which can
be derived from ~a · ~b, they can launch vehicle chatting application on the road. In order
to compute ~a · ~b in a privacy-preserving way, Va and Vb can invoke our newly designed
lightweight PPSPC protocol in Algorithm 7. Since the PPSPC protocol ensures neither
Va nor Vb will disclose their interest preferences to each other during the computation of
~a · ~b, it can efficiently find like-mined vehicle in a privacy-preserving way. For example,
if the returned value ~a · ~b ≥ th, Va nor Vb can launch a chatting session. However, if the
returned value ~a · ~b < th, the common interests of Va nor Vb is not enough to launch a
session. Note that the threshold th is not fixed, it will vary with the road condition.
Correctness of PPSPC Protocol. The correctness of our proposed PPSPC protocol can
be clearly illustrated by the following typical example. Assume two binary vectors are
~a = (a1, a2, a3, a4, a5) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1) and ~b = (b1, b2, b3, b4, b5) = (1, 0, 1, 0, 1). After Step-1
is performed, we have C1 = α+c1+r1 ·β, C2 = α+c2+r2 ·β, C3 = c3+r3 ·β, C4 = c4+r4 ·β,
and C5 = α + c5 + r5 · β.
After Step-2 is executed, we have D1 = α
2 + c1 · α + r1 · α · β, D2 = α + c2 + r2 · β,




Based on the returned D and the secret K =
∑5
i=1 ki, the value of E can be calculated
in Step-3 as
E = D +K =
∑5
i=1(Di + ki)
= [α2 + c1 · (α− 1) + r1 · α · β + c1 + k1] + (α+
r2 · β + c2 + k2) + [c3 · (α− 1) + r3 · α · β + c3+
k3] + (r4 · β + c4 + k4) + [α2 + c5 · (α− 1)+
r5 · α · β + c5 + k5] mod β
= [α2 + c1 · (α− 1) + r1 · (α + 1) · β] + (r2 · 2 · β
+α) + [c3 · (α− 1) + r3 · (α + 1) · β] + r4 · 2 · β
+[α2 + c5 · (α− 1) + r5 · (α + 1) · β] mod β
= 2 · α2 + α + (c1 + c3 + c5) · (α− 1) mod β
(6.1)




i=1 ci, β > (n + 1) · α
2 = 6 · α2 when n = 5, the value
2 · α2 + α + (c1 + c3 + c5) · (α− 1)
< 2 · α2 + α +
∑5
i=1 ci · α < 2 · α
2 + α(1 + α− 5)
< 2 · α2 + α2 = 3 · α2 < β
(6.2)
Therefore, we can remove “ mod β” from Eq.(6.1) and have
E =2 · α2 + α + (c1 + c3 + c5) · (α− 1) mod β
=2 · α2 + α + (c1 + c3 + c5) · (α− 1)
(6.3)
Again, since α+ (c1 + c3 + c5) · (α− 1) < α2, we have






According to the line-19 in Algorithm 7, only when both ai and bi are 1, an α
2 can be
produced. Then, the coefficient of α2 is just the required scalar product ~a · ~b. As a result,
the correctness of PPSPC protocol is verified.
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Algorithm 7 Privacy-preserving Scalar Product Computation
1: procedure PPSPC Protocol
2: Input: Va’s binary vector ~a = (a1, a2, · · · , an) and Vb’s binary vector ~b = (b1, b2, · · · , bn), where
n ≤ 26
3: Output: The scalar product ~a · ~b =
∑n
i=0 ai · bi
—————————————————————————————–
4: Step-1: Va first does the following operations:
5: choose two large primes α, β, where α is of the length |α| = 256 bits and β > (n+ 1) · α2, e.g., the
length |β| > 518 bits if n = 26
6: set K = 0 and choose n positive random numbers (c1, c2, c3, · · · , cn) such that
∑n
i=1 ci < α− n
7: for each element ai ∈ ~a do
8: choose a random number ri, compute ri · β such that |ri · β| ≈ 1024 bits, and calculate ki =
ri · β − ci
9: if ai = 1 then
10: Ci = α+ ci + ri · β, K = K + ki
11: else if ai = 0 then
12: Ci = ci + ri · β, K = K + ki
13: end if
14: end for
15: keep (β,K) secret, and send (α,C1, C2, C3, · · · , Cn) to Vb
—————————————————————————————–
16: Step-2: Vb then executes the following operations:
17: for each element bi ∈ ~b do
18: if bi = 1 then
19: Di = α · Ci=
{
α2 + ci · α+ ri · α · β, if ai = 1;
ci · α+ ri · α · β, if ai = 0.
20: else if bi = 0 then
21: Di = Ci=
{
α+ ci + ri · β, if ai = 1;
ci + ri · β, if ai = 0.
22: end if
23: end for
24: compute D =
∑n
i=1 Di and return D back to Va
—————————————————————————————–
25: Step-3: Va continues to do the following operations:
26: compute E = D +K mod β
27: return E−(E mod α
2)
α2
as the scalar product ~a · ~b =
∑n
i=0 ai · bi
28: end procedure
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Extension of PPSPC protocol. Although Algorithm 7 deals with the PPSPC for binary
vectors, it can be easily extended for the general vector’s PPSPC. For example, to calculate
the PPSPC of the general vectors ~a = (a1, a2, · · · , an), ~b = (b1, b2, · · · , bn), where any
ai, bi ∈ Zm with 2 < m < 28, we only make the following modifications in Algorithm 7,
and its correctness can be easily verified as well.
5: choose two large primes α, β, where α is of the length |α| = 256 bits and β > (n ·m2 + 1) · α2
6: set K = 0 and choose n positive random numbers (c1, c2, c3, · · · , cn) such that m·
∑n
i=1 ci < α−m·n
9: if ai 6= 0 then
10: Ci = ai · α+ ci + ri · β, K = K + ki
18: if bi 6= 0 then
19: Di = bi · α · Ci
Comparison between the proposed PPSPC and Paillier Cryptosystem based PPSPC pro-
tocol. The currently popular Paillier Cryptosystem (PC)-based PPSPC is described as
follows. Given the Paillier cryptosystem E(x) = gxrN mod N2 [93], where N = pq and
the base g are public, Va keeps (p, q) secretly and performs the following steps with Vb: i)
for each element ai ∈ ~a = (a1, a2, · · · , an), Va first uses a random number ri to encrypt ai
as E(ai) = gairNi mod N
2. Then, Va sends E(~a) = (E(a1), E(a2), · · · , E(an)) to Vb; and ii)
after receiving E(~a) = (E(a1), E(a2), · · · , E(an)), Vb uses his vector ~b = (b1, b2, · · · , bn) to



























i=1 ai · bi)
≡ E(~a · ~b)
and returns E(~a · ~b) back to Va; iii) upon receiving E(~a · ~b), Va uses the secret (p, q) to
recover ~a · ~b from E(~a · ~b).
Computational and communication costs: For binary vectors (~a, ~b), Va should take at
least n exponentiations to compute E(~a). Then, Vb takes around (n− 1) multiplications to
calculate E(~a · ~b). Finally, Va takes one more exponentiation to recover ~a · ~b. Therefore,
the computational cost is around (n+1) ·exp+(n−1) ·mul. Note that, if (~a, ~b) are general
vectors, the computational cost should be (3n + 1) · exp + (n − 1) · mul. The security of
the Paillier cryptosystem relies on the unknown factorization of modulus N = pq. When
114
N = pq is set as 1024, each E(ai) and E(~a · ~b) will be expanded to 2048 bits, and then the
communication cost will be (n + 1) · 2048 bits.
Different from the PC-based PPSPC, the proposed lightweight PPSPC does not use
any “homomorphic encryption”, but is very efficient in terms of computational and com-
munication costs, i.e., the computational cost only takes 2n multiplications (mul), and the
communication cost is only (n+1) · 1024+256 bits. Let Tmul, Texp denote the time needed
to execute a modulus multiplication and a modulus exponentiation, respectively. When
we roughly estimate Texp ≈ 240Tmul [94], we use Fig. 6.5 to compare the computation and
communication costs of the proposed PPSPC protocol and the PC-based PPSPC protocol.
From the figure, we can obviously observe that our proposed PPSPC protocol is much effi-
cient, especially in computation costs. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed PPSPC
is the most efficient privacy-preserving scalar product computation protocol till now.




























































Figure 6.5: Comparisons between the proposed PPSPC and the PC-based PPSPC
6.7 Related Work
Recently, several research works have been reported [95, 96], which are closely related
to the proposed FLIP protocol, but focus on other scenarios different from VANETs.
Atallah and Du [95] present secure multi-party computation problems and several privacy-
preserving applications including privacy-preserving database query, intrusion detection,
data mining, and geometric computation. Although they take some initial attempts to
tackle these problems, their solutions are less than satisfactory because a semi-trusted
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third party is required to be involved in the privacy-preserving computations. Based on the
homomorphic encryption, Zhong et al. [96] propose three protocols called Louis, Lester and
Pierre to resolve the nearby friend problem, where a mobile user can determine whether
or not one of his friends is in a nearby location in a privacy-preserving way. However,
Louis still requires an online semi-trusted third party, and both Louis and Lester are
found insecure [97]. Recently, Chatterjee et al. [97] propose a new efficient protocol for
the nearby friend problem without resorting to a semi-honest third party. However, due
to lack of authentication, their protocol could suffer from replay attack and man-in-the-
middle attack, and thus cannot be directly applied in VANET scenarios. Different from the
above works, our proposed FLIP protocol can provide mutual authentication and establish
a shared session key between two like-minded vehicles. However, more importantly, it is a
provably secure protocol suitable for VANET scenarios.
6.8 Summary
Secure finding like-minded vehicles protocol (FLIP) can protect vehicle’s IP and is of vital
importance to the success of vehicle chatting application on the road, yet it has not been
paid enough attention in VANETs. In this chapter, based on the elliptic-curve technique,
we have proposed an efficient IP-preserving FLIP protocol. With the provable security
technique, the proposed FLIP protocol has been demonstrated to be secure in the VANET
scenarios. In addition, extensive simulations have also been conducted to its practical
considerations, i.e., how to balance the level of IP-preserving and the delay of finding
like-minded vehicles on the road. Because the proposed FLIP protocol keeps each other’s




Practical Incentive Protocol for
Vehicular DTNs
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we discussed privacy-preserving protocols for finding like-minded
vehicles in vehicular social networks. However, due to the resource constraints, some ve-
hicles could behavior selfishly in vehicle social networks. To address this issue, in this
chapter, we will present a practical incentive (Pi) protocol for packet forwarding applica-
tions in Vehicular DTNs [48].
The opportunistic data propagation in DTNs has been well studied so far, and several
efficient opportunistic routing protocols have been proposed under the hypothesis that
each individual DTN node is willing to forward bundles for others [98, 99, 100]. However,
when DTN nodes are controlled by rational entities, such as human or organization [101,
102], some DTN nodes will behave selfishly and may not be willing to help others to
forward bundles, so the hypothesis will be violated [103, 104]. For example, in order to
conserve power, buffer and computing resources, a selfish DTN node may be reluctant in
the cooperation that is not directly beneficial to it, which could make a well designed
opportunistic routing useless. Therefore, how to efficiently and effectively resolve the
selfishness problem in DTNs has become a very challenging issue to achieve better packet
delivery performance of DTNs.
To stimulate the possible selfish nodes to forward packets, many reputation-based and
credit-based incentive protocols for wireless ad hoc networks have been proposed [105,
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106, 107, 108, 109, 110]. However, due to the unique features of DTNs, such as the lack
of contemporaneous path and high variation in network conditions, it is hard to detect
DTN nodes’ selfish behaviors or predetermine a routing path. Therefore, these challenges
in DTNs make the existing incentive protocols, which usually rely on a contemporaneous
routing, not applicable to DTNs.
In this chapter, in order to improve the performance of DTNs in terms of high delivery
ratio and low average delay, we propose a Practical incentive (Pi) protocol to address the
selfishness problem in DTNs. In the proposed protocol, when the source DTN node sends
a bundle, it does not set a routing path in advance, but only needs to attach some incentive
on the bundle. Then, the selfish DTN nodes on the road could be stimulated to help with
forwarding the bundle to improve the delivery ratio and reduce the average delay of the
whole DTNs. Specifically, the contributions of this chapter are threefold.
• First, we provide a fair incentive model in which selfish DTN nodes are stimulated
to help forward bundles with credit-based incentive as well as reputation-based in-
centive. In the reward model, to achieve fairness, if and only if the bundles arrive
at the destination node, the intermediate forwarding nodes can get credits from the
source node. Furthermore, for the failure of bundle forwarding, those intermediate
forwarding nodes still can get good reputation values from a trusted authority (TA).
Therefore, with this stimulation, the packet delivery performance of DTNs can be
improved. To the best of our knowledge, no previously reported stimulation schemes
provide the fairness in DTNs.
• Second, in order to guarantee the feasibility of the fair incentive model, we use the
layered coin model [104, 28] and verifiably encrypted signature techniques [111, 112]
to provide authentication and integrity protection in the proposed Pi protocol.
• Third, to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed Pi protocol, we also develop a
custom simulator built in Java to substantially show that the proposed Pi protocol
can achieve the high delivery ratio and low average delay of DTNs when the high
incentive is provided.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we formalize
the network model, the node model, and identify the design goal. Then, we present the
Pi protocol in Section 7.3, followed by the security analysis and performance evaluation
in Section 7.4 and Section 7.5, respectively. We also review related work in Section 7.6.
Finally, we draw our summary in Section 7.7.
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7.2 Models and Design Goal
In this section, we formalize the network model, the node model, and identify the design
goal.
7.2.1 Network Model
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are typically characterized by the unguaranteed connec-
tivity and the low frequency of encounters between a given pair of nodes within the network
[60]. In our model, we consider a DTN as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V and E
represent the set of DTN nodes and opportunistic contact edges, respectively. In the DTN,
a source S can deliver packets to a destination D via the movement of DTN nodes with
proper data forwarding algorithm. Currently, contingent upon whether they allow multiple
copies of a message relaying within the network, the existing data forwarding algorithms
may be categorized into single-copy and multi-copy algorithms. In the single-copy algo-
rithm [100], only one copy is relayed in the network until it arrives at the destination.
While in the multi-copy algorithms, such as flooding or spray routing [98], more than one
copy are relayed in the networks. Due to large number of message copies in the networks,
this kind of approach consumes a high amount of resources which are scarce in DTNs. In
this work, in order to clearly illustrate the practical incentive, we just consider a single-
copy data forwarding algorithm, i.e., for each bundle B, only one copy is initially spread
by the source S, then the only copy is opportunistically relayed from one forwarding node
to another until its reaching the destination D.
7.2.2 Node Model
In DTNs, the selfish behaviors of DTN nodes are naturally caused by human entities who
control them [101, 102]. In our model, in order to study the selfish DTN nodes in a
non-abstract fashion, we take the vehicular ad hoc network as a concrete delay tolerant
network — vehicular DTN, where each DTN node is instantiated by vehicle driven by
people running in a city environment with some velocity. In the rest of this chapter, we
will use the terms “node” and “vehicle” interchangeably to refer to the same DTN entity.
In vehicular DTNs, each vehicle is equipped with On Board Unit (OBU) communication
device, which allows different vehicles to communicate with each other based on the 802.11p
protocol [14]. Note that the 802.11p physical layer offers different bitrates, ranging from
3 to 27 Mbps, from which OBU devices can choose [67]. Therefore, when two vehicles
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are within the transmission range, e.g., 300 meters, they can exchange bundles [14]. In
general, a vehicle is almost resource-unlimited, while the equipped OBU communication
device is considered resource-constrained, i.e., buffer and computation power constraints
[113]. Therefore, there may exist many selfish DTN nodes in the networks. In order to
conserve buffer space, these selfish DTN nodes may be very reluctant in the cooperation
that is not directly beneficial to them. As a result, the selfishness would be against the goal
of the vehicular DTN to cooperatively deliver a bundle from its source S to the destination
D. Therefore, the cooperation probability of a selfish DTN node can be modeled as follows
Pc = αPs + (1− α)Pu = αPs + 1− α (7.1)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the selfish factor, Ps < 1 is the cooperation probability under selfish
condition, i.e., Ps = 0.01, while Pu = 1 denotes the unselfish cooperation probability.
Clearly, if α = 0, a DTN node is unselfish, i.e., it is always willing to help with forwarding
with probability Pc = 1. On the contrary, if α = 1, the DTN node is selfish, the cooperation
probability is just Pc = Ps = 0.01. Therefore, the smaller the selfish factor α, the better
the cooperation in DTNs.
7.2.3 Design Goal
Our design goal is to develop a practical incentive protocol to stimulate the selfish DTN
nodes to improve the cooperation probability Pc in the networks. Specifically, the following
two desirable objectives will be achieved.
• Improving DTN’s performance with stimulation: In order to prevent the overall per-
formance degradation, i.e., low delivery ratio and high average delay, due to the
selfish DTN nodes in DTNs, the credit-based incentive strategy is adopted. Similar
to [104], the basic strategy is to provide incentives for intermediate forwarding DTN
nodes to faithfully forward bundles. Generally, the intermediate nodes will get paid
for bundle forwarding from the other nodes, and will take the same payment mech-
anism to pay for their bundle forwarding requests, by which the overall performance
(i.e., high delivery ratio and low average delay) of the DTNs can be assured.
• Fairness: In the practical incentive protocol, the fairness is also considered. Con-
cretely, the intermediate forwarding DTN nodes can receive credits if and only if the
destination node receives the bundles, which is fair to the source node. At the same
time, even though the bundles do not arrive at the destination, those intermediate
DTN nodes who participated in relaying still can get good reputation values for their
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cooperations. Because a good reputation can build other DTN nodes’ confidence in
helping forward the bundles (when the reputation value is higher than a reputation
threshold Rth), the fairness can further stimulate DTN nodes to improve the DTN’s
packet delivery performance.
Incentive Strategy
To achieve the above objectives, the following hybrid incentive strategy is adopted.
• There exists a trusted authority (TA) in the system similar to [110]. Although it
does not participate in bundle forwarding in DTNs, TA performs trusted fair credit
and reputation clearance for DTN nodes. Therefore, before joining the DTNs, each
DTN node should register itself to the TA and obtain its personal credit account
(PCA) and personal reputation account (PRA) in the initialization phase. Later,
when a DTN node has an available fast connection to the TA, it can report to the
TA for credit and/or reputation clearance [110]. For example, in the vehicular DTN,
a vehicle can communicate with TA for clearance when it makes contact with some
RoadSide Units (RSUs). For each DTN node, PCA stores its credits, while PRA
records its dynamic reputation value as follows: Let RIP (n−1) be the DTN node’s
reputation value at time Tn−1. Then, the new reputation value RIP (n) at time Tn
is formulated as RIP (n) = e
−λTi · RIP (n−1) + CTi , where Ti = Tn − Tn−1, λ is the
rate at which the reputation value would decrease, and CTi denotes the reputation
cumulative function, which is the summation of new gained reputation values in the
time period Ti.
• It is not mandatory for the intermediate DTN node to forward bundles. All inter-
mediate nodes in the DTN network can self-determine whether or not to participate
in bundle forwarding.
• However, once an intermediate DTN node participates in forwarding bundle, it can
get the credits from the source node as well as reputation values from the TA.
• If the bundle does not arrive at the destination node, the source node will not need
to pay credits. However, those intermediate nodes who helped forward can still get
good reputation values from the TA. Based on the above reputation calculation, if
no new reputation value is gained in Ti, i.e., CTi = 0, then RIP (n) = e
−λTi · RIP (n−1)
will decrease with the time. The larger the parameter λ, the quicker the reputation
value RIP (n) decreases. Therefore, in order to keep/increase good reputation values,
this fair incentive strategy is attractive to each DTN node.
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The design of reward calculation is the pivot of a practical incentive protocol, which
should guide the selfish DTN nodes to follow the protocol to help with forwarding bundles.
In the incentive model, the following reward calculation is exercised: once an intermediate
DTN node Ni helped forward a bundle for Disi distance, it can get a reward either Disi ·




Disi · CIP +Disi · RIP , if B arrives at D;
Disi · RIP , otherwise.
(7.2)
where CIP is a unit incentive credit provided by the source S, RIP is a fixed unit reputation
value defined by the TA for optimizing the network. Assume that CF is the unit resource
cost used for forwarding. We define the gaining factor of DTN node Ni as
ζi =











1, if RIP < Rth;
else if RIP ≥ Rth
1, αi − ζi ≤ 0;
(αi − ζi)Ps + 1− (αi − ζi), αi − ζi > 0.
end if
(7.4)
Then, with the cooperation probability Pc, the DTN node Ni is interested in helping
forward the bundle. Note that, when RIP ≥ Rth, different intermediate DTN node may
have different initial selfish factor αi. Therefore, to guarantee the success of stimulation
on all intermediate DTN nodes, the source S can choose a large CIP (i.e., large gaining
factor ζi) in its incentive policy such that each αi − ζi can be minimal. In addition, since
Rewardi is a linear increase function of Disi in Eq. (7.2), the longer the Disi, the more
the Rewardi. Therefore, the intermediate node is willing to forward the bundle as long as
possible.
Layered Coin Model
To guarantee the incentive strategy working well, the incentive must be secure. Therefore,
in the implementation, we use the layered coin to stimulate the bundle delivery [104, 28]. A
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typical layered coin usually consists of a base layer formed by the source node and multiple
endorsed layers formed by the intermediate nodes. Fig. 7.1 shows an example of layered
coin architecture, where (S, Ls), (D,Ld), (Ni, Li) are the source node and its location, the
destination node and its location, and the i-th intermediate node and the location that it
contacts with the i + 1-th node, respectively. IP is the incentive policy provided by the
source node S, TTL, TS, and Sigi refer to the time-to-live information, the timestamp,
and the signature, respectively. IP includes the source’s reputation value RIP signed by TA
and the incentive policy in this bundle packet forwarding, i.e., the incentive in Eq. (7.2),
and the signatures Sig0, Sig1, · · · can witness the cooperation among DTN nodes while
preventing possible malicious nodes from disrupting the system.
Overhead of layered coin. Except the signature fields, we assume the IP field is 64-
byte length, and all other fields are 8-byte length, then the overhead of a n-layered coin
is around 120 + 32 · n + |Sig| · (n + 2) bytes, where |Sig| denotes the length of adopted
signature.
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Figure 7.1: An example of layered coin architecture
7.3 Practical Incentive Protocol
In this section, we propose Pi protocol, which consists of four parts: system initialization,
bundle generation, bundle forwarding, and charging and rewarding.
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7.3.1 System Initialization
We assume that all DTN nodes N = {N1, N2, · · · } and TA are using the same suite of
system parameters. Given the security parameter k, the bilinear parameters (q, g,G,GT , e)
are first generated by running Gen(k). Then, a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
Z∗q and a secure symmetric encryption algorithm E() are chosen [51]. In the end, the system
parameter params = (q, g,G, GT , e, H, E) are published.
Each DTN node with a unique identity Ni ∈ N chooses a random number xi ∈ Z
∗
q as
its private key and computes the corresponding public key as yi = g
xi. At the same time,
each DTN node Ni ∈ N also registers its personal credit account (PCA) and personal
reputation account (PRA) to the TA. Note that, all public keys in the system should be
certified by public key certificates issued by certificate authority (CA). In addition, each
DTN node’s reputation value RIP during a period is signed by TA and anyone can check
it.
7.3.2 Bundle Generation
When a source node S with the private-public key pair (xs, ys = g
xs) at location Ls wants
to send a bundle m to the destination node D with the key pair (xd, yd = g
xd) at location
Ld, S will run the following steps.
Step 1. Compute the static shared key ksd = y
xs
d = g
xsxd between S and D, and encrypt
the bundle m into B = Eksd(m) to achieve confidentiality.
Step 2. Determine a proper incentive policy (IP) as in Eq. (7.2), and make a verifiably
encrypted signature σ0 on M0 = S||Ls||D||Ld||IP ||TTL and B as σ0 = y
(H(M0||B)+xs)−1
d .
When an intermediate node N1 is interested in the IP and willing to forward the bundle
to a possible location L1, it first checks the source’s reputation value RIP and verifies the
validity of σ0 with the equation e(σ0, g
H(M0||B) · ys)
?
= e(yd, g). If the source’s reputation is
acceptable, i.e., RIP ≥ Rth, and the equation holds, N1 signs σ∗1 = g
(H(M0||N1||Ls||TS)+x1)−1
as an Interest Acknowledgement (ACK), and sends σ∗1 and L1 to the source node S. After
receiving σ∗1 and L1, the source node S runs the next steps.




e(g, g). If it holds, S makes the signature σ1 onM0||N1||Ls||TS as σ1 = g(H(M0||N1||Ls||TS)+xs)
−1
.
Otherwise, S neglects the ACK.
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Step 4. Set the base layer as BL = (M0||σ0||N1||TS ||σ1) and forward the bundle B
together with the base layer BL to the intermediate node N1 as follows
S → N1 : B,BL (7.5)
After verifying σ1 = g




e(g, g), N1 begins to forward the bundle.
7.3.3 Bundle Forwarding
When approaching to the location L1, the intermediate node N1 considers it cannot carry
the bundle B close to the destination node D any more and forwards the bundle to the
next-hop DTN node by running the Algorithm 8. Likewise, each subsequent forwarding
node also uses the Algorithm 8 to forward the bundles. Without loss of generality, the
bundle B finally arrives at the destination node D by opportunistic bundle forwarding
with the routing S → N1 → N2 → · · · → Nl → D, as shown in Fig. 7.2. In the following,











Figure 7.2: An opportunistic routing in DTN
At the location Li, the intermediate node Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, is ready to forward the
bundle to the next-hop node Ni+1, the following steps are executed.
Step 1. When the intermediate node Ni+1 is interested in forwarding the bundle B, it
first checks the source S’s reputation value embedded in IP and the validity of (σ0, · · · , σi).






as an ACK to the Ni.
Step 2. After receiving the ACK σ∗i+1, the intermediate node Ni checks
e(σ∗i+1, g)
?








Algorithm 8 Bundle forwarding
1: Data: When approaching to the location L1, the node N1 sets a holding time to wait next-hop node
(Th), and tries to forward the bundle B to the next-hop DTN node within Th
2: procedure Bundle forwarding
3: if a DTN node N2 is interested in forwarding within Th then
4: N1 checks the possible location L2 that N2 can carry the bundle B to
5: if location L2 is closer to the destination D than L1 then
6: N1 forwards the bundle B to N2
7: else
8: N1 continues to wait other DTN node which is interested in forwarding
9: end if
10: else
11: when there is no DTN node which is interested in forwarding the bundle at location L1, N1 has
to drop the bundle packet, since the next-hop route is not immediately available
12: end if
13: end procedure






and sets the i-th endorsed layer as ELi = (Ni||Li ||Ni+1||TS ||σi+1) and forwards the bundle
packet B to the next node Ni+1 as follows
Ni → Ni+1 : B,BL,EL1, · · · ,ELi (7.9)
Step 3. After verifying the validity of σi+1 by checking
e(σi+1, g)
?







the intermediate node Ni+1 forwards the bundle packet B.
At the location Ld, the last intermediate node Nl forwards the bundle (B,BL,EL1, · · · ,
ELl−1) to the destination node D. After the destination node D checks the signatures










and sends σl+1 back to the last intermediate node Nl. After verifying the validity of σl+1
by checking e(σl+1, g
H(M0||B) · ys)
?
= e(g, g), Nl can submit (σ0, · · · , σl+1) to the TA for
clearance in the future.
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7.3.4 Charging and Rewarding
When the last intermediate node Nl has an available fast connection to the TA, Nl reports
(σ1, · · · , σl) to the TA, then the TA performs the fair credit and reputation clearance as
the following steps.
Step 1. TA checks the freshness and the validity of (σ0, · · · , σl+1). If they are fresh
and valid, TA continues; otherwise terminates the operation.
Step 2. Based on the locations (Ls, L1, · · · , Ll, Ld) in the signatures, TA measures the
actual relay distance of each intermediate node. Then, according to the incentive policy in
IP , TA stores the merited credits and reputation values in each intermediate node’s PCA
and PRA, and withdraws the corresponding credit values from the source node’s PCA, as
shown in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 Credit and reputation clearance
1: Data: The TA obtains valid signatures (σ1, · · · , σl) from the last intermediate node Nl
2: procedure Credit and reputation clearance
3: get the location information (Ls, L1, · · · , Ll, Ld) from these signatures
4: measure each intermediate node Ni’s actual relay distance Disi, where Dis1 = |L1 − Ls|, Disl =
|Ld − Ll| and Disi = |Li − Li−1|, where 2 ≤ i ≤ l
5: for i = 0 to l do
6: according to the incentive policy in IP , withdraw Ci = Li×CIP from the source node S’s PCA,
and store the merited credits Ci in Ni’s PCA
7: store Ri = Disi ×RIP reputation values in Ni’s PRA based on the reputation calculation
8: end for
9: end procedure
If the bundle packet does not arrive at the destination node D, each intermediate
node Ni ∈ N , which helped forwarding, still can get the good reputation value by sub-
mitting σi and σ
∗











1 , TA can compute the
relay distance, and store the merited reputation values to Ni’s PRA.














Algorithm 10 Reputation clearance
1: Data: The TA obtains valid signatures (σi, σ
∗
i+1) from the intermediate node Ni
2: procedure Reputation clearance
3: get the location information LNi−1 in σi and LNi in σ
∗
i+1
4: measure the intermediate node Ni’s actual relay distance Disi = |Li − Li−1|































Similarly, the correctness of σ∗i can also be checked. Then, due to the hybrid incentives, the
DTN nodes will be stimulated to faithfully forward the bundles to the destination nodes
in a cooperative fashion.
Communication Overhead. Similar to the BLS signature [114], each signature σi, i =
0, 1, · · · , can be implemented as short as 160 bits ( = 20 bytes). Then, the overhead of
l-layered coin is 160+ 52 · l bytes. When l = 20 is assumed, the overhead of layered coin is
only 1, 200 bytes (≈ 1.17 Kb). Assume each bundle is 2 Mb or more, then the overhead of
layered coin is much smaller than 2 Mb and acceptable for providing security in vehicular
DTNs.
Aggregation and Batch Verification. In the proposed Pi protocol, each signature’s sign-
ing cost is very low, only exponentiation operation is required. However, since the verifica-
tion requires pairing operation, the computation cost becomes a little higher, but still less
than 20 ms [14]. In order to further reduce the communication and computation overheads,
the signatures σ2, σ3, · · · , σl in the proposed Pi protocol can be aggregated as





Then, the aggregated signature σ can be batch-verified as

















Clearly, the correctness of Eq. (7.16) directly follows from Eq. (7.14). Because the sig-
natures σ0, σ1 are provably secure in the random oracle model [111, 112] and the CDH
problem is also assumed hard in G, the signature in Eq. (7.14) is secure. Then, the se-
curity of σ =
∑l−1
i=1 σi+1 also follows. More details on security proof of σ can be found in
[111, 112].
7.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss security issues of the proposed Pi protocol, i.e., the fairness issue
in stimulation, the free ride attack [115], the layer removing attack [104], and the layer
adding attack. Note that, since the proposed Pi protocol only deals with the selfish DTN
nodes in DTNs, other attacks launched by malicious DTN nodes are out of the scope of
this chapter.
• The proposed Pi protocol provides fair incentive. In the charging and rewarding
phase, if i) a bundle is really relayed to the destination node, the source node S will pay
credits to those intermediate nodes for forwarding. However, if ii) the bundle fails to
reach the destination node, the source node S will not pay any credits. Therefore, it is
fair to the source node. For the intermediate nodes, although they cannot get credits for
their forwarding in case ii), they still can increase their good reputation values from the
TA. When the gaining factor ζi is large, those intermediate nodes still feel fair for bundle
forwarding. In addition, since the provably secure short signature schemes are employed
[111, 112], the authentications from the signatures can provide strong witnesses. If an
intermediate node didn’t participate in forwarding, it cannot get any reward. Therefore,
from the above analysis, the proposed Pi protocol can provide fair incentive in the DTN
network.
• The proposed Pi protocol is resistent to the free riding attack. The free riding at-
tack is a notorious selfish attack in DTN, which is conducted by two selfish DTN nodes
that attempt to exchange messages without paying their credits [115]. If these two DTN
selfish nodes are neighbor, this attack makes no sense, since they can directly exchange
messages without the aid of others. When there is at least one normal node residing be-
tween them, launching such an attack is possible. Assume that the intermediate node Ni
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wants to send message m′ to Ni+2 by piggybacking it with the forwarded bundle packet
(B,BL,EL1, · · · ,ELi). Since the signature σ0 = y
(H(M0||B)+xs)−1
d can provide the integrity
protection on (M0,B), the free riding message m
′ will not pass the verification equation.
Thus, the intermediate node Ni+1 can detect the free riding message m
′ and delete it be-
fore passing the bundle message to the node Ni+2. As a result, the proposed Pi protocol
is resistant to the free riding attack in the DTN network.
• The proposed Pi protocol is resistent to the layer removing attack. The layer remov-
ing attack [104] refers to i) a selfish intermediate node removes previous layers on the
forwarding path or ii) two selfish intermediate nodes remove the layers between them to
maximize their credits. However, this attack can be thwarted by the proposed Pi proto-
col. In the bundle forwarding phase in Section 7.3.3, each intermediate node Ni holds two
valid witnesses σi and σ
∗




1 is signed by Ni−1,




1 is signed by Ni+1. Note that, the first intermedi-
ate node N1 gets the witness σ1 = g
(H(M0||N1||Ls||TS)+xs)−1 from the source node, and the
last intermediate node Nl gets the witness σl+1 from the destination node. If a selfish
intermediate node Ni launches the first kind of removing layer attack, after removing the
previous layers, it cannot get σi = g
(H(M0||Ni||Ls||TS)+xs)
−1
from the source node. Therefore,
it can be detected. If two selfish intermediate nodes launch the second kind of removing
layer attack, those removed intermediated nodes can provide their witnesses to prove their
participation. Thus, the selfish nodes will also be detected, and their reputation values
will decrease.
A special removing layer attack, as shown in Fig. 7.3, is the last intermediate node Nl
colludes with the source node S to remove all previous layers for enabling the source node
to pay less rewarding credits. However, this special attack is still hard to launch. This is
because the source node S does not know the last intermediate node Nl in advance in the




cannot deny its signing on σ1 = g
(H(M0||N1||Ls||TS)+xs)−1 . Therefore, the selfish behaviors of
S and Nl in this special case can also be detected.
• The proposed Pi protocol is resistent to the layer adding attack. If a system allows a
DTN node with multiple identities, then the layer adding attack could be launched. The
layer adding attack refers to a selfish intermediate node with multiple identities adds some
additional layers with its different identities on i) the same forwarding path or ii) detour
the forwarding path to maximize its credits, as shown in Fig. 7.3. However, in the proposed
Pi protocol, the Rewardi = Disi · CIP + Disi · RIP increases linearly with Disi. If these
additional layers do not enlarge the actual distance Disi as in case i), the selfish node



















Figure 7.3: Layer removing / adding attacks in DTN
forwarding nodes Ni∗ , Ni+, Ni− are the same node Ni at charging and rewarding phase,
since the trusted authority TA knows all DTN node’s PCA and PRA. In our system, since
one DTN node holds only one unique identifer, and multiple identities are not allowed,
this attack is prevented. Note that in DTN network, more than one DTN nodes collude
with each other to launch layer adding attack is a malicious attack, how to resist it is still
a challenging issue.
7.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed Pi protocol using a custom
simulator built in Java. The performance metrics used in the evaluation are i) the delivery
ratio, which is the fraction of generated messages that are correctly delivered to the final
destination within a given time period; 2) the average delay, which is defined as the average
time between when a message is generated at some source and when it is successfully
delivered to its destination. Both delivery ratio and average delay can be used to examine
the ability of the proposed Pi protocol with some incentive strategy to deliver the bundle
to the destination within a specified period.
7.5.1 Simulation Settings
In the simulations, total n DTN nodes with a transmission radius of 300 meters are first
uniformly deployed in an area of 6,000 m × 15,000 m, as shown in Fig. 7.4, to simulate a
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sparse vehicular DTN.
Mobility model. In vehicular DTNs, the performance of bundle forwarding is highly
contingent upon the mobility of vehicles. Since vehicles are usually driven along the roads
in a city, we assume each DTN node follows the shortest path map based movement routing.
Specifically, each vehicle first randomly chooses a destination in the area, and gets there
using the shortest route with the average velocity v. After reaching the destination, with







Figure 7.4: Vehicular DTN considered for simulation
Selfish ratio. Let ρ = the number of selfish DTN nodes
the total number of DTN nodes
be the selfish ratio (SR) among these
DTN nodes, which usually is a variable based on how many DTN nodes that behave
selfishly in the network [116]. Once a DTN node is selfish, then according to Eq. (7.4), it
may refuse to forward the bundle packets if the gaining factor ζ is less than its selfish factor
α when RIP ≥ Rth. However, with some incentives, i.e., the gaining factor ζ in Eq. (7.4) is
increased, the selfish node may faithfully forward. Note that, in our simulation, we do not
consider the case that RIP < Rth. The reason is that, when RIP < Rth, the selfish nodes
will faithfully forward the bundles, which is equivalent to lowering the selfish ratio ρ in the
simulation.
The detailed parameter settings in the simulations are summarized in Table 7.1. We
perform the experiments for the specified period varying from 1 hour to 12 hours with
increment of 1 hour. For each case, we run the simulation 10 times, and the average
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delivery ratio and average delay are reported.
Table 7.1: Simulation Settings in Pi
Parameter Setting
Simulation area, duration 6, 000 m × 15, 000 m, 12 hours
DTN nodes
Number n = 60, 120
Velocity v = 40± 5km/h, 80± 5km/h
Transmission range, buffer size 300 m, 20 Mb
Mobility model shortest path map based movement
Holding time to wait next node Th = 3 minutes
Selfish factor of each DTN node α ∈ [0.2, 0.8]
Selfish ratio (SR) ρ = [0, , 60%, 90%]
Bundle messages
Generation interval, size, TTL 120± 20 s, 2± 0.5 Mb, 12 hours
Gaining factor of each bundle ζ = 0, 0.4 ∼ 0.5, 0.7 ∼ 0.8
7.5.2 Simulation Results
In Fig. 7.5, we compare the delivery ratio of the sampled DTN in different incentive policies,
i.e., without incentive ζ = 0, with low incentive ζ ∈ [0.4, 0.5] and with high incentive
ζ ∈ [0.7, 0.8], under different selfish ratio ρ = 0, 60%, 90%. From the figure, we can see
the delivery ratio without incentive is very low, especially when the selfish ratio ρ = 90%.
The reason is that many selfish DTN nodes move around the network, then there exist
many dropping events in which when a forwarding node seeks a next forwarding node
at some location but only meets selfish nodes who are not willing to forward, the bundle
message has to be dropped, since the next hop is not immediately available due to the
selfishness. Therefore, Fig. 7.5 shows that the larger the selfish ratio ρ, the more the
dropping events take place and the lower the delivery ratio. On the other hand, when
the network is stimulated with some incentive, the delivery ratio will increase. Because
different selfish node has different selfish factor, the same incentive cannot satisfy all selfish
nodes’ stimulation conditions in Eq. (7.4). Therefore, there still exists a small fraction of
selfish nodes. Intuitively, when the incentive is higher, the fraction of selfish nodes becomes
smaller. By observing the figure, this intuition is corroborated, where the delivery ratio
with high incentive is much higher than that with low incentive, and almost approaches to
that with no selfish nodes, i.e., ρ = 0, in the DTN. Therefore, we can be sure that, when
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ρ = 60%, ζ = 0
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
(a) Group 1: n = 60, v = 40± 5km/h





















ρ = 60%, ζ = 0
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
(b) Group 2: n = 60, v = 80± 5km/h





















ρ = 60%, ζ = 0
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
(c) Group 3: n = 120, v = 40± 5km/h





















ρ = 60%, ζ = 0
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
(d) Group 4: n = 120, v = 80± 5km/h
Figure 7.5: Delivery ratio varies with the specified period from 1 hour to 12 hours
134
choosing a proper incentive, the proposed Pi protocol can effectively stimulate the selfish
nodes and improve the performance the DTN network in terms of high delivery ratio.
We further compare the delivery ratios in Group 1 and Group 2 in terms of different
velocity. From the comparisons, we can see the delivery ratios in Group 2 are higher than
those in Group 1. The reason is that the faster the velocity v, the more chances a DTN node
can contact with other unselfish DTN nodes in time period Th. As a result, the number
of dropping events becomes small, and the delivery ratio increases. We also compare the
delivery ratios in Group 1 and Group 3 in terms of different number of DTN nodes, and the
comparisons show that the increase of DTN node’s number will bring a positive affect on
the delivery ratios. When the total number of DTN nodes increases, the density of unselfish
DTN nodes subsequently increases. Then, a DTN node has more chances to contact with
other unselfish DTN nodes, and the delivery ratio increases. The high delivery ratios in
Group 4 with n = 120, v = 80± 5 km/h further confirm our observations.

























ρ = 60%, ζ = 0
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 60%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.4 ∼  0.5
ρ = 90%, ζ = 0.7 ∼  0.8
Figure 7.6: Average delay within 12 hours with different parameter settings
Fig. 7.6 depicts the average delay with 12 hours with different parameter settings.
From the figure, we can see when there exist selfish nodes in DTN network, the average
delay will decrease. The higher the selfish ratio ρ, the longer the average delay. However,
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when the network is stimulated with some incentive, the average delay will decrease quickly.
Especially, when the high incentive is exercised, i.e., the gaining factor ζ is around 0.7 ∼ 0.8,
the average delays can approach to that with no selfish nodes, i.e., ρ = 0, in the DTN
network. In addition, comparing the average delays in Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4, when the
number of DTN nodes n and/or the velocity v increase, the average delay can be further
reduced.
7.6 Related Work
In DTNs, the lack of contemporaneous routing and high variation in network conditions
make the selfishness problem very different from the one in traditional wireless ad hoc net-
work, and many existing incentive solutions can not be directly applied to DTNs. Recently,
two research works on incentive-aware routing in DTNs have been appeared [103, 104],
which are closely related to the proposed Pi protocol.
In [103], Shevade et al. first study the impact of selfish behaviors in DTNs. Based
on the simulation results, they show that the presence of selfish DTN nodes can greatly
degrade total delivered traffic. To mitigate the damage caused by selfish DTN nodes, they
use the pair-wise tit-for-tat (TFT) as a simple, robust and practical incentive mechanism
for DTNs, and develop an incentive-aware routing protocol that allows selfish DTN nodes
to maximize their individual utilities while conforming to TFT constraints. Extensive
simulation results are given to show that the TFT mechanism can increase total delivered
traffic in the whole DTN network. Although Shevade et al.’s scheme is the first practical
incentive-aware routing scheme for DTNs, the security issues lying in the incentive-based
DTNs are not addressed in the work. In [104], Zhu et al. propose a secure multilayer
credit-based incentive (SMART) scheme for DTNs affiliated with selfish nodes. In SMART,
layered coins are used to provide incentives to selfish DTN nodes for bundle forwarding. In
addition, compared with Shevade et al.’s scheme, several security issues lying in DTNs, i.e.,
credit forgery attack, nodular tontine attack, and submission refusal attack, are addressed
in the SMART protocol, and the corresponding countermeasures are also briefly discussed.
Different from the SMART protocol, the proposed Pi protocol focuses on the fairness
issue in DTNs. Specifically, we propose a hybrid (credit plus reputation) incentive model
with verifiably encrypted signature technique to stimulate the selfish DTN nodes to help
forward bundles. To achieve fairness, if and only if the bundles arrive at the destination
node, the intermediate forwarding nodes can get credits from the source node. Furthermore,
for the failure of bundle forwarding, those intermediate DTN nodes still can get good
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reputation values from the trusted authority. Therefore, DTN nodes will be more confident
in participating in bundle forwarding.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a practical incentive (Pi) protocol to stimulate selfish
nodes in order to cooperate in forwarding bundle packets in vehicular DTNs. By adopting
the proper incentive policy, the proposed Pi protocol can not only improve the whole vehicle
DTN network’s performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low average delay but also
achieve the fairness among DTN nodes. Detailed security analyses have shown that the
proposed Pi protocol can resist most attacks launched by selfish DTN nodes. In addition,
extensive simulations have been conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed




Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize our contributions in this thesis, propose our future research
work, and give our final remarks.
8.1 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• First, a novel social based privacy-preserving packet forwarding protocol, called
SPRING, is proposed for vehicular DTNs, which is characterized by deploying RSUs
at high social intersections to assist in packet forwarding between vehicles by tem-
porarily storing packets through V-2-I communication during the period when the
proper next-hop vehicles of these packets are not available. With such kind of RSU
assistance, the probability of packet drop is reduced and as a result high reliability of
packet forwarding in vehicular DTNs can be achieved. In addition, SPRING can also
achieve conditional privacy preservation and resist most attacks existing in vehicular
DTNs, such as packet analysis attack, packet tracing attack, and black (grey) hole
attacks.
• Second, based on the “Sacrificing the Plum Tree for the Peach Tree” — one of the
Thirty-Six Strategies of Ancient China, a socialspot-based packet forwarding (SPF)
protocol for protecting receiver-location privacy, called SPF, is proposed for VANETs.
Detailed security analysis on SPF has shown that, only when a receiver sacrifices one
socialspot that it often visits, all its other sensitive locations can be protected against
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an external, global, passive adversary. In addition, through extensive performance
evaluation, we have demonstrated that the temporarily storing packets at socialspots
can achieve much better efficiency in terms of delivery ratio and average delay in
VANETs.
• Third, to facilitate vehicles to achieve high-level location privacy in VANETs, an
effective pseudonyms changing at social spots strategy, called PCS, is proposed, where
we have developed two anonymity set analytical models in terms of ASS to formally
analyze the achieved location privacy level, and used game theoretic techniques to
prove its feasibility. In addition, we introduced a practical KPSD model to mitigate
the hazards caused by vehicle theft. Our analytical models on location privacy at
social spot shed light on this research line.
• Fourth, to address the privacy issues in vehicle chatting application in vehicular social
networks, an efficient privacy-preserving finding like-minded vehicle protocol, called
FLIP, is proposed, which allows two vehicles with the common interest to identify
each other and establish a shared session key, and at the same time, protects their
Interest-Privacy (IP) from other vehicles who do not have the same interest on the
road. To generalize the FLIP protocol, a lightweight privacy-preserving scalar prod-
uct computation (PPSPC) protocol is also proposed, which, compared with previous
PPSPC protocols, is more efficient in terms of computation and communication over-
heads.
• Fifth, to stimulate selfish nodes to cooperate in forwarding bundle packets in vehicular
DTNs, a practical incentive protocol, called Pi, is proposed. By adopting the proper
incentive policy, the proposed Pi protocol can not only improve the whole vehicle
DTN network’s performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low average delay
but also achieve the fairness among DTN nodes. Detailed security analyses have
shown that the proposed Pi protocol can resist most attacks launched by selfish
DTN nodes. In addition, extensive simulations have been conducted to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed Pi protocol.
8.2 Future Work
Our research has already made significant progress in secure vehicular social networks.
However, since vehicular social network is a promising platform in pervasive environments,
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there still exist several research directions to be explored to complement this thesis. There-
fore, the following two research topics will be investigated as a continuation of my Ph.D.
thesis work.
• Privacy-Preserving Communications with Blacklists for Vehicular Social Networks:
In privacy-preserving communications, once the misbehaviors caused by users are
detected by system manager, tracing those unique identifiers and revoking their legit-
imate authority seem to be an ideal method and a natural consequence for maintain-
ing the network working. However, in vehicular social network, the high dynamical
topology and limited resource deployed on each vehicle may lead to the malfunctions
on communication with some vehicles temporarily. As a result, those vehicles should
not be considered as malicious ones and immediate revocation by system manager
is not fair towards them. Moreover, if defining malfunction equals to misbehavior in
a highly dynamic network, such as vehicular social network, the valid vehicles may
become less and less, and eventually the network may collapse. Therefore, as one
of our future works, for vehicular social networks, we propose a privacy-preserving
communications with blacklists as follows
1. For each vehicle, it maintains a blacklist which records all the identifiers of
vehicles they cannot communicate successfully in previous period. From the
vehicle’s view, those vehicles on the blacklist are considered as malicious ones
for this specific period and it will not communicate with them during this period.
2. For system manager, it will periodically collect the blacklists from all the vehi-
cles. If one’s appearing times on different blacklists exceeds a preset threshold,
the system manager will revoke the legitimate authority; otherwise, this vehi-
cle’s behavior is recognized as malfunction and the system manager will clarify
its validity.
With implementation of such concept in vehicular social networks, the communica-
tion between vehicles becomes more reliable from the whole system and meanwhile
the personal blacklist does help for improving the local efficiency by avoiding the
time delay caused by malfunction.
• Supporting Reputation-Based Trust in Privacy-Preserving Vehicular Social Networks:
Based on the first future work, each vehicle could maintain a blacklist which is
helpful for selecting nearby trusted peers. In addition, the vehicles are more likely
to share their blacklists with others in vehicular social networks. Then, the so-called
blacklist can be regarded as a list of trust value of contacted vehicles instead of those
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malicious ones. Such distributed reputation-based scheme could help the system
exclude misbehaviors more effectively, i.e., the vehicular communication could be
made of more reliable vehicles. Moreover, the scheme should also provide privacy-
preserving for each vehicle, which may lead more challenge in designing reputation-
based mechanism.
8.3 Final Remarks
In this thesis, we have presented a suite of security and privacy-preserving protocols for
secure vehicular social networks. In addition, we have also identified two future research
topics to complement of this thesis. To facilitate our research accomplishments and findings
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